Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Rulings as to the ownership distribution of a company & a promissory note; Findings of fact in a bench trial; Glen Lake-Crystal River Watershed Riparians v. Glen Lake Ass’n; Wright v. Wright; McDonald v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.; Contract interpretation; Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.; Burkhardt v. Bailey; Amount due pursuant to the promissory note; Whether the claim for unpaid rent was barred by the doctrine of laches; Badon v. General Motors Corp.; Attorney Gen. v. PowerPick Club; Tenneco Inc. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co.
The court held that the trial court did not err by enforcing the ownership distribution set forth in the parties’ written agreement while also ruling that one business (FSG) was indebted to the plaintiff-estate under the promissory note. Also, the trial court did not err in ruling on the amount due pursuant to the promissory note, and the claim for unpaid rent was not barred by the doctrine of laches. The case arose from a dispute concerning business dealings between defendant/counterplaintiff-Johnny Ray Farmer and his now deceased brother, Jimmy D. Farmer. Before Jimmy’s death in 2013, the brothers owned several businesses together, but only the ownership and financial assets of FSG was at issue here. Johnny argued that the trial court’s rulings as to FSG’s ownership distribution and the promissory note resulted in a “double dip.” He contended that “the promissory note was executed for the purpose of recognizing Jimmy’s larger initial investment in FSG, which should have resulted in equalized ownership interests.” Thus, Johnny argued that the trial court should have held that he owned “50% of FSG and FSG was indebted to Jimmy under the promissory note, or, alternatively,” that he only owned 27.8% of FSG “and FSG was not indebted to Jimmy under the promissory note.” But the court held that this argument lacked merit. The 1998 document Johnny and Jimmy signed as directors of FSG unambiguously stated “that Jimmy owned 72.2% of FSG and that Johnny owned 27.8% of FSG. The 2001 promissory note” was likewise “unambiguous in providing that FSG was indebted to Jimmy in the amount of $80,000, plus interest.” While the court acknowledged that the principal value of the note coincided with the disparity in their initial contributions, nothing in the language of the note suggested “that it altered the ownership division expressed in the 1998 document.”
Motion for a new trial under MCR 6.431(B) & to reopen proofs under MCR 6.431(C); New trial based on newly discovered evidence; People v. Cress; People v. Rao; Webert v. Maser; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg
The court held that defendant was not entitled to a new trial or to reopen the proofs based on new found evidence that he suffered from an autism spectrum disorder that he asserted explained his behavior during his police encounter. He also was not entitled to remand for an evidentiary hearing on “new evidence that the arresting officer did not follow protocol and had motive to lie.” He was pulled over for speeding. However, because the road was busy and did not have shoulders, the officer honked his horn several times trying to communicate that he wanted him to pull his vehicle into a nearby driveway. Defendant slowly moved his vehicle forward, but continued driving as the officer followed behind him with emergency lights and siren still activated. When backup arrived, his vehicle was surrounded and he was taken into custody. At trial, he claimed he was confused. He was convicted of third-degree fleeing and eluding. At sentencing, he sought a new trial or to reopen the proofs based on new found evidence that he suffered from an autism spectrum disorder. The trial court denied his request. On appeal, he also sought remand for an evidentiary hearing as to new evidence concerning the arresting officer. The court found that the evidence “was not ‘newly discovered’ or could have been discovered before trial ‘using reasonable diligence.’” With reasonable diligence, defendant “could have investigated his potential mental health issues, and could have discovered his autism disorder prior to trial.” Further, he could have earlier developed evidence about “the proper procedure to notify a car to move to a safer location during a traffic stop.” Finally, the court rejected his argument that newly discovered evidence of the officer’s “less than stellar service record” warranted at least a remand for reconsideration of his motion for a new trial, noting that, “with reasonable diligence, [defendant] and his counsel could have questioned the appropriateness of the officer’s actions before trial.” Appellate counsel’s paralegal’s “‘routine internet search’ could have been conducted at any time with reasonable diligence, including before trial.” Finally, the court rejected his claim that “his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate his mental condition and its impact on his actions before trial.” There was no indication in the record that his “attorney should have suspected that [defendant] was on the autism spectrum and could not process environmental cues during the traffic stop.” No one had diagnosed him “with autism spectrum or Asperger’s disorder before this incident.” Affirmed.
Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; People v. Perkins; People v. Fomby; Narrative testimony; MRE 611(a); People v. Wilson; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Vaughn; Strickland v. Washington; Failure to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Waiver; People v. Carter; People v. Jackson (On Reconsideration); Relevance & unfair prejudice; MRE 401-403; People v. Mills; People v. Unger; People v. Vasher; People v. Blackston; Credibility; People v. Hardiman; Right to a fair trial; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17; Judicial bias; People v. Stevens; People v. Jackson; People v. Willis; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 4; MCL 777.34
The court held that the trial court did not err by allowing the admission of testimony from the detectives or a recording of a conversation between defendant and his mother. It also held that there was no judicial bias and that defense counsel waived any error as to the scoring of OV 4. He was convicted of first-degree home invasion, conspiracy to commit first-degree home invasion, possession of burglar’s tools, felon in possession (FIP), and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 23 to 50 years for the first-degree home invasion and conspiracy convictions, 10 to 20 years for the possession of burglar’s tools and FIP convictions, and consecutive terms of 2 years for each felony-firearm conviction. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the detectives to testify about surveillance footage shown to the jury, noting it “did not invade the province of the jury because the jury was able to reach its own conclusions as to whether [he] was the other suspect seen in the video.” Further, he was not prejudiced by any of the testimony and his counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it. The court also rejected his claim that a recording of a jail visit between himself and his mother should have been excluded as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, noting that, “in light of the overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt, he simply cannot establish prejudice stemming from this alleged error.” It further rejected his contention that a question posed by the trial court pierced the veil of judicial impartiality. “Considering that none of the factors favors [his] position that the veil of judicial impartiality was pierced, [he] has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the trial judge’s conduct during trial improperly influenced the jury by creating the appearance of advocacy or partiality against” him. Finally, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to resentencing because the trial court erred in scoring OV 4, noting his “counsel waived this argument by explicitly and affirmatively agreeing with an assessment of 10 points for OV 4,” which extinguished any error. Affirmed.
Interpretation of provisions of the Michigan Election Law (MCL 168.1 et seq.); Department of Envtl. Quality v. Gomez; MCL 168.542; Placement of the name of a candidate; MCL 168.53; MCL 168.93; MCL 168.551; Affidavit of identity; MCL 168.558(1); MCL 168.550
Holding that the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ requested relief, “finding it had no authority to order defendant to place a candidate on the ballot without that proposed candidate having first filed the requisite petition and an affidavit of identity,” the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying plaintiffs’ emergency claim of appeal to overturn a decision by defendant. MCL 168.53 and MCL 168.93 both “require that nominating petitions, signed by a requisite number of qualified and registered electors, be filed with the Secretary of State on or before 4:00 p.m. on the fifteenth Tuesday before the August primary.” Plaintiffs (who sought to be placed on the ballot) readily admitted they filed no nominating petitions. “Further, a candidate must file an affidavit of identity when filing a nominating petition.” Plaintiffs, having failed to file nominating petitions, and also having failed to file the required affidavits of identity, as required by law, could not be placed on the ballot. They did not contend that they satisfied the statutory requirements for being placed on the primary ballot. “MCL 168.550 expressly precludes the printing of their names on the primary ballot.”
Divorce; Prenuptial agreement; Reed v. Reed; MCL 557.28; Whether defendant-husband’s income from his law firm & investment of those funds remained his separate property; Use of the word “all”; Peters v. Gunnell, Inc.; Whether the prenuptial agreement should have been deemed unenforceable; Lentz v. Lentz; Rinvelt v. Rinvelt; Allard v. Allard (On Remand); Property division; Richards v. Richards; Sparks v. Sparks; Washington v. Washington; Spousal support; Gates v. Gates; Loutts v. Loutts; Berger v. Berger; Woodington v. Shokoohi; Attorney fees; Borowsky v. Borowsky; Myland v. Myland; Request for remand to a different trial judge; In re Susser Estate; Cain v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr.; MCR 2.003(C); In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420; Schellenberg v. Rochester MI Lodge No. 2225 of the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks; The trial court’s exercise of its discretion to control the proceedings; Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Daniel J Aronoff Living Trust
The court found that the trial court properly interpreted the parties’ prenuptial agreement in ruling that defendant-husband’s income from his law firm (and his investment of those funds) remained his separate property. However, it held that the trial court erred in dividing the marital property because it ignored the prenuptial agreement in doing so. Thus, it vacated the parts of the divorce judgment relating to the distribution of the marital estate. As the spousal support award necessarily depended on the property distribution, it also vacated that award. But the court affirmed the award of attorney and expert witness fees to plaintiff-wife, and rejected defendant’s request to remand the case to a different judge. It concluded that the “language of the prenuptial agreement was broad and specific” as to the extent of separate property. The parties used “the word ‘all’ when describing the ‘sums earned as a result of the separate asset of either party subsequent to their marriage . . . .’” There is no broader classification. As to the property division, the “trial court erred in distributing the marital estate without referencing or relying on the prenuptial agreement.” It instead relied only “on its findings of fact and their application to the Sparks factors to determine what it believed to be an equitable and just distribution of the estate.” It erred in doing so because it was not allowed “to simply disregard the prenuptial agreement and resort to equitable considerations without any analysis as to why it was doing so.” The court noted that there were several relevant provisions in the prenuptial agreement that should have been considered. It instructed the trial court on remand to begin by considering whether certain photos, “defendant’s apartment furnishings and furniture,” and an account containing social security benefits received by plaintiff’s daughter were “separate or marital property under the prenuptial agreement.” It then should “follow the agreed upon terms of the prenuptial agreement to award the separate property to the relevant party and then divide the jointly owned property ‘as equally as may be accomplished’” in order to enforce the clear and unambiguous language of the prenuptial agreement.
Dispute over title to real property; Motion to dismiss the entire case following the parties’ acceptance of the case evaluation award; Interpretation & application of the court rule governing case evaluation (MCR 2.403); Magdich & Assoc., PC v. Novi Dev. Assoc. LLC; Larson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; MCR 2.403(M)(1); CAM Constr. v. Lake Edgewood Condo. Ass’n; Failure to exempt any of the equitable claims from case evaluation; MCR 2.403(A)(3); MCR 2.403(C)(1); Lack of a separate award; MCR 2.403(K)(3); Forest City Enters., Inc. v. Leemon Oil Co.; RN W Constr. Co. v. Barra Corp. of Am., Inc.
The court vacated the order granting defendant sole title to the property, reversed the order denying plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the entire case with prejudice. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by not granting his motion to dismiss the entire case following the parties’ acceptance of the case evaluation award. The court agreed. The parties submitted their claims to case evaluation, and both accepted the resulting evaluation. Neither “moved to exempt their equitable claims from the evaluation, nor did the parties stipulate to exempt any of their equitable claims from case evaluation.” Neither sought “to exempt any of their claims from case evaluation.” Rather, they “submitted all of their claims to case evaluation.” They accepted the $0 award, which was necessarily paid within 28 days. “Because no claims were exempted, the award constituted a ‘final adjudication’ of all the parties’ claims,” and once the award was paid, the trial court had to dismiss their “claims with prejudice under MCR 2.403(M)(1).” It erred by holding otherwise. The court noted that this result was “not affected by the case evaluation panel’s apparent failure to state a separate award amount for defendant’s claim against plaintiff or its note that defendant’s counterclaim ‘has merit.’” Regardless of the panel’s note, the result of acceptance was “straightforward: once ‘both parties accepted the case evaluation award without qualification . . . the case [was] over.’” The trial court’s subsequent order removing plaintiff from the title to the property was improper. It reasoned that it did not need to “address the merits of defendant’s counterclaim because the parties’ acceptance of the case evaluation award determined that plaintiff did not have any interest in the property.” But this “was beyond the scope of permissible relief; all that the case evaluation award decided—and all that it could decide—was that plaintiff’s claims entitled him to $0.” This was not equivalent to deciding that he “had no interest in the property.”
Associational standing to sue regarding Medicaid cuts; Lewis v. Casey; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno; Summers v. Earth Island Inst.; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n; United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown; Warth v. Seldin; Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife; Whether the plaintiff-Washtenaw Association for Community Advocacy had standing to seek an injunction; Whether there was an “imminent injury” from the alleged due process violation; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s order denying a preliminary injunction regarding Medicaid cuts due to lack of standing for injunctive relief. Plaintiff-Washtenaw Association for Community Advocacy (the Association) is a nonprofit community organization assisting individuals with developmental disabilities. It joined three individual plaintiffs and sued defendant-Washtenaw County Community Mental Health (WCCMH) and others over cuts to the Medicaid Habilitation Supports Waiver (the Program), challenging the cuts and the alleged lack of due process proceeding them. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction pending a ruling on the merits, but the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the court held that an association, just like an individual plaintiff, must have standing for each claim it asserts “and ‘for each form of relief sought.’” The court stated that the dispositive issue on appeal was “whether the Association through any named member has standing to seek its requested relief on this interlocutory appeal[,]” not “whether the Association through any named member has standing to pursue its due process claim.” The Association was seeking the preliminary injunction to allow WCCMH to give its unnamed members “fresh notices” and “hearing rights” regarding the cuts to the reductions in their Community Living Support budgets and to have an Administrative Law Judge determine whether the budget cuts were proper. However, none of the three named members was likely to establish standing to the relief sought where they had already received administrative hearings before the complaint was filed and thus, were not suffering from any deprivation of due process. Although it is possible that one of the named plaintiffs could have standing to assert a due process claim, that is not the same as standing for injunctive relief. The court remanded for further proceedings, noting that the district court must review the standing issue for each claim and each form of relief sought.
Medical malpractice; Locke v. Pachtman; Necessity of expert testimony to establish a breach of the applicable standard of care; Gonzalez v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr.; MRE 702 & 703; Effect of failing to move to strike plaintiff’s expert’s testimony; Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. University of MI Bd. of Regents
On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted, the court reversed the denial of defendants’ summary disposition motion and remanded for entry of an order granting them summary disposition, holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issues of material fact as to the defendant-doctor’s breach of the applicable standard of care (SOC). This medical malpractice case arose from a shoulder replacement surgery. The court noted that plaintiff’s expert (Dr. R) ultimately only stated that the SOC “required a surgeon to diligently investigate continuing complaints of post-surgical shoulder pain, and that defendant would have breached that standard if plaintiff had made, and defendant had ignored, such continuing complaints made more than 7 to 10 days after the surgery.” R also admitted that his review of the medical records here did not show “plaintiff making such complaints.” Based on R’s expert opinion (and the other evidence presented to the trial court), the court held that plaintiff failed to show that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant breached the applicable SOC by ignoring his “complaints of post-surgical pain.” As R noted, the medical records lacked “references to ongoing pain, particularly after the 7- to 10-day post-surgical period during which [R] stated a patient would commonly experience” post-surgical pain. While there were references to drainage and swelling issues, there were no complaints of continuing pain. The record did “not show that defendant ignored any complaint from plaintiff.” Plaintiff’s expert testified that specific actions defendant took, “including prescribing oral antibiotics, taking samples for laboratory analysis, draining the area when a post-surgical hematoma developed, etc., were all reasonable steps for a surgeon to take in treating plaintiff’s symptoms, if they occurred in the absence of continuing complaints of post-surgical pain.” The court noted that plaintiff “never testified in his deposition that he suffered from continuing pain post-surgery or that he had informed defendant of any such pain.” As he failed to establish the breach of the SOC element, defendants were entitled to summary disposition.
Slip & fall on ice; Premises liability; Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.; Duty to invitees; Lugo v. Ameritech Corp.; Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc.; Serinto v. Borman Food Stores; Hoffner v. Lanctoe; Grandberry-Lovette v. Garascia; Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship; Principle that notice can be actual or constructive; Lowrey v. LMPS & LMPJ, Inc.; Principle that ice buildup without more does not permit a court to impute to a defendant constructive notice of a specific ice buildup on a particular day; Altair v. Alhaj; Principle that a premises owner does not have a duty to guarantee that ice will never form on its premises but does have a duty to ensure that invitees are not unnecessarily exposed to an unreasonable danger; Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Servs.; Expert testimony; Badalamenti v. William Beaumont Hosp.-Troy; Principle that a non-movant, when presented with evidence that no genuine issue of material fact exists, must present more than speculation or conjecture in rebuttal to survive a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10); Coblentz v. Novi
Holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant-store’s actual or constructive notice of the ice on which she slipped, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition and remanded for entry of an order granting it. Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on ice in defendant’s parking lot. The trial court entered an order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition “for the reasons stated on the record.” On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that because plaintiff failed to show that it had actual or constructive notice of the alleged ice, it was entitled to summary disposition. Plaintiff did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant’s actual or constructive notice of the ice. “At best, the statements referred to by plaintiff only indicate[d] that [defendant’s] employee told plaintiff that she would take care of the ice once plaintiff had made her aware of it.” These statements “do not support the inference that the employee had prior knowledge of the hazard.” Plaintiff “variously testified that an employee told her that she ‘was going to handle it,’ ‘would get to it,’ ‘was going to get to it,’ ‘that they hadn’t got [sic] to it’ and ‘would take care of it.’ None of these statements, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, individually or in their totality establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the employee’s knowledge of the ice before plaintiff’s fall.” At best, “they provide a factual basis for how plaintiff arrived at the belief that the employee knew about the ice before her fall.” Her “subjective belief based on one of many possible inferences from the employee’s statements is not sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition. To conclude otherwise would be nothing more than plausible conjecture and subjective belief, neither of which is sufficient to establish a question of fact to withstand summary disposition.” Thus, plaintiff did not carry "her burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding actual notice.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g) & (j); Effect of the fact the children are living safely elsewhere; In re Medina; In re Sanders; Insufficient income & lack of appropriate housing; In re Gonzalez/Martinez; Relevance of a parent’s psychological evaluations; In re Johnson; Probative value of evidence of how a parent treated one child; In re AH; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White
Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ (g) and (j) supported termination and in determining that it was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. She asserted the trial court erred in finding that she did not provide them with proper care and custody given that they were in their father’s care and she had offered to agree to him having sole custody. “However, a trial court is not forbidden to terminate the rights of a parent merely because the children are safely living elsewhere.” The court also noted that the “father opposed resolving the termination case by simply awarding him custody, noting that respondent could later ask for a modification in custody or parenting time.” The fact that they were safely living with him did “not detract from the danger respondent poses to them if they were ever to be returned to” her. The risk that she “would fail to provide proper care and custody was well-established by her poor prognosis and risk of recidivism as found in her sex offender assessment as well as by evidence of [her] poor judgment, lack of boundaries, lack of responsibility and empathy, and poor insight into her own issues as found in her psychological evaluation.” Further, the fact that her “housing conditions and unstable work conditions did not improve after her release” from incarceration on a CSC II conviction as to an unrelated minor indicated she could not provide a stable home. As to the children’s best interests, while the trial court considered the strength of their bond with respondent, it also considered that at the time of the termination hearing, they “had been living with their father and grandmother for quite some time. The children’s bond with their father and paternal grandmother was strong. The trial court also noted that respondent’s actions had resulted in damage to her relationship with the children and her absence from their lives.” It did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that she posed a risk of harm to them and that termination would give them finality and permanency, despite their bond with her.