Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Due process; In re VanDalen; MCR 3.965(B); Notice; Suspension of visitation; MCR 3.965(C)(7)(a); MCL 712A.13a(13); Expert qualification; MRE 702; Hearsay; Out-of-court statement used to explain its effect on the listener; Reasonable reunification efforts; A respondent’s commensurate responsibility to participate; In re Frey; Dispositional order as to parenting time; MCL 712A.18(1)(p); In re Ott; Child’s best interests; Consideration of relative placement; In re Olive/Metts

In these consolidated appeals, the court held in respondent-mother’s appeal that her due process rights were not violated and that the trial court did not err in finding the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts. In respondent-father’s appeal it held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § (c)(i) existed, that reasonable reunification efforts were made, and that terminating his parental rights was in his child’s (MH) best interests. As to the due process claims, the court first concluded that the trial “court was permitted to conduct the preliminary hearing in [the] mother’s absence under MCR 3.965(B)(1) because it found that notice was given.” She did not establish “that her due-process rights were violated by her absence at the [6/24/24] hearing when the [trial] court conducted the hearing as permitted by MCR 3.965(B)[.]” As to her claims related to the conduct of the adjudication trial, among other things the court held that because a therapist “clearly qualified as an expert under MRE 702,” the mother could not show the trial “court erred in permitting her to testify as such.” As to her reunification efforts argument, the court found that any “delay in the provision of services that resulted from [her] lack of participation does not indicate that DHHS failed in its duty to provide her those services.” Turning to the father’s appeal, it first rejected his challenge to the finding that § (c)(i) warranted termination, concluding the record did not support his assertion that he made ongoing, “meaningful progress on each of the issues identified by DHHS[.]” It held that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that domestic violence and substance abuse continued to be barriers to reunification. The court also found that parenting “time was appropriately suspended because the visits were harmful to MH.” And the trial court “appropriately considered the facts that weighed both for and against termination.” While the parent-child bond weighed against it, many of the other factors, such as the “father’s failure to adhere to and benefit from the case service plan, the advantages of MH’s foster-care placement, and the possibility of adoption, weighed in favor of termination.” Affirmed in both appeals.