Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Michigan’s Adult Foster Care Licensing Act (AFCLA); “Adult foster care facility”; MCL400.703(4); “Establishments”; MCL 400.713(1); “Foster care”; MCL 400.704(7); “The provision of”; Deference to an agency’s administrative expertise; Reasonable reliance on an agency’s statutory interpretation; Lawfully rendered services compensable under the No-Fault Act
The court held that at the time of defendant-State Farm’s insured’s (S) stay, plaintiff-Insight Healing Center did not qualify as an adult foster care facility and thus, did not require licensure. As a result, the court rejected State Farm’s contention that the services Insight provided to S were not lawfully rendered and not compensable under the No-Fault Act. In 2014, the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs visited Insight and concluded that “it was not an adult foster care facility and did not require licensure.” State Farm insisted that the department was wrong, and that Insight met the statutory definition of an adult foster care facility. Thus, State Farm maintained, “Insight operated illegally from 2016 through 2018, when” S resided there. The trial court agreed. However, the court concluded on appeal that regardless of the reasons behind Insight’s structure, at the time S resided there, its “business model incorporated the use of independent contractors.” There was no evidence suggesting that this was improper. After the 2014 investigation, the investigator formally determined that “Insight did not require a license and recommended that the complaint be closed. Apparently, it was.” The court found that “Insight’s approach was to allow the residents to develop independent relationships with care providers who were not beholden to nor managed by Insight. Arranging for services to be provided is fundamentally different from ‘providing’ the services. Because Insight itself did not provide the services, it fell outside MCL 400.704(7) and did not require licensure.” The court further noted that there was no evidence “the services for which Insight billed were unnecessary or unreasonable.” Reversed and remanded.
Motion to suppress evidence; “In custody”; People v Barritt; Voluntariness of statements; Warrantless seizure of a phone; Probable cause; “Evidence of wrongdoing”; Exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement; People v Blasius; Whether a search warrant affidavit was defective; Whether references to another arrest & to the “Violent Crime Impact Team” should be excluded at trial
The court held that defendant was not “in custody” when she made statements to the police, and while “under appropriate circumstances, a police promise of confidentiality could undermine an interviewee’s understanding of his or her rights such that any statements made must be deemed involuntary[,]” the circumstances here did not merit excluding her statements. It also held that the police had probable cause to seize her phone when they did, and that a sufficient and valid affidavit supported the search warrant for the phone. Lastly, it found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request to exclude references to a boyfriend’s arrest and to the “Violent Crime Impact Team.” Thus, it affirmed the denial of her motions to suppress or exclude evidence. First, under “the totality of the circumstances, the fact that defendant was questioned in a police station is not sufficient, by itself, to establish that she was ‘in custody.’” It found nothing in the interview suggesting “other indications that defendant was ‘in custody.’” In addition, it did not find any egregious police misconduct or that her statements were involuntary. It agreed “the police cannot simultaneously warn an interviewee that his or her statements will be used as evidence in court and promise that nothing the interviewee says will leave the room.” But context is important. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court could not find that the detective’s (L) “promise of confidentiality actually undermined defendant’s ability to understand and assert her rights.” It next concluded that by the time the police seized her “phone, they unambiguously had probable cause to do so.” The change in her demeanor when her affairs were mentioned, her refusal to answer L’s “questions about whether any of her boyfriends might have killed” her husband, and her refusal to name her boyfriend allowed the police to rightly suspect she “was not being honest with them, that there was more than a mere possibility that one of [her] boyfriends was involved in the murder, and that the phone would contain evidence from which” he could be identified. The court also agreed with the trial court that exigent circumstances allowed the police to seize it without a warrant. An error in the affidavit for a warrant to search it did not affect whether probable cause was shown, and the court held that the warrant was properly issued.
Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Sufficiency of the evidence; Felony-murder & armed robbery; Court costs
The court concluded that the complained of error was not outcome determinative, and even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the other acts evidence, there were insufficient grounds for reversal. Also, the jury could have reasonably determined that “defendant was in the victim’s apartment on the night in question, and by extension, that he committed felony-murder and armed robbery.” Finally, the trial court did not plainly err when it imposed $1611 in court costs. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting other acts evidence under MRE 404(b). Specifically, he argued that Detective N’s “testimony as to defendant’s actions related to a 2007 conviction of AWIGBH was irrelevant and was offered solely to demonstrate propensity. Additionally, the testimony was unfairly prejudicial because it distracted the jury from the lack of evidence tying defendant to the victim’s murder.” The prosecution argued that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the testimony as to the prior conviction was relevant and offered for a proper purpose. The evidence was probative of his identity, intent, motive, and method or operation in committing the crime. Even if the trial court erred by admitting the other acts evidence, the prosecution argued, the evidence was not outcome-determinative. The details provided in N’s testimony constituted “legally sufficient common features to establish a rational inference of a common plan or scheme.” As to MRE 403, the probative value of the evidence—establishing his identity through a common plan or scheme—did not appear to have been substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The two acts appeared fairly similar. Further, the testimony appeared reliable because N worked the prior case and defendant was convicted of the other act. The court noted that “the prior act was over a decade old; however, remoteness of time goes to weight and not admissibility.” Even excluding the prosecution’s other acts evidence, it “met its burden to prove that defendant committed felony murder and armed robbery in connection with the victim’s death.” Affirmed.
Right to counsel; People v Anderson; Assertion of the right to counsel; Patterson v Illinois; Right against self-incrimination; People v Wyngaard; Waiver; People v New; Ineffective assistance of counsel
The court held defendant was not entitled to resentencing based on her allegations that her rights to counsel and against self-incrimination were violated. She pled guilty to attempted fourth-degree fleeing and eluding and was sentenced to 21 months’ probation, and 21 days of jail time, to be served on weekends. The terms of her probation required that she “not use or possess alcohol or intoxicants and that she comply with alcohol and drug testing requirements as directed by her probation officer.” Shortly thereafter, she violated her probation by failing to comply with alcohol testing requirements and failing to report to serve her weekend jail sanction. Due to her actions at the arraignment on her probation violation, she was “found to have violated her probation in other ways as well.” She ultimately pled guilty to most of the allegations, and the trial court found her guilty of the other violations. It sentenced her to 365 days in jail. It then denied her motion to correct her allegedly invalid sentence and for resentencing. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that she was entitled to resentencing based on violations of her Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights, finding that neither her right to counsel nor her right against self-incrimination was violated. It noted she “did not assert her right to counsel at her arraignment on the probation violations.” And she “did not petition for the appointment of counsel with respect to her probation violations until after her arraignment and counsel was not officially appointed to represent defendant until two days after the arraignment.” In addition, at the arraignment on her probation violation, the trial court did not compel her “to respond to any question posed to her, let alone any question where the answers may incriminate her.” Moreover, by pleading guilty she “waived constitutional violations alleged to have occurred before the plea.” Finally, because her constitutional arguments failed, there was no basis for her “claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview [her] and review [an] allegedly altered medical document prior to her submitting [it] to the trial court, and in not motioning the [trial] court to exclude the document or objecting to its use because counsel had not looked at it before she submitted it to the court.” Affirmed.
Res judicata; Tolling; The No-Fault Act’s one-year-back rule; MCL 500.3145; Presumption that statutory amendments operate prospectively; Davis v State Employees’ Ret Bd; Motion to transfer; Venue; MCL 600.1621(a)
The court reversed the trial court’s ruling dismissing plaintiff’s action based on res judicata, but affirmed its ruling that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145 applied and its denial of plaintiff’s motion to transfer the case to another trial court. The court held that res judicata did not apply here. Defendant cited “no authority for the proposition that the Wayne Circuit Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(6) was an adjudication on the merits of the claims raised.” Instead, defendant argued that “because the Wayne Circuit Court’s 2014 order was an order granting summary disposition, it was a dismissal on the merits.” This argument was unpersuasive in the context of this case. “The Wayne Circuit Court did not address, let alone decide, the merits of plaintiff’s claims. Instead, it dismissed them because of the then-pending action in Kentucky. While this order may have been on ‘on the merits’ with respect to the sole question addressed by the trial court—whether another action had been initiated between the same parties involving the same claim in Kentucky—that is no longer a controlling question (or even a question) in the present case.” It was uncontested that there was “no longer a separate lawsuit involving these parties and these claims in Kentucky, and it is uncontested that the merits of plaintiff’s claims have not been resolved by a court in a prior proceeding.” Thus, res judicata did not apply to its “dismissal of the 2013 lawsuit, and the Wayne Circuit Court erred when it concluded that plaintiff’s newest lawsuit was barred under that doctrine.” But there was no merit in plaintiff’s argument that “the parties agreed to toll the one-year-back rule when the case was ‘transferred’ from Kentucky to Michigan[.]” A prior panel of the court “directed the Wayne Circuit Court to make factual findings and legal conclusions on remand.” Based on the court’s review of the record, it could “not say that the trial court’s factual conclusions on this point were clearly erroneous.” As to the one-year-back rule, the court found that it was “clear from the text of MCL 500.3145 that the Legislature did not intend the tolling provision of subsection (3) to have retroactive effect.” Plaintiff filed his case before the amendment was effective. Thus, it did not apply to his complaint. Remanded.
Codicil interpretation; In re Estate of Raymond; Patent & latent ambiguity; In re Woodworth Trust; Extrinsic evidence
Agreeing with the trial court that there was a patent ambiguity in the codicil at issue (and arguably also a latent one), the court found no error in its decision to look at the language that was unambiguous and apply it as written given that the available extrinsic evidence did not resolve the patent ambiguity. In her will, decedent (Barker) named respondent-Brault, her niece, as PR, with her other niece, petitioner-Oleksy, as an alternate. But in the codicil, she named Oleksy as PR, and after Barker’s death, Oleksy was appointed without objection. The trial court later removed her as PR for “lack of administration of the estate.” On appeal, she argued that interpretation of the codicil required a finding she was the beneficiary, to the exclusion of Brault, to the residue of the estate. The codicil contained a patent ambiguity as “to whether Barker intended Brault to be removed as a beneficiary of her estate.” The will was clear that Brault “was to receive the residue of Barker’s estate. While the codicil clearly” intended to remove her as PR, it was not clear whether it “also modified the distribution of Barker’s residual estate.” It provided that if Oleksy predeceased Barker, all of Barkley’s property was to go to one of Oleksy’s daughters (L). The codicil did not specifically state “that Oleksy was to receive the residue of Barker’s estate. However, the provision of the codicil leaving all of her property to [L] if Oleksy predeceased Barker creates confusion.” Also adding confusion was a provision “leaving all of Barker’s jewelry and four paintings to Oleksy to share with her children. If” she intended that Oleksy “receive the residue of her estate, there would be no need for a provision leaving Oleksy any specific property[.]” The only available extrinsic evidence to determine Barker’s intent “was the conflicting hearing testimony of Brault and Oleksy.” The trial court found that this did not give it any real guidance to resolve the ambiguity. Applying the codicil’s unambiguous language, Oleksy was to (and did) serve as PR, and she survived Barker, so the triggering event for the property to go to L did not occur. The provisions leaving money to an animal shelter and Barker’s jewelry and four paintings to Oleksy were unambiguous. The court held that the “codicil did not require further interpretation or expansion beyond the specific statements contained therein.” Affirmed.