“Legitimate purpose” jury instruction in an aggravated stalking case; People v Coones; Sufficiency of the evidence; MCL 750.411i; Threatening or harassing conduct; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a meritless argument; Adequate preparation

The court rejected defendant’s jury instruction and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and held that there was sufficient evidence to support the aggravated stalking convictions. Defendant (who uses they/them pronouns) was previously married to one of the complainants and they share a child. The communications giving rise to this case were “in contravention of a court order and personal protection orders (PPOs).” Defendant first contended “the trial court erred by omitting a specific instruction regarding communications relating to parental rights as exceptions to harassment and as constituting legitimate purposes.” But the record showed the trial court gave “the standard jury instructions, including all elements of aggravated stalking, and instructed that each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [It] further instructed on the definition of harassment and the statutory exceptions, including constitutionally protected activity and conduct serving a legitimate purpose.” Thus, the court found “the jury received legally sufficient instructions.” The court rejected defendant’s claim “that their communications served a legitimate purpose—namely, to pursue a relationship with their daughter, demonstrate mental fitness, and address alleged interference with parental rights[,]” concluding that “the conduct at issue was not concerning any of those issues but rather was clearly in violation of a no-contact order and valid PPOs.” It determined this case was analogous to Coones “as defendant’s conduct was likewise clearly illegitimate because it contravened both PPOs issued at the behest of the complainants and the district court’s” no-contact order. It found that the majority of the “communications were wholly unrelated to parental rights,” that none of them “were for purposes of parenting time or related to concerns about” the child, and that the threats did “not constitute constitutionally protected speech, as true threats fall outside the ambit of First Amendment protections.” The court also held that the prosecution presented “ample evidence that a reasonable person would have perceived defendant’s conduct as threatening or harassing.” Affirmed.