Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging fabrication of evidence; Mills v Barnard; Malicious prosecution; “Probable cause”; Qualified immunity; Collateral estoppel under Michigan law; Peterson v Heymes

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that defendant-Walters was not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff-Tanner’s fabrication-of-evidence claim. It found that a reasonable jury, crediting “Tanner’s account that she never made any of the statements at issue,” and considering the interview transcript, could conclude “Walters’s testimony and notes about his interview stating otherwise strongly suggested that he fabricated the statements.” Tanner served 17 years in prison before being released on a writ of habeas corpus based on insufficient evidence. She then sued Walters, the now-retired detective on her case, alleging violations of her constitutional rights based on his fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution, among other claims. Walters moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court ruled that Tanner’s fabrication and malicious prosecution claims could proceed to trial. The court first reviewed the transcript of Walters’s May 24 interview of Tanner and noted it “differed in important ways” from Walters’s testimony at the preliminary exam. It rejected Walters’s argument that Tanner was required to show “purposefulness” to support a standalone falsification of evidence claim. “Rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘knowingly fabricated evidence against [a plaintiff], and [that] there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” The court found that the May 24 transcript supported Tanner’s “claim of falsity as none of the challenged statements appear in the transcript.” As to the malicious prosecution claim, case law provides that liability can extend to an officer who includes falsehoods in investigatory materials, knowing that a prosecutor is likely to rely on them and where the false material “‘actually influenced the prosecutor’s ultimate decision to bring charges.’” The court held that “a jury reasonably could conclude that Walters’s false statements ‘were material’” and further that “the state court relied on Walters’s false statements for its probable cause determination.” The court rejected his theory that the state court’s finding of probable cause collaterally stopped the district court from ruling otherwise, determining his argument did “not align with Michigan law.” The court held that a reasonable jury could find that without Walters’s statements, there would have been no finding of probable cause to prosecute Tanner. Affirmed.