Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Sentencing; Fourth-offense habitual offender status; MCL 769.12; Whether the mandatory minimum of 25 years violates the prohibitions against cruel or unusual punishment; MCL 769.12(1)(a); People v Benton; People v Lorentzen; People v Bullock; The proportionality test; People v Hallak; Principle that imposing a mandatory minimum sentence is not a departure; MCL 769.34(2)(a); Principle that legislatively-mandated sentences are presumptively proportional & presumptively valid; People v Brown
The court held that there was no violation of defendant’s constitutional right to be free from cruel or unusual punishment. He was convicted of CSC I for the violent rape of his friend’s 61-year-old mother, and two counts of resisting or obstructing a police officer for running from police and then resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 15 to 30 years for CSC I and 6 to 15 for each resisting or obstructing conviction. After a prior appeal, he was resentenced to 25 to 37½ years and 46 to 180 months respectively. In the present appeal, the court rejected his argument that MCL 769.12(1)(a) is unconstitutional because its application results in cruel or unusual punishment. The statute “reflects a legislative determination that the circumstances that implicate a mandatory minimum sentence under the statute pose such a threat to the safety of society absent a lengthy term of imprisonment for the offender that mitigating and individualized factors cannot be considered so as to undermine the Legislature’s goal to protect the public.” In addition, “MCL 769.12(1)(a) requires a criminal history that encompasses at least three prior felony convictions, which reflects a level of egregiousness of behavior that is comparable, at least somewhat, to the conduct addressed in MCL 750.520b(2)(b). This is especially true in the instant case because of the horrific manner in which the sexual assault was perpetrated.” Further, unlike the statutes in Lorentzen and Bullock, “which covered nonviolent drug crimes that stood alone without the need to show prior criminal activity, MCL 769.12(1)(a) requires the commission of a serious crime—violent in nature, three prior felonies, and proof that at least one of those felonies is a listed prior felony. Lorentzen and Bullock simply do not support finding a constitutional violation in this case.” Finally, although not identical, “the Michigan statutory scheme is sufficiently comparable to California’s three strikes law with respect to the type of conduct and criminal history that gives rise to a lengthy mandatory sentence. The fact that MCL 769.12(1)(a) does not allow for the exercise of discretion permitted by California law does not persuade us to rule differently, especially where defendant in this case has failed to demonstrate that mitigating circumstances or individualized factors existed that require us to rule that the 25-year minimum sentence constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment.” Affirmed.
Claims related to the purchase of a residence; Whether defendants procured the release of liability through fraud; Wyrembelski v St Clair Shores; Batshon v Mar-Que Gen Contractors, Inc; Collucci v Ekland; Paterek v 6600 Ltd; “All”; Dresden v Detroit Macomb Hosp Corp; The Seller Disclosure Act (SDA); Duty on sellers to disclose the existence of certain known conditions; MCL 565.957(1); “As is” clause; M & D, Inc v McConkey; Fraudulent misrepresentation; Hord v Environmental Research Inst of MI; Bev Smith, Inc v Atwell
Holding that plaintiffs-buyers’ allegations of fraud in this case arising from the sale of a residence did not preclude the trial court from granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition based on a release, the court affirmed. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in establishing “the release of liability signed by plaintiffs operated as a bar to recovery because defendants procured the release through fraud.” The court noted that plaintiffs released defendants “from all liability” and that such language was “sufficiently broad enough to operate as a complete bar to recovery, including claims for fraud.” Further, their arguments were also unpersuasive because they did not “produce any evidence of fraud or fraudulent inducement.” Although not directly argued in their brief on appeal, the court considered whether the facts presented to the trial court supported a claim of fraud based on obligations under the SDA, “because plaintiffs alleged defendants failed to disclose the severe flood damage, repair work, mold issues, and history of use or manufacture of narcotics in the house, and a fire on the property in 2010.” They also argued that defendant-“Sanjuanita Navarro advised sellers not to disclose the flooding damage to plaintiffs. Again, though not directly argued on appeal, these accusations could potentially create a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation.” However, the court held that the record lacked any documentary evidence that supported any claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. It was “uncontroverted that plaintiffs were given an opportunity, and did inspect the residence prior to the closing, indicating their complete satisfaction and desire to move in immediately. Further, it is uncontroverted that plaintiffs released defendants ‘from all liability’ and did so without any evidence of fraud, duress or coercion by defendants or anyone acting on their behalf.”
Due process; Right to a jury trial; People v Jendrzejewski; Motion to change venue; Principle that the existence of pretrial publicity, standing alone, does not necessitate a change of venue; People v Cline; Waiver; People v Clark; Other acts of domestic violence; MRE 404(b); MCL 768.27b(1); People v Railer; People v Cameron; An offense involving domestic violence; MCL 768.27b(6)(a)(i), (b)(ii), & (b)(iv); An “act of domestic violence”; MCL 768.27b(6)(a)(iii); Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v Watkins; People v McGhee; Harmless error; People v Burns; People v Rosa; Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree murder; People v Bennett; Premeditation; People v Plummer; “Preconceived motive”; People v Taylor
The court held that the trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by denying his motion to change venue, that he was not denied a fair trial based on the admission of other acts of domestic violence, and that there was ample evidence from which to find he premeditated and deliberated the stabbing death of his girlfriend. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court denied him due process and a fair trial by refusing to consider, and by failing to grant, his motion to change venue. “By acknowledging that voir dire was appropriate before the motion to change venue could be decided, by failing to renew the motion to change venue during or after voir dire, and by instead expressing satisfaction with the jury selected, defendant waived review of his motion to change venue.” In addition, considering the totality of the circumstances, “defendant was not denied an impartial jury or a fundamentally fair trial . . . .” The court also rejected his claim that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of other acts evidence showing he had a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old ex-girlfriend and forced her to have sex in front of children and family members. “Defendant’s act of forcing his girlfriend to engage in sexual activity constitutes domestic violence, and particularly when considered with the other instances of past domestic violence, this act provides a full and complete picture of defendant’s history and establishes defendant’s propensity to commit domestic violence against women with whom he has a dating relationship.” Further, the probative value of “evidence establishing defendant’s propensity to commit domestic violence was [not] outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Moreover, any error was harmless. Finally, the court rejected his contention that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The series of “separate and distinct acts of violence— with time in between for defendant to reflect while twice retrieving a new weapon—allowed [him] time to take a second look and supported the conclusion that [he] acted with premeditation and deliberation.” Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence; Assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer; MCL 750.81d(1); Whether the officers’ actions were lawful; People v Corr; People v Moreno; Whether the initial stop was legal; People v Kazmierczak; People v Barbarich; Terry stop; Terry v Ohio; Knowles v Iowa; People v Simmons; People v Champion; People v Kavanaugh; Particularized suspicion; People v Coscarelli; Lawful arrest; People v Manning; People v Cohen
The court held that the police officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant-Smith had violated traffic law and then acted lawfully when conducting the traffic stop. It further held that a rational trier of fact could find that they had probable cause to believe that he had outstanding warrants and thus, acted lawfully when arresting him. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer. He claimed that the prosecutor failed to establish that the officers’ actions were lawful. He asserted that there was insufficient evidence he was speeding and thus, “the initial stop was illegal.” But Officer N “testified that he noticed that Smith’s vehicle appeared to be traveling in excess of the posted speed limit.” N paced the “vehicle for approximately three blocks and determined that Smith was traveling 32 [mph] in an area with a posted speed limit of 25 [mph]. The dash camera footage admitted at trial showed the police cruiser traveling up to 42 [mph], and catching up to Smith’s vehicle only after Smith stopped at a stop sign.” N testified that “he decided to effectuate the traffic stop because Smith was speeding.” Thus, the court held that N “possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Smith was speeding based upon his initial observation of Smith’s vehicle and upon his act of pacing Smith’s vehicle.” Contrary to his suggestions on appeal, N’s subjective intent was irrelevant. Thus, the court held that the traffic stop was lawful. It further held that the “officers who were present at the scene lawfully arrested Smith.” The evidence supported that, after he “admitted that his identification was in the home and therefore was not in his immediate possession while he was operating his vehicle, the officers had information demonstrating probable cause to believe that Smith had violated the law.” Based on this evidence the arrest was lawful. Further, “Smith was ultimately arrested after he voluntarily exited his home and attempted to enter his vehicle. By the time this occurred, [N] already had conducted a search for Smith using the police database and had determined that there were multiple warrants out for Smith’s arrest. [N] testified that an individual can be arrested if the individual has outstanding warrants. [N] further testified that he had informed the other officers who were at the scene about Smith’s outstanding warrants. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find that the arrest was lawful.” Affirmed.
Action seeking PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act; MCL 500.3105(1); Negligence; Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC; Causation; Wilkinson v Lee; Cause in fact; Weymers v Khera; Legal cause; Skinner v Square D Co; “Serious impairment of body function”; MCL 500.3135(1) & (5); McCormick v Carrier
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-insurer (Citizens) and insured (Griffin) summary disposition of plaintiff’s auto negligence action. She sued defendants for injuries she allegedly sustained when Griffin ran a red light and hit the vehicle in which she was riding. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants on the basis that she could not prove causation. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that she submitted sufficient evidence to establish that she sustained injuries in the accident, and that that those injuries resulted in a serious impairment of body function. It noted that neither the police report nor the medical reports supported her assertion, that she failed to explain how her disability certificates showed the injuries were caused by the accident, and that she “did not present a single opinion from a doctor linking her injuries to the accident.” As such, she “failed to establish the accident caused her injuries and summary disposition in favor of Griffin and Citizens was proper.” Further, because she “failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact whether the accident caused her injuries, the issue of causation was properly decided by the trial court.” Finally, the trial court did not err by finding she “failed to demonstrate a serious impairment of a body function as a result of the accident.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (c)(i), & (j); In re Williams; In re Dahms; In re White; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Martin; Failure to obtain & present information & witness testimony as to respondent’s ongoing mental health treatment
Holding that respondent-father’s failure to challenge the trial court’s findings under § (b)(i) precluded appellate relief, that this and other grounds were established, and that he was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed termination of his parental rights. His failure to challenge one of the statutory grounds relied upon by the trial court was fatal to his appeal. Further, the court held that even if he had not abandoned this issue on appeal, it would conclude that the trial court did not err by holding that multiple statutory grounds for termination of his parental rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence. As to § (c)(i), for example, he failed to “accomplish any meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication” and the record supported the trial court’s determination that there was no reasonable likelihood that he “would rectify his parenting barriers in the foreseeable future.”
Authorization of a temporary custody petition; Whether sufficient evidence supported MCL 712A.13a(9) & MCR 3.965(C)(2); Principle that how a parent treats one child is probative of how he or she may treat his or her other children; In re AH; In re LaFrance Minors
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err when it adopted the referee’s findings and determined that respondent-mother presented a substantial risk of harm to her child-F’s life, physical health, or mental well-being, and that continuing F’s residence in her home was contrary to F’s welfare. Thus, it did not clearly err when it placed F outside of respondent’s home under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2). Respondent argued that the DHHS failed to establish that she presented a substantial risk of harm to F’s life, physical health, or mental well-being, or that continuing F’s residence in her home was contrary to F’s welfare. Thus, she contended that “the trial court clearly erred when it adopted the referee’s factual findings and determined that the criteria for placing [F] into foster care” were met. Specifically, she contended that the DHHS failed to present evidence that she harmed F or posed a threat of future harm to F, particularly since F was in her “care for a period of time without any evidence of harm having occurred.” But the court held that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. Its order considered all five requirements of MCL 712A.13a(9). Respondent’s argument was unpersuasive. While it was true that there was no record evidence that she actually harmed F “during the less than two months she cared for her, there can be no doubt that respondent’s continued drug use posed a threat of future harm to [F], particularly when viewed in light of [F’s] vulnerability and dependence on respondent and respondent’s history of placing her children at risk through her own substance abuse.” The record showed that she “has yet to complete the substance-abuse portion of her parent-agency agreement, and that previous substance abuse has led to the harm of her children and, allegedly, to her children’s siblings. Moreover, respondent had again succumbed to her substance use disorder while [F], an infant, was in her care.” Affirmed.