Search & seizure; Motion to suppress based on lack of “probable cause” to support a search warrant; U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Allen; Payton v. New York; Ziegler v. Aukerman; Illinois v. Gates; “Nexus requirement”; United States v. Carpenter; United States v. Jones; United States v. Miggins; United States v. Gunter; United States v. Kenny; United States v. McPhearson; United States v. Frazier; “Staleness”; Sgro v. United States; United States v. Spikes; United States v. Abboud; “Good faith” exception; United States v. Leon; Davis v. United States; Whether a “drug ledger” constituted “hearsay”; United States v. Mendez (10th Cir.); United States v. Goshen (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Gonzales (9th Cir.); Applicability of the Confrontation Clause; Davis v. Washington; Authentication of the drug ledger; FRE 901(a) & (b); United States v. Crosgrove; United States v. Kalymon; Exclusion of evidence of the defendant’s Michigan medical marijuana license; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op; Gonzales v. Raich; Confidential informant (CI)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] While the search warrant affidavit supplied a “tenuous nexus” between drug trafficking and defendant-Brown’s home, under the totality of the circumstances, there was sufficient probable cause for the magistrate judge to issue the search warrant. Brown argued that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the drug and firearm evidence because the warrant lacked probable cause. The court held that it was “a close question.” The “affidavit contained no evidence that Brown distributed narcotics from his home, that he used the residence to store narcotics, or that any suspicious activity had taken place there.” There was no suggestion that a reliable CI “had purchased drugs there, that the police had ever conducted surveillance at Brown’s home, or that the recorded telephone conversations linked drug trafficking to” his home. “Key to the issuance of this search warrant was Brown’s status as a previously-convicted drug dealer, coupled with the police investigation of Brown’s involvement in ongoing trafficking of heroin and possibly cocaine, the drug dog’s detection of narcotic odor in Brown’s 2002 Yukon,” and the vehicle’s registration to Brown at his home. The “magistrate judge could reasonably infer . . . that Brown had recently used the Yukon . . . to ferry narcotics and that there was a fair probability that a search of his residence would turn up contraband or evidence of a crime.” The court concluded the affiant’s information had not become stale in the 22 days between Brown’s arrest and the application for a search warrant. Even if the affidavit had lacked probable cause, the Leon good faith exception would apply. The drug ledger was not hearsay but rather offered “as circumstantial evidence of a ‘tool of the trade’ to prove that Brown was involved in illegal drug trafficking.” Also, because the ledger was “nontestimonial,” the Confrontation Clause was inapplicable. The ledger was also sufficiently authenticated. The district court did not err by excluding evidence of Brown’s Michigan medical marijuana license because while “state law may permit marijuana use for medicinal purposes under defined circumstances, federal law treats any possession, distribution, or manufacture of marijuana as a federal offense, and medical necessity is not a defense to a federal criminal prosecution for manufacturing or distributing marijuana.” Affirmed.