Whether a prosecution witness’s testimony was contrary to People v. Smith, People v. Peterson, & People v. Thorpe; Whether the admission of the testimony was prejudicial; People v. Carines; Harmless error; People v. Whittaker; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Bruner; Presumption that jurors are capable of assessing an expert’s testimony; People v. Kowalski

Holding that a witness’s (pediatrician-M) diagnosis was unlikely to have had such an overwhelming effect on the jury—especially compared to the victim’s own testimony and in light of the other witnesses and the obvious weaknesses brought out in the rest of M’s testimony—that it affected the outcome of the proceedings, the court concluded that its admission did not so unfairly prejudice defendant as to require reversal. He was convicted of CSC I and II. In a prior appeal, the court rejected his hearsay challenges and his argument that another witness’s testimony constituted improper vouching. The Supreme Court found that M’s testimony was improper and remanded on the issue of prejudice. On remand, the court began by addressing the dissent, noting that “if reversal was necessary simply because [M’s] testimony was erroneous, there would be no need to analyze whether it was actually prejudicial, and our Supreme Court would not have remanded the matter to us.” It then held that admission of M’s testimony was not so unfairly prejudicial as to require reversal. The court noted that the effect of the victim’s own testimony was “highly significant” to whether M’s testimony was prejudicial in addition to being improper, and that M “was simply one out of several individuals who corroborated what the victim had said, and the jury was aware that her diagnosis was based entirely on her assessment of the consistency of the victim’s statements.” In addition, M “had also been impeached by vigorous and competent cross-examination drawing out serious deficiencies in the basis for her diagnosis, such as the fact that she did not personally interview the victim and did not even know who did, internal inconsistency in how she described her diagnosis, and her obvious evasiveness when asked about what evidence—if any—underlay her diagnosis.” Thus, the jury was aware that the victim’s “consistency was of critical concern, and it was well-situated to make its own determination of just how consistent her statements had actually been.” It declined to follow the dissent’s “logic for concluding that the jury would somehow give more weight to [M’s] testimony after being informed that [M] had less of an opportunity to observe the victim than had the jury itself.” The court presumed “the jury followed their instructions and weighed the credibility of each witness as directed when reaching their verdict.” Affirmed.