Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Claim for failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the Act); 42 USC § § 12112(b)(5)(A); Deister v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Jacobs v. North Carolina Admin. Office of the Courts (4th Cir.); Inapplicability of McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting; Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc.; Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care Sys.; Requirement that an employer engage in an “informal, interactive process” as to reasonable accommodations; 29 CFR § 1630.2(o)(3); EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co. (5th Cir.); Beck v. University of WI Bd. of Regents (7th Cir.); Motion for reconsideration; Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e); Kerr for Kerr v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.; Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker; National Ecological Found. v. Alexander
The court held that plaintiff-Brumley failed to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate her disability because the ADA did not require defendant-United Parcel Service (UPS) to immediately grant her an accommodation but instead mandated that the parties engage in the “informal, interactive process” and she voluntarily abandoned that process. Brumley worked for UPS as a “sorter,” which sometimes required her to lift as much as 70 pounds. After injuring her back at work, she returned to work in a temporary position, but was prevented from returning to the sorter position because of continued work restrictions. She engaged in the ADA interactive process with UPS, but eventually discontinued the process, had her doctor remove her work restrictions, and then sued under the ADA and other statutes. The district court granted UPS summary judgment. The court first noted that the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework did not apply because claims for failure to accommodate “‘necessarily involve direct evidence. . . .’” It held that UPS was not required to “immediately” comply with Brumley’s request for accommodation under the Act, but “had discretion to provide a reasonable accommodation as identified through the interactive process. For this reason, if Brumley voluntarily abandoned the process, UPS is not liable for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.” The court rejected her claims that she was “coerced” into abandoning the interactive process, holding that she failed to provide sufficient evidence “to create a genuine issue of material fact as to her voluntariness.” Thus, the court concluded that she failed to establish her prima facie claim for failure to accommodate. Further, her motion for reconsideration was properly denied because a “Rule 59 motion was an improper vehicle for raising new arguments based on an unalleged retaliation” claim and her newly discovered evidence would not have helped prove her failure to accommodate claim. Affirmed.
First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 USC § 1983; Farhat v. Jopke; Whether plaintiff was acting as a “private citizen” & not a “public employee” entitling his actions to First Amendment protection; Garcetti v. Ceballos; Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, TN; Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist.; An individual’s First Amendment rights as a public employee; Connick v. Myers; Pickering v. Board of Educ.; McMurphy v. City of Flushing; Whether any protected speech was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in his termination; Boulton v. Swanson; Benison v. Ross; Thaddeus-X v. Blatter; Clemens v. Mount Clemens Cmty. Sch. Dist. (ED MI); Whether there was a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination violation; Garrity v. New Jersey; McKinley v. City of Mansfield; Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd.; Chavez v. Martinez; Qualified immunity; Mitchell v. Forsyth; Purisch v. Tennessee Tech. Univ.; Causey v. City of Bay City
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that plaintiff-Haddad could not support his First Amendment retaliation claim where he was not acting as a private citizen but instead was performing the duties of a public employee related to his job as an insurance contract examiner. He sued the defendant-Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services (MDIFS) for allegedly terminating his employment for exercising his First Amendment rights. As part of his job, Haddad conducted Market Conduct Exams (MCEs). He was terminated for violating defendants’ policies after he began investigating an insurance company’s no-fault “intra-family exclusion” (IFE). The district court granted defendants summary judgment. Addressing an issue raised for the first time on appeal, whether Haddad’s claim was not foreclosed because he was acting as a “virtual private citizen” when investigating the IFE, the court held that “he was acting pursuant to his official duties” and that he “was not acting as a private citizen because his desire to thwart the inclusion of IFEs in insurance policies was part of his job as an examiner. . . .” The court then adopted the district court’s opinion. The district court ruled that Haddad’s conduct was undertaken pursuant to his official duties “and not as a private citizen.” It found that even if some of his speech and activities could be attributed to a private citizen, the balancing test in Pickering defeated his claim. Balancing “the justifications for a speech restriction against the employee’s free speech interest[,]” Haddad failed to counter defendants’ claims that his actions were sufficiently disruptive to the MDIFS. He also was unable to show that any protected speech or activity was a substantial or motivating factor in his termination. The district court concluded that the defendants sufficiently established that he violated the MDIFS’s confidentiality policies. It also determined that his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when he was required to sign a Garrity form and his statements were then given to the attorney general because his statements were never used in a criminal proceeding. Lastly, the district court concluded that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as there was no constitutional violation. Affirmed.
Contractual indemnity; Genuine issue of material fact; Allison v. AEW Capital Mgmt., LLP; Mutuality; Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc.; Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of MI v. Nikkel; Agency; Meretta v. Peach; Blair v. Checker Cab Co.; Michael v. Kircher; Apparent authority; Atlantic Die Casting Co. v. Whiting Tubular Prods., Inc.; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Moon; Hearst Publ’g Co. v. Litsky; In re Union City Milk Co.; Constantine v. Kalamazoo Beet Sugar Co.; Cutler v. Grinnell Bros.; Actual authority; Field v. Jack & Jill Ranch; Ratification; David v. Serges; “Affirmance”; Sullivan v. Bennett
Holding that summary disposition to third-party defendant-W.H. Canon was not warranted under the facts as they stood, the court reversed summary disposition for Canon and remanded. An “arrow board” traffic control device malfunctioned and injured plaintiff, Canon’s employee. Canon had leased it from defendant-Spartan. Plaintiff sued Spartan for negligence. Spartan filed a third-party complaint against Canon for contractual indemnity. Spartan based its claim on a “Customer Leasing Contract” that was signed by a Spartan employee and G, an employee of Canon. Canon sent G to pick up the arrow board from Spartan. Before allowing G to take possession of it, Spartan required G to sign the leasing contract. On the back was an indemnity clause. Canon contended that G “lacked actual and apparent authority to bind Canon to the indemnification provision, and that the indemnity agreement was unenforceable because there was no mutual assent to that term in the leasing contract.” Initially, the court noted its “disagreement with the trial court that there was no mutuality of assent, or ‘meeting of the minds.’” Moving on to whether G could bind Canon to the contract, the court first held that, based on the undisputed facts, G “did not have apparent authority to sign the leasing contract for Canon.” However, it reached the opposite conclusion on the question of whether G had actual authority to contract on Canon’s behalf. Based on the evidence, there was “a question of fact whether Canon employees previously signed leasing contracts like the one” here, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Spartan, the court held that they had. “So, Canon employees picking up equipment from Spartan previously signed leasing contracts with Spartan on Canon’s behalf, Canon’s management knew or should have known about this because the employees handed those contracts to management, and yet no one from Canon ever objected or attempted to stop this practice.” Thus, there was “a question whether Canon knowingly acquiesced to [G]—or any employee that Canon sent to pick up equipment from Spartan—signing the leasing contract on Canon’s behalf.” If so, G had “actual authority to sign the leasing contract for Canon, and Canon is bound to the indemnity agreement.” Further, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Spartan, there was “a question whether Canon ratified the leasing contract by not repudiating it within a reasonable time after” G presented it to a purchasing agent for Canon.
Breach of contract; Termination of a distribution agreement; Contract interpretation; Dobbelaere v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Defining “wrongful possession”; Defining terms undefined in the contract; McGrath v. Allstate Ins. Co.; Whether defendant had no ownership interest in the sales route once plaintiff purchased it from its original owner; Unjust enrichment; Genesee Cnty. Drain Comm’r v. Genesee Cnty.; Whether an appellate brief should be struck for nonconformity with the MCRs; MCR 7.212(C)(6); Evidence not presented to the trial court; Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.
The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that defendant was entitled to terminate the distribution agreement because plaintiff “wrongfully possessed” cases of a product, or in concluding that defendant had a possessory or ownership interest in the sales route plaintiff had purchased. Further, his unjust enrichment claim was not viable given that there was a valid and enforceable contract. As a preliminary matter, the court declined to strike plaintiff’s appellate brief for nonconformity with the MCRs, finding that the nonconformity was not sufficient to warrant this action. As to the merits, the parties disputed whether plaintiff had committed a default by taking cases of a beef jerky product called Deer Cups. The contract did not define wrongful possession. Consulting a dictionary, the court found that the “term ‘wrongful’ is defined as ‘having no legal claim,’ and the term ‘possession’ is defined as ‘the act of having or taking into control.’” It concluded that at a minimum, the evidence suggested that “plaintiff knew, or should have known, that all of the products should have been paid for and listed on his bill of lading prior to their removal from the warehouse. Plaintiff knew that he did not order the Deer Cups, but instead of leaving them at the warehouse, plaintiff took them without paying for them and then sold two of them.” This showed that he exercised control over them “without legal authority to do so.” Thus, his actions constituted wrongful possession as described in the agreement. The court also concluded that, by “purchasing the distribution agreement, which was subject to defendant’s approval, plaintiff gained the right to service the sales route and customers that had been assigned to” the original owner. But defendant retained actual ownership of the “route and customers, which it maintained subject to” the agreement, which explicitly stated “that the sales routes and customers are not subject to sale between distributors.” Thus, defendant was not obligated to compensate plaintiff for the sale of the agreement after it was terminated. The court affirmed summary disposition for defendant.
Sentencing; Proportionality; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Davis; People v. Lee; Principle that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel & unusual punishments; Miller v. Alabama; Montgomery v. Louisiana; MCL 769.25 & MCL 769.25a; MCL 769.25(4) & (9); Presumption of constitutionality; People v. Dillon; Jail credit; MCL 769.11a; MCR 1.108(1); People v. Lyons; Constitutionality of MCL 769.25a(6); The Ex Post Facto Clause; U.S. Const., art 1, § 10; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 10; People v. Wiley; Principle that an unconstitutional statue is void ab initio; Johnson v. White
The court held that defendant’s resentence was not invalid, but that his jail credit was improperly calculated. In 1993, he was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to murder (AWIM), and felony-firearm. After a juvenile disposition hearing, the trial court sentenced him as an adult rather than a juvenile. He was sentenced to life without parole for first-degree murder, 15 to 40 years for each count of AWIM, and 2 years for felony-firearm. In 2017, the trial court resentenced him to 40 to 60 years for first-degree murder, but his other sentences remained the same. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his resentence was invalid because it was disproportionate, and because MCL 769.25 is unconstitutional. It first found that, “MCL 769.25, and effectively, MCL 769.25a, is not unconstitutional as applied to defendant because the application of these statutes in resentencing afforded [him] a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” The trial court showed “at the resentencing hearing that it thoughtfully weighed [his] maturity and ability for rehabilitation against the severity of the crimes, but ultimately determined that a 40-year minimum sentence was appropriate.” It also listed his “accomplishments while incarcerated, but gave more weight to the egregious nature of the crime.” The court next found that his “minimum sentence of 40 years was presumptively proportionate because it fell within the statutory range.” In addition, he failed “to articulate unusual circumstances that render his resentence disproportionate.” Further, the nature of his crime (the murder victim was a three-year-old child) “merited the trial court’s imposition of the highest statutory minimum sentence, which was also proportionate.” However, the court agreed with him that the jail credit included on his judgment of resentence was incorrect. “Based on the apparent error in calculation by the trial court, and its failure to specify why it included two fewer days of jail credit than that included in the updated PSIR, remand is necessary for a proper calculation of jail credit, and for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of resentence to reflect an award of 7,932 days of credit for time served.” Affirmed, but remanded.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support second-degree murder & assault with intent to murder (AWIM) convictions; People v. Smith; People v. McRunels; Aiding & abetting; MCL 767.39; People v. Robinson; People v. Carines; Mere presence; People v. Norris; Identity element; People v. Oliphant; Cell phone tracking evidence; MRE 702; People v. Kowalski; Abandoned argument; People v. Lopez; Prosecutorial misconduct; Knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction; People v. Aceval; A police witness’s identification of defendant in a surveillance video; Distinguishing People v. Fomby & United States v. LaPierre (9th Cir.); Remand for ministerial correction of the judgment of sentence (JOS); People v. Avant; Felon in possession (FIP)
The court held that there was sufficient evidence defendant was one of the shooters who killed one victim and caused serious injuries to two others to support his second-degree murder and AWIM convictions. He abandoned his claim as to the cell phone tracking evidence and failed to cite any Michigan case rejecting such expert testimony. As to his prosecutorial misconduct claim based on false testimony, given that the prosecution made “concerted efforts to correct the challenged testimony,” the court was not convinced that he was denied a fair trial. It also rejected his claim as to a police witness’s identification of him in a surveillance video where the video did not place him at the scene or identify him as a shooter. Thus, it affirmed his second-degree murder, AWIM, FIP, and felony-firearm convictions. But it remanded for the ministerial correction of his JOS, which incorrectly reflected that he was convicted after a guilty plea, instead of after a jury trial. The court concluded that the evidence established he was one of the shooters who killed victim-D and seriously injured victims-DC and KD. The record showed that KD would act as an intermediary between defendant’s girlfriend (A) and Oxycodone sellers. When KD tried to buy Oxycodone for A from an unfamiliar seller, he was “robbed of the $10,000 in purchase funds.” After the robbery, A called defendant, who was very upset about the loss of the money. The shooting occurred two days later. KD identified defendant and A as being at the scene. He testified “that defendant was one of the armed men who shot him” and D. DC saw another man in the house with A just before he was shot, and DC’s girlfriend saw a man run from the house with A just after DC was shot. The cell phone evidence and surveillance video footage from a hotel placed defendant and A in the city before the shooting. The cell phone evidence “also placed defendant in the vicinity of the shooting . . . contemporaneously with and after the shooting.” One of his cell phones police seized after the shooting revealed that he was searching the Internet for information about the crimes in the time period after they occurred.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support a carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) conviction; People v. Gaines; People v. Kosik; MCL 750.227; People v. Hernandez-Garcia; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to call any witnesses on defendant’s behalf; Waived issue; People v. Kowalski; People v. Shuler
Holding that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant-Hines concealed his gun from the victim, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict him of CCW. He was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, intentional discharge causing serious impairment, CCW, felon in possession, and felony-firearm. Applying the standard articulated in Hernandez-Garcia in this case, sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s finding that Hines concealed a gun. He argued that the victim’s testimony established that the victim did not look at Hines upon opening the door, but instead immediately turned back towards his TV. However, at trial, the prosecution questioned the victim about his interactions with Hines directly before the shooting in order to clarify the rapid events. During cross-examination, the victim also testified that he opened the door and looked at Hines’s face before turning around to go back toward the TV. Because the victim testified that he did not see Hines with a gun when he opened the door, the jury could infer that Hines’s gun was “not discernible by the ordinary observation of persons casually observing the person carrying it.” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Shaw; People v. Lane; Trial strategy; People v. Putman; Failure to make a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Relevance of a defendant’s possession of a weapon; People v. Houston; Credibility; People v. Bosca; Failure to develop an issue on appeal; Mitcham v. Detroit; Hearsay; MRE 801 & 802; Principle that when a defendant opens the door to evidence regarding an otherwise inadmissible topic, the prosecution may question the defendant about that topic; People v. Lukity; People v. Horn; Principle that, in general, a witness may be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement; MRE 607 & 613; People v. Rodriguez
The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of felon in possession (FIP), carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), felony-firearm, and operating a vehicle while his license was suspended (OWLS). The trial court sentenced him as a fourth habitual offender to 46 months to 15 years for FIP, 46 months to 15 years for CCW, 2 years for felony-firearm, and 67 days, time served, in jail for OWLS. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. It noted that because his girlfriend’s mother’s (C) testimony that he had a revolver “was relevant and therefore admissible, defense counsel was not ineffective when he failed to object to her testimony on relevancy grounds.” It also found that because defense counsel asked him about the issue of his identification, and his “explanation was presented to the jury, defendant’s claim on appeal that counsel should have argued that [he] lacked identification on the day he was arrested is meritless.” The court next held that he “opened the door to the prosecution’s line of questioning regarding [his former girlfriend’s (B)] statement, and defense counsel’s failure to ‘raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’” It further noted that "defense counsel’s failure to impeach [C] does not meet the second requirement of an ineffective assistance claim ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different.’” Finally, it found that defense counsel’s decision not to call B must be presumed to be a matter of trial strategy. Affirmed.
Other acts evidence in the form of photography books found in defendant’s home; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. Denson; People v. Starr; People v. Knox; MRE 404(a)(1); People v. Vasher; Relevance; MRE 401-402; People v. Railer; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v. Cameron; People v. Crawford; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Solloway; People v. Armstrong; Matters of trial strategy; People v. Russell; People v. Williams
Holding that the photography books found in defendant’s home were admissible under MRE 404(a)(1), that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them, and that defense counsel was not ineffective, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC I and II convictions. The trial court initially denied the prosecution’s motion to introduce the books under MRE 404(b). But defendant later opened the door to their admission by his direct testimony that “amounted to an assertion that his character would not allow him to act in the manner described by” one of the victims, who testified that he took a photo of her vagina. His testimony opened the door “to ‘cross-examination into relevant specific instances of conduct’ that would rebut defendant’s claimed character trait,” and thus his possession of the books containing explicit nude photos “of children became relevant to refute his assertion that he would not take such a photograph because he did not think it was right.” Noting that MRE 403’s balancing test applied, the court concluded that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the books was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” While it initially excluded them, finding that their prejudicial nature “substantially outweighed their probative value, that assessment changed when defendant testified that he did not think it was ‘right’ to take direct pictures of young children’s private areas. In so testifying, defendant made his possession of the photography books very probative of a fact at issue, being whether his character was as impeccable as he had asserted.” Thus, at that point the probative value of the evidence “outweighed its potential to be prejudicial.” As to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court noted that it was defendant, not defense counsel, who opened the door to admission of the books. Further, he did “not overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s questioning constituted a sound trial strategy,” and thus did not show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support a domestic violence conviction; People v. Nowack; People v. Wolfe; MCL 750.81(2); Whether the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence; People v. Lacalamita; People v. Lemmon
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that defendant was guilty of a domestic violence against his then 18-year-old daughter, CW. Also, because her testimony supported a conviction under MCL 750.81(2), and the trial court found her testimony credible, defendant’s conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence. He was convicted of domestic violence, third offense. His conviction arose from an altercation involving CW in their family home. Defendant argued that “CW’s testimony was not credible because she often stated she did not remember what happened, she had to be reminded of her preliminary examination testimony, she was ‘wishy washy and non committal [sic],’ and she ‘had an attitude problem.’” However, the trial court heard CW’s and her mother’s (C) inconsistent accounts of 9/24/16. The trial court acknowledged that there were some issues with CW’s testimony and demeanor; nonetheless, it found her testimony to be credible and C’s testimony not to be credible. “Because the trial court found CW’s testimony credible that defendant slapped her and ‘squeezed’ her face, and it occurred while she resided in the same household as defendant the required elements under MCL 750.81(2) were fulfilled.” Affirmed.
Cross-examination of defendant’s wife about whether she knew him to carry guns & her knowledge of his prior weapons convictions; Harmless error; MCL 769.26; People v. Lyles; People v. Lukity; People v. Denson; Felon in possession (FIP); MCL 750.224f; People v. Bass; Felony-firearm; MCL 750.227b(1); People v. Burgenmeyer; Possession; People v. Johnson; FIP as a predicate felony for felony-firearm; People v. Calloway; Evidence of flight; People v. Unger
On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, the court held that the error in admitting defendant’s wife’s (T) cross-examination testimony about her knowledge of his prior felony-firearm convictions was harmless given the overwhelming untainted evidence of his guilt. Thus, it affirmed his FIP and felony-firearm convictions. In a prior appeal, it had found that the testimony was not admitted in error. However, the Supreme Court reversed that part of its judgment and remanded for the court to determine whether the error was harmless. The court concluded that the “convictions were strongly supported by the untainted and unequivocal testimony of two police officers who observed defendant in possession of the firearm.” Officers F and S testified that they saw a person, “later identified as defendant, pull a handgun from his pocket and place it in the trunk of a car” as they approached. They did not see “anyone else walk near the trunk of the car.” They handcuffed defendant. F opened the car trunk, and S “recovered a handgun from inside. The gun was the only item in the trunk.” The parties stipulated “that defendant had a prior felony conviction and was not eligible to possess a firearm at the time of his arrest;” thus, the relevant element at issue for both the FIP and felony-firearm charges was whether he carried or possessed the gun. Examining T’s erroneously admitted testimony, the court noted it was “worth emphasizing that the jury was independently apprised that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony and was ineligible to possess a firearm at the time of his arrest.” The references to his prior convictions during T’s testimony “were relatively brief, and the convictions were from several years before” this incident. While the prosecution argued in closing argument that T’s admission that she knew about the prior convictions showed that she lied, T’s “credibility was essentially inconsequential in this case because the evidence for which defendant sought to rely on her was extremely weak for his defense.” The court held that he failed to show it was more probable than not that the error in admitting T’s cross-examination testimony was outcome determinative.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii) & (c)(i); Principle that only one statutory ground must be proven; In re VanDalen; In re HRC; Desertion; Principle that limited contact with a child is insufficient to rebut a finding of desertion; In re Laster; In re Hall; Best interests of the child; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re Moss Minors; In re White; In re Frey
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to the child where § (a)(ii) existed and termination was in the child’s best interests. The trial court found that he “was both unwilling and unfit to parent the child,” and that the child’s maternal great-grandmother could provide the child “with the stability and permanence that he needs.” On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by finding grounds for termination of his parental rights and by failing to explicitly find that it was in the child’s best interests. As to § (a)(ii), it noted that “it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that respondent deserted [the child] for 91 days or more and failed to seek custody of him during that period.” Further, although the trial court erred by finding that § (c)(i) applied, the “error was harmless because only one statutory ground is required for termination.” Finally, it noted that, “[i]n its oral opinion regarding termination of respondent’s parental rights, the trial court included a brief discussion of the child’s best interests, noting that (1) respondent was not stepping forward to be a parent, (2) respondent’s absence was by choice, (3) [the child] had a need for stability and a safe home, (4) [the great-grandmother] provided that safe, stable home, and (5) [she] provided [the child] with the love and affection that he needed. Each of these factors was properly considered by the trial court and weighed in favor of termination.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (h), & (j); Principle that only one statutory ground must be proven; In re VanDalen; Best interests of the child; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss Minors; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-father’s parental rights to the child where at least one statutory ground for termination existed and it was in the child’s best interests. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the basis of his lengthy incarceration. On appeal, the court first noted that because he challenged only the trial court’s finding as to § (j), there was “no need to go any further concerning the statutory grounds” because, even if there was error, only a single ground for termination is required and there was no error in the trial court’s findings as to the other statutory grounds “in light of the evidence presented to the court, especially in connection with §” (h). It also rejected his claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests. “Even contemplating the bond between respondent and his daughter,” it could not conclude that the trial court erred in its finding. “She has been thriving in foster care, will likely be adopted by her foster parents and remain with her siblings, and is indeed in need of permanence, finality, and stability; she will be in her thirties before respondent is even considered for parole.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (g); Best interests of the child; In re Moss Minors; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White; In re Frey; In re AH; In re Medina; Lawyer guardian ad litem (L-GAL)
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. She did not claim error as to the trial court’s conclusion that §§ (c)(i) and (g) were proven by clear and convincing evidence, and her continued use of controlled substances provided sufficient evidence to support termination under §§ (c)(i) and (g). She argued that the trial court failed to properly consider and give deference to the L-GAL’s opinion that termination was not in the child’s best interests. She cited “MCL 712A.17d(1)(b) and (i) for the proposition that the L-GAL’s duties include determining, representing, and advocating for the best interests of the child.” The DHHS did not dispute that this language described the L-GAL’s duties. Rather, the DHHS correctly pointed out that “MCL 712A.19b(5) authorizes the trial court to terminate a parent’s parental rights ‘[i]f the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests . . . .’” Thus, it was the trial court, not the L-GAL, that was “charged with making the final determination on whether termination” was in the child’s best interests. The court also noted that “MCL 712A.17d(1)(i) provides that a L-GAL is ‘[t]o make a determination regarding the child's best interests and advocate for those best interests according to the [L-GAL’s] understanding of those best interests.’ This language makes clear that a LGAL’s role is to independently determine a minor child’s best interests and then advocate for those interests to the trial court; such a role necessarily does not entail the L-GAL making the final decision on a child’s best interests, nor does the role require the trial court to give deference or any weight to the L-GAL’s view.” Also, the trial court respectfully considered the L-GAL’s position, but disagreed. The court found no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed that termination was in the child’s best interests. Affirmed.