Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Jury instructions; People v. Moore; People v. McGhee; Whether an instruction on “mere presence” should have been given; People v. Gillis; Other acts evidence; People v. Waclawski; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. Knox; People v. Steele; People v. VanderVliet; People v. Dobek; People v. Sabin (After Remand); People v. Golochowicz; People v. Jones; Probative value; MRE 403; Prejudice; People v. Schaw; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; People v. Fisher; Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Graves; DNA evidence; Edry v. Adelman; Contributing to error by plan or negligence; People v. Witherspoon (After Remand); Waiver; People v. Green; Sufficiency of the evidence; Safe-breaking; MCL 750.531; Breaking & entering a building with intent to commit larceny; MCL 750.110; People v. Toole; People v. Davenport; Judicial bias; In re Contempt of Henry
The court held that there was no need for a “mere presence” instruction and the trial court did not err by declining to give one. It also rejected his challenges to the admission of other acts and DNA evidence. Further, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of safe-breaking and breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a larceny. Finally, it rejected his claim of judicial bias. He argued that the trial court erred by declining to give “a ‘mere presence’ jury instruction because such an instruction would have allowed the jury to conclude that he had merely been present at” the Indiana burglary to which he had pled guilty to aiding and abetting. He did “not explain or support with authority his apparent contention that the trial court was required to instruct the jury that it could essentially relitigate the Indiana case in its deliberations in this case.” Further, the jury received several limiting instructions as to the use of the other acts evidence admitted at trial, and was informed of his role in the Indiana burglary. The current charges against him “were not based on an aiding and abetting theory” and the jury was not instructed that he could be convicted as an aider and abettor. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other acts evidence on the basis it was sufficiently similar to the charged offenses in this case, and that the probative value of the other acts evidence was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Affirmed.
Search & seizure; U.S. Const. amend. IV; Const. 1963, art 1, § 11; People v. Hawkins; Probable cause; People v. Waclawski; People v. Echavarria; People v. Stumpf; People v. Ulman; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Watson; People v. Thomas; Failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Heft; People v. Pickens; People v. Ericksen; Sentencing; PSIR; People v. Grant; People v. Uphaus (On Remand); MCL 333.7401(1) & (2); MCL 333.7401(2)(a); MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv)
The court held that an evidentiary hearing on the statements in the affidavit was not warranted and that the warrant was supported by probable cause. Thus, the “affidavit described sufficient credible, reliable facts to give rise to probable cause and the issuance of the search warrant.” Defendant-Wright was convicted for second offense possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a controlled substance, and felon in possession of ammunition. He challenged the validity of the search warrant, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a Franks hearing to challenge the contents of the affidavit accompanying the search warrant. He further argued that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant was not supported by probable cause, contending that the confidential informant (CO) had only made one controlled buy and that his 48-hour-old CO was stale. He failed to make a preliminary showing that the search warrant affidavit contained any false statements warranting an evidentiary hearing. He produced no proof that statements in the affidavit were false or that these allegedly false statements were made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. His conclusory assertions showed nothing more than a desire to cross-examine the CO. Thus, the search warrant affidavit retained its presumed validity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold a hearing to inquire into its validity. Although Wright claimed to be challenging the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit, his challenges were aimed at the reliability of the CO, including the CO’s identity. He further maintained that the CO made only one controlled buy 48 hours before the police officer obtained the search warrant. He misinterpreted and minimized the contents of the affidavit. First, the police officer who prepared the warrant and affidavit explained that he previously worked with the CO to make two controlled buys of crack cocaine. This statement helped to establish the CO’s reliability. The police officer then noted that he received information from the CO in the last 48 hours that he could purchase crack cocaine from his home. The affidavit described the CO’s controlled buy of crack cocaine from Wright’s house in detail, including the affiant’s observation of the informant’s entry into his home with money and no drugs and his departure from his home with drugs and no money. The affidavit then stated that the CO told the police officer that he had previously bought drugs from the same house, where he knew Wright lived, and that Wright told him he could buy crack cocaine from him “at any time.” The controlled buy reinforced the CO’s statements about Wright and strengthens his credibility. Contrary to his assertion on appeal, these statements showed a continuing pattern of illicit behavior, further showing that the CO’s 48-hour-old information was not stale. Affirmed.
Personal injury action under the No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.); Serious impairment of a body function; MCL 500.3135(1), (2), & (5); McCormick v. Carrier
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding that plaintiff failed to show he suffered a serious impairment of a body function, as required to proceed on a tort claim against defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries he sustained when defendant sideswiped his motorcycle. The trial court found in favor of defendant. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that he suffered serious impairment of body function because the injury to his right knee affected his ability to lead a normal life. It noted that he “did not show that his injury had a measurable impact on his employment.” Before the accident, he worked as an audio engineer, which involved heavy lifting, and at a pub. Five days after the accident, he returned to work at the pub one or two days per week, but stopped after two months. Although he “claimed that he was not able to perform the same type of work because he still could not lift heavy equipment, he was clearly able to work in some capacity.” In addition, his doctor lifted all restrictions a couple of months after the accident, but he “apparently stopped working then.” He “was able to work after the accident, and his decision to stop working two months later did not show that the knee injury was responsible for this decision.” He also “claimed that he was unable to engage in certain hobbies, such as driving his motorcycle and kayaking.” However, his doctor “testified that he would not restrict plaintiff with respect to these specific activities . . . .” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); Principle that at least one statutory ground must be met; In re VanDalen; Reunification services; Failure to engage in the services offered; In re Frey; Best interests of the child; In re White; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Principle that a trial court may consider the entire record when making its best-interests determination; In re Trejo Minors; In re Hudson; In re La Flure
The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondents-parents’ parental rights to the child where at least one statutory ground for termination existed and it was in the child’s best interests. The trial court terminated their parental rights primarily on the basis of their unsafe, unsanitary, and inappropriate living conditions. On appeal, the court rejected respondent-father’s argument that he was not provided reasonable services to address his parenting deficiencies, noting both parents received numerous services but failed to engage in them. “More than a year after being informed that their lifestyle posed significant risks to their child, respondents failed to take the steps necessary to ensure [the child’s] safety while in their care.” In addition, “there remained a significant risk that [the child] would be harmed if returned to respondents’ care and, given respondents’ ambivalence to the hazards in their home and confrontation with caseworkers, there was no reasonable likelihood that respondents would be able to provide a safe environment for” the child within any reasonable time. The court also rejected their claim that the trial court did not properly assess whether termination of their parental rights was in the child’s best interests because it relied on the same information it used to make its statutory-grounds determination. It noted that “it is entirely proper for a trial court to consider the same evidence in its statutory-grounds and best-interests analyses.” Indeed, “the trial court may consider the entire record when making its best-interests determination.” Finally, it rejected their contention that the trial court failed to use the requisite multifactor analysis when making its best-interests determination, noting that “before making its best-interests determination and terminating [their] parental rights, the trial court did indeed consider [the child’s] age, respondents’ lack of compliance with the DHHS case-service plan, the deficiency of their parenting skills, [the child’s] need for permanency, and the likelihood that [the child] could not be returned to their home in the foreseeable future.” The evidence showed that they “consistently failed to comply with the case service plan, that they prioritized their personal needs over their financial obligations, and that they could not be expected to rectify the conditions that posed a danger to” the child. Their “inability to provide for [the child’s] safety support[ed] the trial court’s finding that termination was in [the child’s] best interests. Affirmed.