Divorce; Criminal contempt; Restitution; MCL 600.1721; MCL 771.3(1)(e); Taylor v Currie; Actual injury; Conversion; Foremost Ins Co v Allstate Ins Co; Chose in action; City of Holland v Fillmore Twp

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded plaintiff-ex-wife (Lynn) $0 in restitution. In contemplation of the parties’ divorce, defendant-ex-husband (David) transferred martial funds to his brother, defendant-Howard. Lynn filed a fraudulent-transfer claim, and a jury found David fraudulently transferred the funds. She later moved to require Howard and his company, defendant-Alliance, to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating the trial court’s order. The trial court ultimately found Howard and Alliance in criminal contempt and ordered restitution in the amount of $370,000. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed. However, the trial court later denied Lynn’s request for restitution in the amount of $1.5 million. In the present appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred when it awarded her $0 in restitution, noting it did not err by finding she “did not suffer ‘an actual loss or injury.” Because she “did not have a property right in the $370,000 funds, the withdrawal of those funds from Alliance’s account cannot be deemed a wrongful exertion ‘over [Lynn’s] personal property,’ meaning that her claim of conversion is without merit.” In addition, her “reliance on the order authorizing proceedings supplementary to judgment also is not persuasive. Nowhere in that order did it decree that Lynn had a property interest in any property held by Alliance or that she had a right to the property. Although the order enjoined Alliance and Howard from transferring or otherwise interfering with” any property belonging to the judgment debtors, or to which they may be entitled or which may thereafter be acquired by or become due to said debtors, including the proceeds from the sale of real estate, “the order never established that any property held by Alliance was Lynn’s or owed to her. The order reinforces this because it further authorized Lynn ‘to file a complaint for proceedings supplementary to judgment,’ where such a decree could happen.” Affirmed.