Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
42 USC § 1983 action asserting a constitutional malicious-prosecution claim; Sykes v. Anderson; Jones v. Clark Cnty.; “Probable cause"; District of Columbia v. Wesby; Manuel v. City of Joilet; Michigan v. DeFillippo
The court held that defendant-police officer (Roberts) was properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff-Lester’s malicious-prosecution claim where there was probable cause for his prosecution. A witness (W) identified a photo of Lester as the man who accompanied an individual who murdered a competing drug dealer. DNA consistent with Lester’s was also found at the scene. But when W came face-to-face with Lester at trial, she was uncertain about the identification. The jury acquitted Lester. He sued for malicious prosecution under § 1983. The court first noted that “the Fourth Amendment prohibits only those pretrial seizures (or prosecutions) that lack probable cause, and § 1983 grants qualified immunity to defendants who mistakenly but reasonably conclude that probable cause exists.” It held that as a matter of law there was “ample evidence” indicating that Lester was an accomplice to murder, creating the “‘substantial chance of criminal activity’” necessary to establish probable cause. In addition to W’s statement, many other witnesses supported her general account, and DNA found at the scene supported her initial identification. The court emphasized the different burdens for establishing the probable cause necessary to bring a case with the proof beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to convict. It noted that “the Supreme Court has recognized that cases will inevitably arise in which the government validly establishes the probable cause necessary for a pretrial detention, but later falls short in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court concluded that the inconsistencies between W’s statement and other evidence, “even considered collectively, do not show the absence of probable cause.” Affirmed.
Breach of contract; Dunn v Bennett; Elements of a contract; Thomas v Leja; Consideration; Bank of Am, NA v First Am Title Ins Co; Mutual assent; Apportionment of costs by a drainage board; MCL 280.468 & 469; MCL 280.478(1) & (2); A drainage board’s authority to enter into contracts with public corporations; MCL 280.471; Assumpsit; Kristoffy v Iwanski; Unjust enrichment; AFT MI v Michigan
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendant-drainage district on plaintiff-assignee and trustee’s breach of contract, assumpsit, and unjust enrichment claims. Plaintiff contended defennant charged the city “substantially more than the amount” charged by the water treatment plants for the disposal of the city’s stormwater over several years. Plaintiff claimed “defendant improperly reallocated the sanitary sewage disposal costs imposed by the water treatment plants to stormwater disposal costs, and as a result" it overcharged the city. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by finding it failed to state a breach of contract claim. “Given the requirements set by the Drain Code, the drainage board was in no way engaged in bargaining with [the city] or any of the other benefiting public corporations when it entered the Final Order of Apportionment pursuant to its statutory obligations.” It made no offer to the city, there was no bargained-for exchange, or meeting of the minds, between the city and defendant before the Final Order of Apportionment was entered, and none was required. Thus, plaintiff “failed to overcome the strong presumption that the Final Order of Apportionment did not create a contract.” And while the Drain Code authorizes a drainage board to enter into contracts with public corporations, plaintiff did not allege that the city had a separate contract with defendant. The court also found the trial court did not err by ruling that plaintiff failed to allege any damages in support of its assumpsit and unjust enrichment claims. Plaintiff “failed to show that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that [the city] did not incur any damages in this matter.” Finally, in light of plaintiff’s failure “to cite legal authorities that establish defendant was required to charge a reasonable rate, or otherwise adequately brief how the trial court erred, plaintiff has abandoned this argument on appeal.” Affirmed.
Evidence that the victim was on probation; MRE 608 & 609; Relevance; MRE 401-402; Exclusion under MRE 403; Harmless error; Right to confrontation; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to inadmissible hearsay statements; MRE 801(c); Excited utterance hearsay exception; MRE 803(2); People v Smith; Failure to object to the introduction of text messages; Failure to object to the testimony of the victim’s nurse; MRE 803(4); Failure to review a cell phone recording of the assault & to listen to the recording of the victim’s initial police interview; Resentencing; Lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM); MCL 750.520b(2)(d)
The court concluded that defendant failed to establish the existence of reversible error on the basis of the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that the victim was on probation at the time of the incident that led to defendant’s CSC I, kidnapping, and assault by strangulation convictions. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Thus, the court affirmed his convictions. But it remanded for the trial court to make an appropriate record as to his sentencing issue regarding LEM. He argued that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing evidence that the victim was on probation. He also contended that this “infringed his constitutional rights of confrontation and to present a defense by preventing him from showing that the victim was lying about the sexual assault in order to divert the police investigation away from her own alcohol and marijuana use that night that violated the terms of her probation, which would have given the jury a compelling reason to believe the defense theory that the victim fabricated the assault.” The court noted that counsel’s proposed theory of relevance was “narrowly focused on whether the victim had a specific motive to lie about the specific incident of sexual assault in this case. Therefore, contrary to the trial court’s statements in its ruling at the evidentiary hearing, MRE 608 and MRE 609 were inapplicable and did not support excluding the proposed evidence under these circumstances.” This was error by the trial court. To the extent it “indicated at the evidentiary hearing on remand that it had been concerned about admitting the evidence due to the potential for the jurors to become curious about the underlying conviction and other matters outside the scope of” the trial, it did not explore giving a proper “limiting instruction to address these concerns.” As to MRE 403, “the proposed evidence was highly probative for providing a logical explanation for why the victim may have fabricated the assault, which was of significant importance to defendant’s” consent defense. If an appropriate instruction had been given indicating the proper purposes for which her “probationary status could be considered and prohibiting the jury from speculating about the underlying facts of” her prior conviction, “the probative value of the proposed evidence would not have been ‘substantially outweighed’ by any of the dangers listed in MRE 403.” But he was not entitled to relief because he “was not prevented from presenting the jury with the fundamental essence of his defense, namely that the victim consented to the activity and falsely claimed” he assaulted her.
Guilty & no-contest pleas; MCR 6.302; People v Cole; Whether a plea is understanding, voluntary, & accurate; MCR 6.302(A)-(E); Challenge to the voluntariness of a plea; MCR 6.301(A); MCR 6.302(C)(3); MCR 6.310(D); People v Cobbs
The court held that the trial court did not err by accepting defendant’s no-contest plea. He pled no-contest to charges of possession with intent to deliver meth, possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a mixture containing heroin, possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a mixture containing cocaine, FIP, and felony-firearm, third or subsequent offense. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 78 months to 50 years for possession with intent to deliver meth, 19 months to 20 years for possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a mixture containing heroin and also for possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a mixture containing cocaine, 9 months to 20 years for FIP, and 10 years for each of his felony-firearm convictions. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his plea was involuntary. It had “no reason to conclude that defense counsel failed to follow his ethical obligation in requesting the court’s preliminary sentence evaluation under Cobbs. Moreover, defense counsel asked the trial court, on behalf of his client, to approve a no-contest plea rather than the guilty plea referred to by the trial court. An under-oath defendant affirmed his desire to plead no-contest to all of the charges. And, finally, a form evincing defendant’s intent to plead to the charges was filed with the court.” Further, the trial court “followed the sentencing agreement and defendant cannot demonstrate either plain error or prejudice.” The court also rejected his claim that the sentencing court erred in imposing court costs, a crime-victims’ assessment, and attorney fees because they were not included in the Cobbs agreement, and that by imposing these expenses, the trial court exceeded the terms of the agreement, requiring it to inform him of his right to withdraw his no-contest plea. “As defendant was informed that costs and fees would be imposed as part of his sentence, and agreed that the court could impose them, he waived this claim.” Affirmed.
Right to counsel of choice; MCR 6.005(F) & (G); United States v Gonzalez-Lopez; Presentence jail credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Idziak
The court held the trial court erred by denying defendant’s request for appointed counsel, but did not err by refusing to grant him one additional day of jail credit. He was convicted of CCW, FIP, felony-firearm, and domestic violence. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 2 to 25 years for CCW and FIP and to 56 days, with credit for time served, for domestic violence. And although the CCW sentence was concurrent with his 2-year sentence for felony-firearm, his FIP sentence was consecutive to his felony-firearm sentence. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for appointed counsel because he and his counsel (M) informed the trial court that there had been a breakdown in their attorney-client relationship and that defendant had informed the trial court that he was indigent. “By rejecting defendant’s decision to remove [M] as his retained attorney in the absence of any adverse impact on the orderly administration of justice, the trial court denied defendant his Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel.” However, the court rejected his claim that the trial court erred by refusing to grant him one additional day of jail credit toward his sentence by failing to include the date his sentence was imposed. The sentencing court “properly ruled that defendant was not entitled to another day of jail credit for the time he spent incarcerated in jail on the day he was sentenced.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Sentencing; Reasonableness of a departure sentence; People v Lampe; Articulation of adequate reasons to explain the extent of a departure; People v Smith; Effect of a within guidelines sentence; MCL 769.34(10); Sentencing on multiple convictions; People v Lopez
While the court concluded that the trial court failed to articulate adequate reasons to explain the extent of its departure from the guidelines in sentencing defendant on his assault with intent to commit CSC conviction, it affirmed his within guidelines sentences for his CSC IV convictions. It remanded for the trial court to either further articulate its reasons for the extent of the departure on the assault with intent to commit CSC conviction or resentencing on that conviction. He was sentenced to 160 months for that conviction, and 32 to 48 months for each CSC IV conviction. The guidelines range for his assault with intent to commit CSC conviction was 114 months. The trial court justified the departure “by describing defendant as a predator and referring to the impact of the crimes on the victims. Although this may be an accurate assessment, these factors are addressed by the guidelines, specifically in OV 4 (psychological damage to victim) and OV 10 (exploitation of vulnerable victim; predatory conduct).” The trial court failed to explain how they “were given inadequate weight by the guidelines such that an upward departure sentence was warranted, nor did it explain the justification for the extent of departure.” In addition, as to the trial court’s noting “that it had little hope for defendant’s rehabilitation, particularly in light of” his previous offenses, although “an inability to rehabilitate is one factor properly considered to justify a departure sentence, the trial court failed to explain how much weight was given to this factor versus the other factors” it considered. However, the court rejected defendant’s challenge to his CSC IV sentences. Under MCL 769.34(10), it was required to affirm the within guidelines minimum sentence here. It noted that the trial court scored the guidelines for the CSC IV convictions, revised the “guidelines in light of the corrected information, sentenced defendant to a sentence that fell within the revised guidelines, and stated that it considered the sentence to be appropriate even in light of the corrected information.” Thus, the court found no abuse of discretion.
Misconduct in office by a public official; MCL 750.505; Whether defendant-former dean of a university’s College of Osteopathic Medicine was a public officer; Elements of a “public office of a civil nature”; People v Freedland; People v Bruce; MCL 390.661
Holding that defendant, formerly the dean of a university’s College of Osteopathic Medicine (COM), was a public officer for purposes of the misconduct in office charge, the court affirmed his conviction under MCL 750.505. The case arose from allegations that he used his position as dean “to sexually exploit female students.” He argued that the trial court erred by determining that he was a public officer, and thus abused its discretion in not quashing the district court’s bindover on the misconduct in office charge. The court disagreed, noting that in Freedland, the Supreme Court “identified five ‘indispensable’ elements to demonstrate a ‘public office of a civil nature.’” The court found that it did not have to resolve here “whether establishing fewer than all of the Freedland factors” is sufficient to show that a defendant was a public officer because consideration of all the factors supported the conclusion that this defendant was a public officer. It concluded “that (1) the Legislature created the office of dean of the COM, (2) the office was delegated a portion of the sovereign power of the government, (3) the powers and duties of the office are defined through legislative authority, (4) the office exercises duties under the general control of the board of trustees of MSU, and (5) the office has permanency and continuity.” Because defendant, in his position as COM dean, was a public officer for purposes of the misconduct in office charge, the trial court correctly concluded “that the district court did not abuse its discretion by binding defendant over to the trial court based upon that determination of law.”
Denial of objection to a referee’s recommendation as to child support; Equitable abatement; Second arrearage credit; Friend of the Court (FOC)
The court affirmed the trial court’s retroactive child support modification as to the second credit to which plaintiff-mother admitted at the referee hearing, and reversed and remanded as to the trial court’s equitable abatement of the rest of defendant-father’s arrearage. He admitted to a child support arrearage, and she made “statements at a referee hearing to the effect that she had given defendant two credits of $10,000 each, only one of which” was reflected in the FOC’s records. Over her objection, the trial court retroactively modified the father’s “child support order to give him a deduction for both credits, rather than only one credit, and it further abated the remainder of the arrearage on equitable grounds.” Plaintiff first argued that equity was an impermissible basis for retroactively modifying a child support obligation, and the father expressly agreed. The court was not bound by concessions of law. But the parties were correct. It “has clearly explained that, pursuant to MCL 552.603(2), equity is not a permissible basis for retroactively modifying child support orders.” It held that the “trial court erred in abating the $1,202.95, and to the extent the trial court cited equity as an alternative basis for abating the second credit of $10,000.00, it also erred.” As to the second $10,000 credit, plaintiff contended “that she never actually granted him” such a credit. She argued that “there was neither an agreement nor approval by a court, as proved by the absence of any such agreement in the” FOC’s records. The court disagreed. “First, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that there was an agreement. . . .[P]laintiff described to the referee having ‘signed off’ on two separate credits of $10,000.00 each, and she later affirmatively agreed that she had given two such credits.” The court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake in concluding that the parties agreed to two credits of $10,000.00.” Secondly, it “found no case law holding that ‘court approved’ should mean anything other than the obvious.” The court found that by necessary implication, the trial court gave that assent in this case. Thus, it was unable to hold that “the trial court erred in applying the second $10,000.00 credit to retroactively modify defendant’s support order, pursuant to MCL 552.603(5).”
Statutory gross negligence claims against government employees; Maiden v Rozwood; MCL 691.1407; Necessity of identifying a common-law duty; Beaudrie v Henderson; Whether the gross negligence claim was “fully premised” on an intentional tort claim; VanVorous v Burmeister; Gross negligence defined; MCL 691.1407(8)(a); Pleading facts in avoidance of governmental immunity; Pleading an intentional tort; Odom v Wayne Cnty; Malicious prosecution; Probable cause for an arrest; Malice; False arrest & imprisonment; Whether remand was required for further development of the record
Rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Michigan recognizes statutory gross negligence claims against government employees, and concluding that even if his gross negligence claim was not barred, he failed to show that defendant-Mitchell was grossly negligent, the court affirmed summary disposition for Mitchell. Further, it found that he failed to sufficiently plead an intentional tort in avoidance of governmental immunity. Finally, holding that probable cause existed for his arrest, the court also affirmed summary disposition on his malicious prosecution and false arrest/imprisonment claims. It also found that remand for further development of the record was unnecessary. The case arose from plaintiff’s 3-day detention and 45-day placement on a tether after his arrest. A private investigator uncovered exculpatory evidence but Mitchell, the officer in charge of the case, and an assistant prosecutor (D) refused to dismiss the case against plaintiff. When the victim (M) did not identify him at the preliminary exam, the case was dismissed. While plaintiff relied on Maiden in arguing that “Michigan recognizes statutory gross negligence claims against government employees,” in Beaudrie, the Supreme Court expressly stated “that MCL 691.1407 ‘does not create a cause of action’ and, instead, a plaintiff must identify a common-law duty.” In addition, the court concluded that his gross negligence claim was barred because it “relied on the same ‘wrongful conduct’ as his intentional tort claims” and thus, was “fully premised” on those claims. The court added that Mitchell was not grossly negligent given that there was no evidence he “acted in bad faith or that he did not honestly believe that he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff.” He properly relied on M’s “immediate identification to determine that he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and defendant was under no obligation to look further for exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, because defendant relied on the identification, there is no indication that his reliance on other officers’ police reports and refusal to act on the information from plaintiff’s mother was in bad faith. Finally, the exculpatory evidence was presented after plaintiff had been arrested and charged, and it was also provided to” D.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); Principle that only one statutory ground is required; In re Ellis; Reasonable reunification efforts; Accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act; In re Frey; Children’s best interests; In re White
Holding that § (c)(i) was established, that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, and that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. It also affirmed the order terminating respondent-father’s rights, concluding that his failure to challenge each statutory ground relied upon by the trial court rendered this issue moot, and that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that terminating his rights was in the children’s best interests. While the mother asserted that the DHHS failed to sufficiently accommodate her disabilities, the court found that the DHHS was mindful of her “issues throughout this lengthy case and tried to accommodate her by selecting services that involved a more personalized, hands-on approach to improve” her parenting skills. Although she participated diligently “in these services, the common consensus among the caseworkers and service providers was that [she] did not sufficiently benefit. [She] also chose not to participate in the programs that were designed to provide assistance to parents with cognitive impairments.” Thus, the court was not persuaded that she would have fared better if the DHHS had offered her other services. As to § (c)(i), the evidence supported that she “had not accomplished any meaningful change in the condition that led to adjudication” given that her inability to consistently provide the children proper care “was the constant theme at nearly every hearing that took place during this lengthy case.” Further, the record clearly showed that there was no reasonable likelihood the condition leading to adjudication would be rectified within a reasonable time considering her children’s ages. She “was provided extensive services for” over four years but, while she at times made progress, she failed to show “a consistent ability to appropriately care for the children.” As to the father, he only challenged three (§§ (c)(i), (g), and (j)) of the five grounds cited by the trial court for terminating his rights, and the court concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in ruling that these grounds existed. It also rejected his argument as to the children’s best interests, noting that they “had been in foster care for four years and desperately required permanency, which [he] could not provide them at the time of termination.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); Reasonable reunification efforts; Suspension of parenting time; MCL 712A.13a(13); Child’s best interests; Child sexually abusive materials (CSAM)
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification. Also, the trial court did not err by terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to child-K under §§ (c)(i) and (j). Further, the trial court did not err by suspending his parenting time. Finally, termination of his parental rights served K’s best interests. As to reunification, respondent pled guilty to “CSAM possession and was required to register as a Tier II sex offender for 25 years.” Thus, the DHHS had no obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with K. Regardless, the DHHS provided him with multiple services aimed at reunification. His “caseworker referred him to a psychological evaluation, provided him with a workbook until he could begin services while incarcerated, and maintained communication with respondent’s counselors and parole officer to ensure that respondent completed necessary services both during and after incarceration.” Thus, the trial court did not err by holding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification. Also, as to § (c)(i), the court held that despite “the positive assessments and completed programs, respondent failed to take responsibility and continued to minimize his behavior by making light of it as if such conduct constituted a joke.” Clear and convincing evidence established that he “had not rectified the conditions that led to adjudication and would not do so within a reasonable time given” K’s age. Further, as to § (j), the court held that the trial court did not err by concluding that the “evidence established that respondent posed an active risk of sexual harm to a child, particularly one of” K’s age.