Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (MCL 28.721 et seq.); Actions seeking injunctive & declaratory relief on the basis that the SORA as amended violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to plaintiffs; Does #1-5 v. Snyder (6th Cir.); Whether the trial court properly declined to address some of plaintiffs’ claims; Thomas M Cooley Law Sch. v. Doe I; Principle that generally if a statute only applies prospectively the prior version of the statute applies to acts that occurred before the new statute’s effective date; People v. Doxey
The court concluded that because the Court of Claims’ ex post facto analysis resolved the cases in these consolidated appeals, any decision on plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional claims would have been unwarranted dicta and constituted a prohibited advisory opinion. Further, even if the Court of Claims erred, plaintiffs could not show that their constitutional rights were violated. Finally, the court clarified the effect of the 2006 and 2011 SORA amendments on registrants who committed their crimes before the amendments’ effective dates. Plaintiffs were “convicted sex offenders whose offenses occurred in 1994 and 2011, respectively.” They did not take issue with the relief the Court of Claims granted them – “an injunction enjoining retroactive application of the 2006 and 2011 SORA amendments consistent with Does #1-5.” Rather, they sought further relief, effectively asking the court “to declare the SORA facially unconstitutional—allegedly because it is vague and creates an irrebuttable presumption as to an element of proof—and to reverse their underlying convictions.” The Court of Claims did not consider these claims because it resolved the cases “on the basis that retroactive application of the SORA amendments to plaintiffs” violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court concluded that the Court of Claims did not err in failing to address their additional claims. Further, assuming without deciding that it did, plaintiffs could not establish that their constitutional rights were violated by this alleged error “because the substantive provisions of the 2006 and 2011 amendments do not apply to” them and thus, “those amendments’ alleged unconstitutional effects do not touch on plaintiffs’ substantial rights.” As to the effect of those amendments on registrants whose crimes occurred before the effective dates of the amendments, “Does #1-5 determined that the SORA, as amended, does not apply retroactively, given that such application would result in” an ex post facto violation. Thus, “the prior version of the SORA in effect at the time of plaintiffs’ convictions” applied to them. Affirmed.
Modification of a parenting-time order; The Child Custody Act (MCL 722.21 et seq.); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Shade v. Wright; The statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23) & parenting-time factors (MCL 722.27a(7)); Failure to make findings of fact before granting a motion to modify parenting time
Holding that the trial court erred by modifying a parenting-time order without first making any factual findings, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant-father’s motion and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted that a trial court must make several findings before modifying parenting time. It may “modify a previous parenting-time order for proper cause or because of changed circumstances if the modification serves the child’s best interests.” If a modification would change the child’s established custodial environment (ECE), the moving party has to show by clear and convincing evidence that the change is in the child’s best interests. But if the proposed change does not change the ECE, the moving party must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is in the child’s best interests. Further, both the statutory best-interest factors and parenting-time factors are relevant. The trial court here “failed to make findings on any of these issues.” It did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. It did not make findings as to the ECE, whether the requested change in parenting time would alter the ECE, or whether the proposed change served the best interests of the child. It also “did not address whether defendant established proper cause or changed circumstances.” It failed to “evaluate the child’s best interests using any statutory factors. On remand, the trial court must follow the framework for ruling on a modification of parenting time and articulate its findings.”
Divorce; Division of marital property; Whether property is marital property or separate property; Reeves v. Reeves; Korth v. Korth; Cunningham v. Cunningham; Equitable division; Berger v. Berger; McDougal v. McDougal; Spousal support; Woodington v. Shokoohi
The court held that the trial court did not err by awarding defendant-ex-husband the parties’ former marital home. The parties divorced and the trial court awarded defendant the house, a duplex, along with responsibility for the tax lien and the mortgage. It declined to award spousal support. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff-ex-wife’s argument that the duplex was separate property, not marital property, because defendant transferred his interest in the house to her. It noted that “although the trial court acknowledged the existence of the quitclaim deed, [it] ruled that the termination of defendant’s interest in the property was not equitable and that it was marital property. Unlike new property acquired after a separation, defendant’s transfer of his interest in the marital home to plaintiff did not negate his contribution to the house during the course of the marriage.” Further, the court found the “award of the house to defendant was fair and equitable. The trial court noted “the length of the marriage, the parties’ ages, the income disparity between the parties, defendant’s receipt of government benefits, defendant’s inability to work because of his injury, both parties’ contribution to the upkeep of the house, and the absence of any other marital assets of significant value.” Even without the rental income, it “correctly noted that plaintiff’s demonstrated income was twice defendant’s income.” It also “acknowledged that defendant was saddled with a $36,000 tax lien on the house in addition to the mortgage, debts that exceed the monthly rental income. Awarding the house to defendant addressed the trial court’s primary concern with the parties’ disparate incomes.” The court also rejected her claim that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding income from the duplex’s rental apartment to defendant as spousal support. “First, the trial court did not award either party spousal support.” Next, its “purpose in awarding defendant the house was to equalize the parties’ incomes,” and he was responsible for the debts on it. As such, it “did not abuse its discretion when it resolved defendant’s request for spousal support by awarding him the house.” Affirmed.
Premises liability; Sanders v. Perfecting Church; Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Servs.; Duty a landowner owes to a visitor; Kosmalski v. St. John’s Lutheran Church; Trespasser; Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship; Willful & wanton misconduct; Taylor v. Laban; Ellsworth v. Highland Lake Dev. Assocs.; Liability for injuries to a licensee; White v. Badalamenti; Open & obvious danger; Lymon v. Freedland; Objective standard; Hoffner v. Lanctoe; A hazard concealed by darkness; Blackwell v. Franchi; Abke v. Vandenberg; Knight v. Gulf & W. Props., Inc.; Whether the danger as presented would have been discovered by an ordinary person upon casual inspection; Novotney v. Burger King Corp.; Prohibition on expanding the record on appeal; Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.; Personal protection order (PPO)
Concluding that plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants breached a duty owed to her whether she was a trespasser or a licensee, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. They did not engage in willful and wanton misconduct, and had plaintiff exercised ordinary care by using a flashlight, she would have discovered the hazard (a 23-inch tall post that was spray-painted orange with a silver cap) upon casual inspection. The incident occurred near a cabin in northern Michigan. Plaintiff tripped over a metal post defendants had installed on a boundary line. The court did not decide whether she was a trespasser or a licensee because there was no “genuine issue of material fact that defendants breached a duty” under either standard. As to the willful and wanton conduct standard applicable if she was a trespasser, while she asserted that they had a history of harassing her and her family, the only evidence she offered of this was an ex parte PPO prohibiting one of the defendants from shouting at or otherwise contacting her family. The court found that this was insufficient “to establish a genuine issue of material fact that defendants intentionally disregarded plaintiff’s safety.” It also concluded that their “actions in constructing a post near the existing survey markers in an open area of grass and spray-painting the post orange” indicated that they “considered the safety of people on the property and took affirmative steps to protect visitors from harm regardless of their status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.” If plaintiff was a licensee, they did not owe her a duty to remedy or warn of open and obvious dangers. The court found that an “ordinarily prudent person should expect dangers—especially tripping hazards—to be concealed by darkness in a natural, outdoor setting” such as the one here. While the post “was not a natural object, it posed a tripping hazard similar to that of a log, large rock, or hole.” Plaintiff also knew “that other artificial tripping hazards were present in the area.” Under the circumstances, “an ordinarily prudent person would have used a flashlight or similar lighting aid when crossing the path” she travelled and thus, would have discovered the post.
Trespass; D’Andrea v. AT&T MI; Activities on an easement; Schadewald v. Brule; Deference to a trial court’s credibility determinations; Berger v. Berger; Harmless error; MCR 2.613(A); Ypsilanti Fire Marshal v. Kircher (On Reconsideration); Contempt of court; Assault; Damages in a tort action; Health Call of Detroit v. Atrium Home & Health Care Servs., Inc.; Tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy; Cedroni Assoc., Inc. v. Tomblinson, Harburn Assoc., Architects & Planners Inc.; Private nuisance; Capitol Props. Group, LLC v. 1247 Ctr. St., LLC
The court held that the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs $7,400 in damages resulting from defendants’ trespass and assault. Also, it properly granted equitable relief to defendants as to the two easements on their property and plaintiffs’ trespass on defendants’ land. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erroneously concluded that they committed a trespass by moving a fence and boulders off the easement onto defendants’ property and by trimming trees on the easement. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs committed a de minimis trespass as to the trees, boulders, and fence, “which did not interfere with defendants’ use and enjoyment of the servient estate. In lieu of awarding” defendants damages, it “ordered plaintiffs to (1) relocate the portions of fence encroaching on defendants’ property back to the easement and (2) either return the boulders to” their prior location, or entirely remove them from the easement. It also ordered that “any future tree trimming or removal would be limited to the trees encroaching on the easement.” The court concluded that, as to the fence, the trial court’s finding was supported by the testimony of the person who “surveyed the land and indicated that the existing fence line was outside of the easement by 0.4 feet and 0.9 feet. There was no testimony suggesting that defendants ever authorized this invasion.” While a prior consent judgment “granted plaintiffs ‘the right to move the fencing encroaching into the easement at their own expense as long as the integrity of the field is enclosed during the process,’ nothing authorized them to move the fence to defendants land.” Thus, because the movement of the “encroaching fence resulted in ‘an unauthorized invasion upon the private property of another,’” it constituted a trespass. The consent judgment also did not give plaintiffs the right to move the boulders to defendants’ property. As to the trees, “the trial court only ordered plaintiffs to adhere to the consent judgment they were already required to follow.” Thus, they could show no harm from any error. While plaintiffs challenged the $500 they were awarded in assault damages, “the trial court did not clearly err by using the fine that would be assessed in a criminal case as a benchmark for damages” that should be recovered civilly. Affirmed.
Elements of a valid will under the Estates & Protected Individuals Code (MCL 700.1101 et seq.); MCL 700.2502(1)(a)-(c); Exception for an unsigned will; MCL 700.2503; In re Attia Estate; Clear & convincing evidence; In re Martin; Hearsay; Hearsay exception under MRE 803(3); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brooks; Credibility; Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. Grout
The court held that the probate court did not err by denying petitioner’s (the decedent’s boyfriend’s stepson) motion to admit an unsigned will as the will of decedent. Under the terms of the unsigned will, petitioner and his sister would receive the estate, which consisted primarily of assets left to the decedent by her boyfriend. Respondent (the decedent’s sister) claimed there was no discussion with the attorney about the decedent’s estate or will, that the decedent’s relationship with the stepchildren had soured near the end of her life, and that she “would never have made them beneficiaries of her estate.” The probate court denied petitioner’s motion, finding he failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended for the draft will to constitute her actual will. On appeal, the court concluded that the probate court’s finding that there “were ‘clearly misunderstandings’ by both” the decedent and respondent was well supported by the evidence. In addition, “respondent presented other testimony that cast doubt on” the decedent’s intentions. Further, “it was undisputed that respondent and [the decedent] were very close.” There was also doubt over whether the decedent even knew that the completed draft will existed. The court concluded that, “[i]n light of the conflicting testimony,” the probate court did not err “by determining that petitioner failed to establish, ‘by clear and convincing evidence, that the decedent intended the document to constitute . . . her will.’” The evidence “was not so strong as to establish a firm conviction that the unsigned draft will was evidence of” the decedent’s testamentary intent. Affirmed.