Age discrimination claim based on the respondent-apartment complex’s two-adults-only-per-unit occupancy policy; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) (MCL 37.2101 et seq.); MCL 37.2505(1); Direct evidence of discrimination; Hazle v. Ford Motor Co.; Harrison v. Olde Fin. Corp.; Whether the ELCRA prohibits all housing practices that directly or indirectly limit occupancy based on the age of a renter or the persons living with the renter; Department of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp.; General rule that children & adults are not similarly situated as to the need to live with their parents; Diez v. Davey; The ELCRA’s prohibition of housing discrimination on the basis of familial status (dependent on the presence of a minor child); MCL 37.2102; MCL 37.2502(1)

Holding that the respondent-apartment complex’s two-adults-only-per-unit occupancy policy did not violate the ELCRA, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the claimant-Department’s age discrimination claim. The court noted that the policy’s prohibition did not depend “on the actual chronological age of a prospective adult renter and his or her prospective adult roommates.” The would-be renter and her daughters “could have been any age over 18 and they would not have been denied on the basis that they were too old or too young to rent a unit.” As three adults seeking to rent one unit together, they “were treated exactly the same as every other group of three adults that may have attempted to rent a single unit.” However, the policy “facially discriminates on the basis of whether the prospective renters are over or under the age of 18.” The Department argued that the ELCRA “prohibits all housing practices that directly or indirectly limit occupancy based on the age of a renter or the persons living with the renter.” The court disagreed, noting that the Michigan Supreme Court recognized in Beznos “that some distinctions based on age are permissible.” The court concluded that it was clear the ELCRA’s “prohibition of age discrimination only requires that similarly situated people be treated equally and that adults and minors are not always similarly situated.” It noted that as “a general rule, children and adults are not similarly situated with respect to the need to live with their parents.” The Department’s argument that the policy facially established “the existence of unlawful discrimination” lacked merit as the distinction the policy made was “permissible based on the differences between adults and minors in the context of housing.” Further, it identified no evidence that the adoption of the policy “was motivated by a predisposition to discriminate against persons over the age of 18 years.” Respondent explained the policy “was meant to address parking congestion, to ensure residential tranquility and stability, and to minimize damage to rental units.” That it could have made a different decision about how to address its concerns did not establish that its adoption of the policy was “motivated by discriminatory animus.”