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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Judicial review of a decision from the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) concerning alleged unfair labor practices; Whether the pay-for-service fee policy violates the union’s duty of fair representation & is invalid regardless of whether it also violates MCL 423.209 or MCL 423.210 of Michigan’s Public Employment Relations Act (PERA); Janus v AFSCME Council 31
Addressing an issue of first impression in Michigan, the court held that in “the absence of legislative authorization, the pay-for-service fee policy at issue violates the union’s duty of fair representation and is invalid regardless of whether it also violates MCL 423.209 or MCL 423.210.” The court struck “down the Union’s pay-for-service fee policy because it violates the Union’s duty of fair representation, which makes it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the pay-for-service fee policy also constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of § 9 or § 10 of PERA.” The court affirmed “the analysis and holding contained in Part III of the Court of Appeals’ opinion to the extent it held that the Union’s pay-for-service fee policy was invalid on the basis that it violated the duty of fair representation, and” it affirmed “the Court of Appeals’ analysis and conclusion that Janus did not hold that a union can unilaterally fashion a policy or procedure imposing fees for services on only nonunion employees.” Considering the court’s “holding as to the duty of fair representation and the recent substantive amendments of PERA enacted by 2023 PA 9 and 2023 PA 114, we vacate as unnecessary the Court of Appeals analysis and holdings as to the alleged violations of § 9 and § 10 of PERA.” The court concluded that MERC’s findings of fact here “were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. To the extent MERC’s conclusions of law reflected a finding that the pay-for-services fee policy violated the duty of fair representation, this decision does not constitute a substantial and material error of law, nor does it violate a statutory or constitutional provision.” However, consistent with how the court handled the Court of Appeals’ decision, it vacated “MERC’s conclusions of law to the extent that MERC also determined that the pay-for-services fee policy violated § 9 and § 10 of PERA. With these qualifications, the decision of MERC is affirmed.”
Substantive due process claim challenging an arbitrator’s decision; Unfairness argument; Claim the arbitrator committed a contract law error; Rescission of a contract; An arbitrator’s authority; Contract interpretation
The court concluded plaintiff failed to show that the arbitration award at issue violated his due process rights or was unfair. Further, it found the award was consistent with the parties’ expressed intent and was within the arbitrator’s contractual authority. Thus, it affirmed the circuit court’s order confirming the award, which gave plaintiff “seven days to cure his $150,000 default on a parcel of real property he was buying from defendant, or to surrender the property to defendant.” Plaintiff contended the award should be vacated because the arbitrator denied him due process by giving him only seven days to pay. But the court noted that the arbitrator’s decision “was not a governmental action.” The parties stipulated to the arbitration services of a private company. The court found there was “no basis for regarding the arbitrator’s decision as governmental action. Plaintiff does not reference the trial court in his argument, and offers no support for the proposition that due-process protections apply to a privately mediated dispute.” The court also concluded he failed to show any unfairness. “The parties’ settlement agreement provided that any disputes regarding the agreement would ‘be decided by the mediator; acting as arbitrator[.]’” He did not challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement. Thus, he “consented to having the arbitrator resolve the dispute after [he] had defaulted on his payments.” As to the seven-day period, “the arbitration award simply allowed plaintiff to pay the balance owed under the agreements after [his] failure to make payments had resulted in three formal interventions to compel payments beginning in early 2019. Despite the seemingly short time constraint, it was not unfair that the award allowed [him] yet another opportunity to cure his defaults before he would be obliged finally to surrender his interest in the property.” He also asserted the arbitrator committed legal error, effectively rescinding the purchase contract “while failing to restore the parties to the positions they held before the contract.” But the court found no legal error apparent in the award. “Allowing plaintiff a short time to complete the purchase or surrender the property along with the 25% of the purchase price already paid, was not a demonstrably egregious error particularly given that the parties effectively agreed on this remedy for default in their settlement agreement.”
Motion for a new trial; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to properly respond to an expert witness’s sudden unavailability; Right to present a defense; Newly discovered evidence; Consideration of a postconviction polygraph exam; Other acts evidence of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b(1); Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, right to present a defense, newly discovered evidence, and a postconviction polygraph exam. Also, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting other acts evidence of domestic violence. He was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his wife, A. He discovered A “hanging from the basement rafters in their home with an extension cord wrapped around her neck and attached to a hook in the rafters.” Defendant argued that trial counsel failed to properly respond to a defense expert’s (Dr. D) “sudden unavailability due to a personal medical emergency, and that counsel’s deficient handling of that matter deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial on this ground after” a Ginther hearing. The court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion “that defense counsel’s decision to respond to [D’s] sudden and unexpected absence by offering [D’s] previous opinion letter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” The record indicated “that counsel considered and explored other potential options for responding to the situation and had legitimate reasons for declining to pursue those options, reasonably believed that [D] would not be available to testify anytime soon, and reasonably believed that [D’s] opinion letter could assist the defense by providing the jury with an opinion from a qualified expert that [A’s] death resulted from a suicidal hanging.” The fact that the “opinion letter did not address other potential causes for [A’s] thyroid cartilage tip fracture or fully discuss the significance of the absence of petechiae in [A’s] eyes did not render counsel’s strategy unsound where counsel was able to effectively explore those issues in his cross-examination of other witnesses.” As a result, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on this basis. The court further determined that (1) D’s absence did not deprive defendant of his right to present a defense, (2) additional proposed testimony by D did not qualify as newly discovered, and (3) defendant failed to establish “that the foundational requirements for consideration of polygraph results were satisfied.” Affirmed.
Sentencing; Consideration of youth as a mitigating factor; Miller v Alabama; People v Boykin; People v Snow; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Posey; Life without parole (LWOP); Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
The court concluded the trial court on resentencing “gave thorough and well-reasoned consideration to defendant’s age as it affected the proportionality of his sentence.” The court also held that the 40 to 60-year sentence it imposed for his first-degree murder conviction was proportionate and reasonable. He was also convicted of second-degree home invasion. He was 17 years old at the time of the crimes in 2006. He was originally sentenced to LWOP for the murder conviction but the case was remanded for resentencing under Miller. He asserted the trial court on resentencing did not “adequately consider his youth as a mitigating factor as required by Miller and its progeny, and that it imposed a disproportionate and therefore unreasonable sentence.” The court disagreed. At the end of the Miller hearing, “the trial court found that defendant was impetuous, lacking in complete growth, and impulsive in his behavior, and that he had failed to appreciate the risks or consequences of his behavior. [It] also acknowledged [his] upbringing and home environment, including the fact that his parents were largely absent from his life, leaving him to be raised by his sickly grandmother. [It] also discussed defendant’s lack of a bond with his parents and the fact that [his] childhood was characterized by bullying, substance abuse, academic struggle, trauma, and domestic violence.” Further, it found that he “was working toward rehabilitation.” The court concluded the record showed “the trial court more than adequately considered defendant’s youth in light of Miller.” In addition, it “discussed all four Snow objectives and how they impacted its sentencing decision.” The court further determined that he failed to show “his sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate under the circumstances of” the case. The trial court noted he “expressed genuine remorse for killing the victim” and it acknowledged the possibility he “may have the potential to be a law-abiding citizen upon release.” But it also considered an MDOC evaluation classifying him “as a having a high risk of recidivism and a medium risk for violence.” It additionally considered, among other things, his age as it impacted his rehabilitation potential, “the sentencing objectives of deterrence, the protection of society, and” disciplining defendant, and “the horrific nature of the crime and the suffering of the victim’s family.” Affirmed.
Termination of parental rights & stepparent adoption under MCL 710.51(6); Ability to support the child during the two years preceding the filing of the petition; MCL 710.51(6)(a); Social Security Disability (SSD)
The court concluded that the trial court did not err by holding that respondent-father “had the ability to support LW during the two years preceding the filing of the petition but failed to do so.” Petitioner (LW’s mother) petitioned the trial court to allow her husband, LW’s stepfather, to adopt him, alleging “that respondent had not supported or had contact with LW for six years.” The court noted that the “primary purpose of MCL 710.51 is to foster stepparent adoptions in situations in which the natural parent has regularly and substantially failed to support or contact his or her child and refuses to consent to stepparent adoption.” It was undisputed that respondent sought “to prevent the stepfather from adopting the child.” It was “also undisputed that the most recent child support order entered in this case indicated that respondent’s child support obligation ended in 2012 as a result of [his] assertion that his only income was from SSD. Therefore, this case should be treated as though no support order had been entered.” Thus, the court noted “the issue before the trial court was whether respondent had the ability to support LW and, if so, whether [he] ‘failed or neglected to provide regular and substantial support’ for the child.” He argued there was no evidence “that he had the ability to regularly and substantially support LW during the two years preceding the filing of the petition.” The court found that since 2009, he “has regularly received SSD payments on the basis of his unidentified disability. [He] testified that, before 2019, SSD payments were his only means of income and he provided some level of support to LW from that income.” The record was “unclear as to whether respondent continued to work after 2019 or during the two-year statutory period, but there was no evidence or testimony that the SSD payments ever ceased; in fact, [his] counsel stated at the hearing that respondent was ‘on disability, social security’ and ‘that is his income.’” Further, while he “was incarcerated at the time of the hearing, he had only been incarcerated for six of the 24 months of the statutory period; additionally, there was no testimony or evidence presented that the incarceration had affected his receipt of SSD payments. The requirements of MCL 750.51 do not contain an exception for an incarcerated parent.” Given his “past support of LW and the fact that he continued to receive SSD benefits during the statutory period, the trial court did not err by determining that [he] had the means to provide some form of child support during the statutory period yet failed to do so.” Affirmed.
Auto negligence; Third-party no-fault claim under MCL 500.3135; Motion for relief from judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); Heugel v Heugel; Threshold injury; Closed-head injuries; MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii); Churchman v Rickerson
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiffs’ motion for relief from judgment, vacating the order granting defendant-Amazon’s motion for summary disposition, and reinstating plaintiffs’ claims. As such, it also abused its discretion by denying Amazon’s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff sued defendants for injuries they sustained when they were rear-ended by a semi-truck. Amazon moved for summary disposition, arguing that none of the plaintiffs sustained a threshold injury, and even if they did, no excess wage loss claims could be pursued against it. The trial court initially dismissed plaintiffs’ claims and entered judgment for Amazon. But it later set aside its previous order granting Amazon summary disposition and granted plaintiffs’ motion for relief from judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). Later, it denied Amazon’s motion for reconsideration and plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal. On appeal, Amazon argued “the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs relief from judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f)—thereby setting aside an order granting Amazon’s motion for summary disposition—when plaintiffs did not seek relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), the decision reinstated claims plaintiffs actually conceded and abandoned, and no extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant such relief as required under that rule.” Amazon also argued the trial court should have granted its motion for reconsideration of that erroneous decision. The court agreed, finding the trial court “clearly abused its discretion in granting plaintiffs relief from that judgment on the stated grounds.” First, its “justification for granting plaintiffs relief from the judgment, entered in Amazon’s favor, under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), i.e., because [it] missed two mentions of traumatic brain injuries in plaintiffs’ responsive brief, was erroneous.” Second, its justification for granting them relief from the judgment, “i.e., because [it] may have missed a reference to a ‘traumatic brain injury’ located somewhere in the huge stack of medical records submitted with plaintiffs’ responsive brief, was erroneous.” Third, the justification that “plaintiffs provided ‘new evidence,’ was erroneous.” The trial court also “should not have granted relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) because even if [it] concluded that the third requirement of the test set forth in Heugel was met, i.e., ‘extraordinary circumstances [ ] exist that mandate setting aside the judgment in order to achieve justice,’ the substantial rights of Amazon, the opposing party, would be detrimentally affected by setting aside the judgment in Amazon’s favor.” Reversed and remanded.
Best interests of the child; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re LaFrance; Effect of relative placement; In re Atchley
Holding that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. He did not challenge the trial court’s ruling as to the existence of statutory grounds for terminating his rights. Rather, he argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it found that termination was in the best interests of the child because he was unable to complete his parent-agency agreement due to his incarceration, and the child was in a relative-placement with her paternal aunt (G). “Given the amount of time respondent had before being incarcerated to comply with his parent-agency agreement, there is no evidence to support his contention that he would be compliant if given more time following his release from prison. This is compounded by the fact that [he] could only guess when he would be released.” The trial court found that even if he “was released from jail in 90 days, he still lacked suitable housing and a stable income.” Further, while a child’s placement with a relative weighs against termination, the trial court found G provided the child “with the permanency and stability that she needed and that respondent could not provide.” Respondent claimed to have phone calls with the child “while incarcerated, but the trial court did not find the calls to be enough to maintain contact with” the child. Instead, it found the child “did not know her father and was not bonded with him.” The court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court erred in these findings. Termination of respondent’s parental rights would allow [G] to move forward with adoption.”