Custody modification; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Proper cause or change of circumstances; Established custodial environment (ECE); The statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Factors (c), (i), & (l); Legal custody; MCL 722.26a(1)(b); Parenting time; MCL 722.27a(1) & (7)

Holding that the trial court clearly erred in maintaining “an untenable status quo[,]” the court reversed the order denying plaintiff-mother’s motion for sole legal custody of the parties’ child and restrictions on defendant-father’s parenting time, and remanded. The “child has identified as female since the child was a toddler despite having been born with male anatomy.” The court first found that to the extent the trial court determined “there was not proper cause or a change of circumstances necessitating a review of the custody arrangement, this finding was against the great weight of the evidence.” Even if there was not a change of circumstances, it was “undeniable from the record that the current arrangement is not working, and this is proper cause.” The court noted the child had been taken to the ER “three times due to suicidal ideation, and suicidal ideation was regularly documented at school. The child’s thoughts continued to escalate, and the child was eventually hospitalized for six days. The parents were perpetually unable to agree on how to proceed, with plaintiff[] advocating for gender-affirming care while defendant[] insisted on providing an ‘alternate path.’” The court rejected plaintiff’s contention the trial court erred in finding an ECE, but concluded it abused its discretion by not granting her sole legal custody. The court determined the trial court made findings as to MCL 722.23(c) and (l), and MCL 722.26a(1)(b), that were against the great weight of the evidence. The “record overwhelmingly established that plaintiff[] had a significantly greater disposition to provide the child with medical care.” The evidence suggested defendant “lacked insight into the sources of the child’s mental illness” and the court noted he “made numerous assertions that were directly contrary to the expert testimony.” In addition, the “evidence irrefutably established that the parties were incapable of agreeing with respect to hormonal medicate and psychiatric care.” Defendant admitted it was impossible for them to agree on an “approach to the child’s gender dysphoria.” The court determined the “only conclusion supported by the evidence is that plaintiff[] was substantially better equipped to make important decisions in the” child’s best interests. It also held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff’s request to put restrictions on defendant’s parenting time.