Hearsay; MRE 803(4) (exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); People v. Mahone; People v. Duenaz; People v. Yost; Hearsay within hearsay; People v. Hawkins; Right of confrontation; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2; People v. Garland; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Chambers; MRE 803(2) (excited utterance hearsay exception); People v. Smith; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Bahoda; People v. Lane; Presumption jurors are impartial; People v. Miller; Jury voir dire; People v. Tyburski; People v. Bailey; Opinion testimony; People v. Dobek; Shifting the burden of proof; People v. Fyda; People v. Fields; Cumulative effect of errors; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Taylor; People v. Mayhew; Sentencing; Consecutive sentences; MCL 750.520b(3); Judgment of sentence (JOS); Sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE)

Finding that victim-A’s statements were admissible under MRE 803(4), and rejecting defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims, the court affirmed his CSC convictions and sentences. But it remanded for modification of his JOS to specify that the CSC I sentences were to be served consecutively to each other, but concurrently with the CSC III sentences. He argued that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of hearsay statements from A and A’s mother to M, a SANE who examined A the day after defendant’s alleged sexual abuse. He argued that A’s statements during the exam were hearsay and not admissible under MRE 803(4), the “exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, because the examination was intended primarily for investigative purposes, not for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.” The court disagreed. “The fact that an examination is initiated in part to investigate a sexual assault is not dispositive.” The relevant question was “whether the declarant’s statements were reasonably necessary for medical diagnosis or treatment.” M described examining A “for physical injuries and to determine what medical treatment might be necessary. [M] explained that when examining a patient, she needs to ask the patient what happened to determine what type of examination to conduct and to determine what treatment or procedures might be necessary.” When she examined A, no physical injuries were apparent, but A “complained of pain in her pelvic area. [M] found some redness or irritation to tissue above the clitoris.” While the exam was conducted after A’s “mother contacted the police to report a sexual assault, the record discloses that a purpose of [M’s] examination was to diagnose a possible injury, and to determine whether [A] required treatment and what treatment was appropriate.” Thus, A’s statements were admissible under MRE 803(4). As to the statements by A’s mother during the exam, the court concluded that because her “statements were made in the context of assisting [M’s] medical diagnosis and treatment, they too qualified for admission under MRE 803(4).” Defendant further complained that her “statement included a statement from an aunt who described seeing defendant in the hallway with a telephone.” He asserted that this “should have been excluded because it was double hearsay.” The court found there was “no reasonable basis for concluding that the aunt’s limited statement affected” the trial’s outcome.