Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Due process; Moore v. Illinois; Exclusion of evidence of an identification; Perry v. New Hampshire; People v. Kurylczyk; “Showup” lineup; Stovall v. Denno; People v. Gray; Ex parte Frazier (AL); Suggestiveness; People v. Riley (NY); State v. Gordon (CT); Whether there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification; Neil v. Biggers; People v. Thomas; Manson v. Brathwaite; Harmless error; People v. Anderson (After Remand); People v. Carines
Holding that the showup lineup conducted by the police was unnecessarily suggestive and unreliable, and that the error was not harmless, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, suppressed any evidence from the showup, and remanded for a new trial. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit open murder after a trial in which the jury was told that a witness identified him as the shooter during a “showup” identification conducted by the police following the shooting. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the identification violated his right to due process, that the evidence should have been suppressed, and that he was entitled to a new trial. It first found that the showup was impermissibly suggestive. “In this case, all we need to observe in order to conclude that the procedure was suggestive is that defendant was shown singly to the witness.” It next found that there was no necessity justifying the showup procedure. “The crime had been long over by the time the showup was conducted, and there was no ongoing danger that police were better able to address by dispensing with a reliable identification procedure.” Further, after reviewing "the Biggers factors and other evidence relied on by the trial court,” the court did not “believe that the prosecution . . . met its burden to show that the indicia of reliability in this case ‘[were] strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive circumstances . . . .” Finally, as to harmlessness, “the prosecution’s case was ‘significantly less persuasive’ without the showup identification evidence.” Justice Zahra, joined my Justice Markman, dissented, noting he would affirm because the identification “retained strong indicia of reliability and did not lead to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The trial court properly admitted [the detective’s] testimony regarding this identification, allowing the jury to consider its ultimate weight.”
Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Dillon; People v. Hoag; People v. Lockett; People v. Grant; Matters of trial strategy; People v. Unger; People v. Vaughn; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Carll; Failure to have the trial court rule on the motion to suppress the firearm before the end of trial; Prejudice; Jury trial waiver; People v. Leonard; People v. Antwine; Knowing & voluntary; People v. Cook; MCR 6.402(B); People v. Cartwright; People v. Mosly; Felon in possession (FIP); Carrying a concealed weapon (CCW)
The court held that defense counsel’s (C) request that the trial court rule upon defendant’s motion to suppress at the same time that the trial court rendered its verdict after the bench trial did not place his performance “below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Defendant was not prejudiced by C’s decision because he failed to establish a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if the trial court had ruled on his motion to suppress the firearm before rendering its verdict. He also knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial despite the judge’s failure to specifically state on the record that he accepted his waiver. He was convicted of FIP, CCW, and felony-firearm, second offense. At the Ginther hearing, C “testified that, in his opinion, consolidating the bench trial and the suppression hearing gave defendant the best chance of acquittal because the trial judge would be required to consider the arresting detectives’ credibility in regard to the motion to suppress and defendant’s guilt at the same time.” C expressed “that he could undermine the arresting detectives’ credibility such that the trial court could acquit defendant even if it denied defendant’s motion to suppress.” C reasoned “that this strategy gave him ‘two bites at the apple.’” Before trial, C “investigated the events leading up to defendant’s arrest by taking pictures where defendant was arrested, interviewing witnesses, and preparing the witnesses for trial.” At trial, C called witnesses in an effort "to undermine the arresting detectives’ credibility.” In doing so, C elicited testimony that was contrary to the detectives’ version of the events leading up to defendant’s arrest. The trial court determined that the detectives’ testimony was credible and C’s strategy ultimately failed. Considering "the strong presumption that an attorney’s challenged action constituted sound trial strategy, and that this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy, [C’s] performance was not objectively unreasonable." Whether or not the court might have made the same decision was not the test; it was an aspect of C’s trial strategy, "the strategy was thought out in advance, and it was not unreasonable for [C] to think it presented the best prospect for success." Affirmed.
Custody; The Child Custody Act (CCA) (MCL 722.21 et seq.); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Lieberman v. Orr; Credibility; Beason v. Beason; Threshold requirements for a party seeking a custody change; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Necessity of an evidentiary hearing before custody can be modified; Grew v. Knox; Harmless error; Fletcher v. Fletcher; Kubicki v. Sharpe; Established custodial environment;Yachcik v. Yachcik; Children’s best interests; MCL 722.25(1); Pierron v. Pierron; Findings on the statutory factors; Factors (a), (j), & (l); Consideration of each child’s individual best interests; Foskett v. Foskett; Reliance on a referee recommendation; Admissibility of evidence supporting the trial court’s rulings; Ex parte communications; Consideration of a Friend of the Court (FOC) report; Harvey v. Harvey; Order enjoining an FOC employee & the children’s counselor from discussing contents of their communication to counsel or the parties; The Friend of the Court Act (MCL 552.501 et seq.); MCL 552.507a(1); MCR 3.210(C)(6); In camera interview of the children; Factor (i); Molloy v. Molloy; Discovery; Denial of requests to compel production; Cabrera v. Ekema; MCR 3.218(B)(1) & (A)(1); Expert testimony; MRE 702; Alleged judicial bias; Parenting-time; MCL 722.27a(1) & (3); McRoberts v. Ferguson; Luna v. Regnier; Request for reassignment on remand; Cassidy v. Cassidy; Bayati v. Bayati
The court concluded that the trial court’s errors were harmless, rejected defendant-mother's claims of judicial bias, and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff-father sole legal and physical custody. It also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in suspending her parenting time under MCL 722.27a(3). Finally, it declined her request to order reassignment of the case on remand, noting that it found no error requiring remand and that it would not have been necessary in this case. Thus, the court affirmed the order granting plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children, and providing defendant with no parenting time, subject to periodic review to determine whether reinstituting it would be in the children’s best interests. The court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by failing to comply with procedural requirements of the CCA “before granting plaintiff full-time parenting time in” 11/17. It also agreed that “the trial court committed clear legal error by precluding disclosure of the” recommendation as to continued reunification efforts to the parties, and in denying defendant’s motion to compel production of “the raw test data from the psychological evaluations of the parties and children.” However, it found these errors harmless in this case. As to the custody ruling, the court concluded that “the trial court’s poor view of defendant’s credibility appears well grounded.” It disagreed with her contention that “the trial court’s perception went against the great weight of the evidence because her testimony was corroborated by text messages and over 40 exhibits . . . .” Although many of the text messages corroborated assertions she made at the hearings, they concerned essentially uncontested matters. While she might disagree with the trial court’s findings, “the trial court found from the totality of the evidence that plaintiff’s actions were generally appropriate and in” the children’s best interests.
Medical malpractice; Cox v. Board of Hosp. Managers for the City of Flint; Expert testimony; Decker v. Rochowiak; Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Motion for a new trial; MCR 2.611(A)(1)(e); Campbell v. Sullins; Motion for directed verdict
The court held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial. It also held that the trial court properly denied defendant-doctor’s motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff sued defendant for medical malpractice based on an alleged surgical error. The jury found that defendant was professionally negligent, but that plaintiff failed to prove she suffered an injury. The trial court then entered a judgment of no cause of action, denied plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and/or a new trial. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by denying her motion for JNOV and abused its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial because the undisputed evidence established that she suffered injury due to defendant’s negligence. “[R]easonable persons could honestly reach different conclusions about whether [plaintiff’s second] surgery was needed to address a complication of an intricate spinal surgery or instead constituted an injury due to” defendant’s negligence. Additionally, “the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence because there was conflicting evidence as to whether the . . . surgery was an injury or whether [defendant’s] negligence caused the need for the surgery.” Thus, it was for the jury to determine "the issue of credibility and to allocate weight to each expert witnesses’s testimony.” Further, given “the substantial conflicting testimony as to whether plaintiff’s arachnoiditis was an injury caused by the presence of the surgical foam inside plaintiff’s dura, the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for JNOV. The jury, as factfinder, was free to accept [the experts’ opinions] as to what caused the arachnoiditis.” Moreover, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial because the overwhelming weight of the evidence did not favor her.” The court next rejected plaintiff’s claim that there was no dispute that her final three surgeries constituted injuries and were necessary to repair dural tears after the surgical foam had been left inside her dura. The “jury was presented with conflicting testimony as to what caused plaintiff’s dura to repeatedly tear.” Finally, the court rejected defendant’s contention on cross-appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict as there was no evidence that he breached the standard of care because the expert testimony was based on pure speculation. “[N]o matter how defendants attempt to frame the issue, the crux of their argument is that [the] testimony or opinion was not credible and should not have been given any weight. Because credibility determinations are inappropriate for purposes of ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court did not err when it denied” his motion. Affirmed.
Undue influence; In re Williams Estate; Relevance of events occurring after the disputed instruments were executed; MRE 401; Leffingwell v. Bettinghouse; McPeak v. McPeak (On Remand); Principle that evidence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship after the instruments were executed cannot be used to retroactively establish a presumption of undue influence; Bill & Dena Brown Trust v. Garcia; Judicial notice of a doctor’s report; Taking judicial notice of the court’s own files; In re Marxhausen’s Estate; Consideration of factors relevant to the decedent’s susceptibility to undue influence; In re Mikeska Estate; Sufficiency of the evidence to establish a presumption of undue influence; In re Susser Estate; Fact question of whether a confidential relationship existed apart from a well defined fiduciary category; Alpha Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Rentenbach; Broadness of the phrase “confidential or fiduciary relationship”; In re Estate of Karmey; Van’t Hof v. Jemison
The court concluded that the probate court did not exclude the evidence of events occurring after the decedent (Boyk) executed the instruments in dispute, but rather held, after considering it and the rest of the evidence, that appellants failed to meet their burden to establish undue influence. The court found no error or clear error in the probate court’s ruling. Thus, it affirmed the probate court’s opinion and order that held the instruments – a “Lady Bird” deed and wills – were not the result of undue influence exerted by appellee. The probate court noted that the post-execution evidence “could not be used to retroactively establish a presumption of undue influence with regard to those instruments.” It also determined that “because ‘the majority of the incidents occurred after the [disputed instruments] were executed,’ ‘the timeline of events . . . does not support a finding of undue influence.’” Thus, it weighed the evidence. The court also concluded that the probate court did not err in taking judicial notice of a doctor’s report, in light of the report’s relevance to the issue of undue influence. Further, the probate court did not clearly err in determining that appellants failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a presumption of undue influence. The court was unpersuaded by their contention that a fiduciary relationship existed as a matter of law based on a power of attorney. The probate court “accepted appellee’s testimony that she had never actually acted as” Boyk’s attorney-in-fact, and while she admitted “she had been appointed as Boyk’s patient advocate under a ‘medical power of attorney,’ there” was no evidence she was acting in this capacity when he executed the disputed instruments. Further, although there was ample evidence indicating “that Boyk placed his faith, confidence, and trust in appellee, there is no basis to disturb the probate court’s finding that appellants failed to” show that he was “reliant on her for judgment or advice.”
Disabled veteran’s property tax exemption; The Barnes Act (disabled veteran property tax relief); MCL 211.7b; Statutory requirement that plaintiff used the property “as a homestead”; ProMed Healthcare v. Kalamazoo; Canons of statutory construction; Michigan United Conservation Club v. Lansing Twp.; Homestead defined; Bloomfield Twp. v. Kane; Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (MCL 211.1 et seq.); MCL 211.7a(1)(c); MCL 211.7b(1) & (2); Whether plaintiff’s wife was simply a legal extension of himself
Holding that the Tax Tribunal (TT) did not err in denying plaintiff-McAdoo’s disabled veteran’s property tax exemption claim, the court affirmed. McAdoo argued that the TT erred when it found that he was ineligible because he had been incarcerated since 1995 and did not reside at the property he owns during the 2017 tax year. The parties do not dispute that McAdoo is a “disabled veteran” under the statute and that he co-owned the Ludington property during the 2017 tax year. The sole question was “whether McAdoo satisfied the statutory requirement that he also used the property ‘as a homestead’ during the tax year under consideration.” It was his “burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did so.” Construing the statutory language in favor of the taxing authority, the court held “that the Legislature unmistakably intended that an otherwise qualifying disabled veteran claiming the disabled veteran’s homestead exemption must actually physically occupy the property as his or her home during the tax year for which he or she seeks the benefit of the exemption.” Applying this definition here, the TT did not err in holding “that McAdoo may not rightfully claim this property tax exemption because he did not physically occupy the Ludington property as his home.” There was no dispute that he was never physically present at the property during the 2017 tax year. The court similarly rejected his related argument that his wife was simply a legal extension of himself. The statutory language belied any such claim “as the disabled veteran himself or herself is unambiguously the object of the express statutory requirement that the real property be ‘used . . . as a homestead by a disabled veteran’—not his or her spouse. Thus, under the unambiguous language of the statute, a surviving spouse may continue to claim, or claim in the first instance, the exemption in a tax year if, and only if, the disabled-veteran spouse was ‘otherwise eligible’ before his or her death. This additional provision would be at least partially superfluous under McAdoo’s proposed reading. Because McAdoo is both alive and did not physically occupy the property during the 2017 tax year, neither McAdoo nor his wife may properly claim the exemption.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (c)(i), (g), (j), & (k)(iii); In re Beck; In re Moss Minors; In re Hudson; In re BZ; In re Miller; Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White; Whether the trial court properly advised respondent of the consequences of his plea; Jurisdiction over a child; In re Ferranti; MCR 3.961(A); MCR 3.961(B)(3); MCL 712A.2(b); MCR 3.971(A); MCR 3.971(C)(2) now found in MCR 3.971(D)(2); The plain-error test; MCR 3.971(B)(4); MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § (j) was established, and that termination of respondent-father’s rights was in the child’s best interests. Also, although the trial court plainly erred by failing to inform him in a manner consistent with the demands of MCR 3.971(B)(4), the court could not hold that the plain error affected his substantial rights, nor had “it been shown that the error seriously affected the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of the child protective proceedings.” Thus, the court affirmed termination of his parental rights to the child. As to § (j), ample evidence was presented to terminate his parental rights under this subsection. There was evidence that his child was terrified of him, that she threatened suicide if returned to his care, that he physically assaulted and harmed her, “and that he endangered her safety through his chronic alcohol abuse and by regularly being intoxicated while caring for her.” Thus, the trial “court did not clearly err when it found that there existed a reasonable likelihood that returning the child to respondent would result in further physical and emotional harm. The same evidence also supported termination under the other grounds set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) relied on by the” trial court.