Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Whether the verdicts were consistent; People v. Russell; People v. Reese; Findings of fact; MCR 6.403; MCR 2.517(A); People v. Ellis; People v. Smith; Felonious assault; People v. Bosca; People v. Legg; Credibility of witnesses; People v. Kanaan
The court held that the trial court’s failure to make a specific factual finding as to the third element of felonious assault was not dispositive and that the trial court’s verdicts were not inconsistent because it credited testimony that defendant pointed the gun at T, while it simultaneously discounted testimony that defendant also pointed the gun at R. He was convicted of felonious assault and felony-firearm. Defendant argued that the trial court made insufficient factual findings as to the third element. It explicitly stated that he did not intend to injure T (his wife) or R (his mother-in-law), “saying that defendant did not ‘want to hurt anybody,’ and used the gun to make himself ‘feel powerful, [to] control his environment, [and] to control other people.’” It did not make a specific factual finding as to whether defendant intended to place R or T in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery by him. But the trial court’s finding that he used the gun to control them indicated that the trial court found defendant intended to make them apprehend an immediate battery. This interpretation was supported by the trial court’s assertion at his sentencing hearing that its finding as to defendant’s desire to control them implied that he wanted to make “[R and T] feel threatened that they might have an immediate battery.” Further, “the trial court is not required to ‘make specific findings of fact regarding each element of the crime.’ A court’s ‘factual findings are sufficient so long as it appears that the trial court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law.’” Defendant also argued that the trial court’s verdicts were inconsistent because it acquitted him of felonious assault of R while convicting him of felonious assault of T based on evidence concerning the same physical act. “The trial court failed to explain which portions of the testimony it found credible and which it did not.” Based on its verdicts, however, it was clear that the trial court found the testimony that defendant pointed the gun at T credible but not the testimony that defendant pointed the gun at R. This was further supported by the trial court’s remark at defendant’s sentencing hearing that they had “different interests,” meaning “that one had an interest to lie.” The trial court was entitled to make this credibility determination, and it did not render its verdict inconsistent. Thus, the trial court’s verdicts can be “rationally reconciled” with its factual findings. Affirmed.
Sentencing; People v. Lockridge; Principle that, in general, the court must affirm a within-guidelines sentence; MCL 769.34(10); People v. Jackson; Proportionality; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Anderson; People v. Babcock
Holding that defendant failed to show that the trial court erred by failing to address proportionality, or by scoring his guidelines or relying on inaccurate information under MCL 769.34(10), the court affirmed. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver meth, possession with intent to deliver alprazolam, and operating a vehicle without a license after a traffic stop in which officers found a variety of drugs and scales. The trial court sentenced him to 40 months to 20 years for the meth conviction, 1 to 4 years for the alprazolam conviction, and 93 days, time served, for operating a vehicle without a license. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by failing to specifically address the proportionality of his sentence and consider certain mitigating factors, such as his drug abuse, illegal status, and impending deportation. It noted that because his minimum sentence was 40 months, which is within the minimum sentencing guidelines range, MCL 769.34(10) applied and the court was required to affirm. Defendant “agreed to the scoring of his minimum sentencing guidelines range as correct. [He] has not alleged on appeal that the trial court erred in scoring [his] minimum sentencing guidelines range or relied on inaccurate information in determining [his] sentence.”
Case seeking to set aside a deed under the Michigan Uniform Voidable Transfer Act (MUVTA) (MCL 566.31 et seq.); Fraudulent transfer; Whether questions of material fact existed as to the application of MCL 566.35; In re Rasmer Estate; Dillard v. Schlussel; Requirement that a deed be delivered in order to pass title; Gillie v. Genesee Cnty. Treasurer; Delivery; McMahon v. Dorsey; Insolvency at the time of the transfer; MCL 566.32; MCL 566.34(1)(a); Credibility; In re Handelsman; Res judicata; “Raise or waive” rule; Walters v. Nadell; Unclean hands doctrine; Attorney Gen. v. PowerPick Club; MCL 566.37; McFerren v. B & B Inv. Group (After Remand); Consent judgment; Laffin v. Laffin
Holding that summary disposition was improper when questions of material fact existed as to the application of MCL 566.35, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in plaintiff-RPAD’s favor, and remanded for entry of an order denying RPAD’s motion for summary disposition and for further proceedings. The case concerned a quitclaim deed executed in 2008. Defendant-DiNoto (Salvatore), in his individual capacity and as personal representative of the defendant-Estate of Fara DiNoto, appealed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to RPAD and setting aside the quitclaim deed under the MUVTA. Relevant to the case was a loan given to Little Road, LLC in 2005. Little Road was owned by Salvatore, his brother John, John’s son Peter, and others. The complaint in this case alleged that John, Salvatore, and Fara all understood that Little Road would be unable to pay a loan from an entity named the Private Bank when it was set to come due in 2008. It “further alleged that the 2008 quitclaim deed was executed in order to ‘hinder, delay and defraud’” the Private Bank. It also alleged that at the time of the transfer, Salvatore and John were insolvent. The complaint sought to set aside the deed under the MUVTA. The court found that factual questions existed regarding whether Salvatore was insolvent at the time of the transfer. He presented “evidence showing that in the months before the transfer, he had a net worth far exceeding $2 million.” Also, there was no admission of intent to defraud. Thus, the court held that factual questions remained regarding whether the elements of MCL 566.34(1)(a) or MCL 566.35 may be established. Because they existed, summary disposition should not have been granted.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); In re Moss Minors; Whether respondent was likely to make sufficient improvements within a reasonable time; In re Dahms; Whether the child was at risk of emotional harm; In re Hudson; A parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, & management of their children; In re Rood; Best interests of the children; In re Gonazlez/Martinez; In re White
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to the children where at least one statutory ground for termination existed and it was in the children’s best interests. The trial court terminated her parental rights on the basis of her inability to care for her children. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by finding there were statutory grounds for termination. As to §§ (c)(i) and (g), it noted that, “[a]fter more than 182 days had passed, the evidence demonstrated that [she] remained unable to provide proper care and custody and would be unlikely to do so within a reasonable period of time.” She “did not fully comply with the parent agency agreement and the caseworker opined that she did not substantially benefit from the services she completed.” Although she “testified about her income and recent housing prospects, she had not substantiated her wages or other sources of income over the previous six months and had moved four or five times in less than one year.” Despite her “belief that she had matured during the course of the proceedings and had established enough stability to care for the children, her beliefs were not borne out by the record.” Moreover, she was unlikely to make sufficient improvements within a reasonable time. As to § (j), it found that her “history, both before and during the child protective proceeding, suggested that the children would continue to experience unhealthy upheaval in their lives if they were returned to [her] care.” The court also rejected her claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests. “The evidence showed that respondent was suffering from untreated mental health disorders that substantially impaired her ability to provide adequate care for the children.” Her “conduct in repeatedly placing the children in guardianships and regular changes of employment and housing evidenced patterns of inconsistency that would make it difficult for her to satisfy the children’s emotional and physical needs.” In contrast, “the children’s emotional, medical, and educational needs were being met while they remained in the care of their maternal grandmother.” And although they “expressed love for respondent, they all preferred to live with their maternal grandmother and appeared more strongly bonded to her than respondent.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (i), (j), & (k)(iii)-(v); In re White; In re Ellis; In re Harper; In re AH
The court held that the trial court properly terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to her child (BMP) where § (b)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence, and it was in BMP’s interests. The record in this case established that the mother’s oldest child (CP) was abused by the mother in 12/00. She “struck the then 11-day-old CP in the head with a baby monitor three times until he would re-take his pacifier, causing brain damage." CP was injured, and now suffers from “'brain atrophy, seizure disorder, cerebral palsy, [and] developmental and physical delays that include [the] inability to talk normally, walk unaided[,] or attend to daily living tasks.’” The mother was convicted of first-degree child abuse, and was incarcerated from 8/01 to 2/07. The court has determined that “‘[h]ow a parent treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.’” Her physical abuse of CP was thus, probative of how she may treat BMP. Further, she “testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not believe that she has ever had ‘temper issues or anger management issues’ that were directed ‘toward[] her kids,’ and that the abuse of CP occurred because she was angry with CP’s father.” This explanation, or justification, of the abuse inflicted upon another child, CP, was concerning. It was likewise concerning that when the mother was offered services in relation to the pending termination of CE, caseworkers from the DHHS expressed concern regarding her apparent agitation and irritation toward CE when CE would cry or fuss. Ultimately, she failed to benefit from services that would have led to the reunification. Thus, her past behavior was the best predictor of future injury to BMP. The trial court did not err in concluding that there were grounds under § (b)(i) to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Affirmed.