Motion for judgment of acquittal (JOA); FedRCP 29; Sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction of conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion; 18 USC §§ 1591 & 1594(c); Sentencing; Enhancement for a “vulnerable victim” (USSG § 3A1.1(b)(1)); Enhancement for the use of a computer (§ 2G1.3(b)(3)(B))

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Aldridge’s conviction for conspiracy to sex traffic an adult where the injuries to the victim supported the claim that Aldridge voluntarily joined a conspiracy to coerce his girlfriend (K) into prostituting herself to support their drug habit. Aldridge argued the district court erred by denying his motion for JOA on the conspiracy charge where there was insufficient evidence to support it. He was convicted of conspiring with another individual (P) to sex traffic K. The government argued that K was “coerced” where P supplied she and Aldridge with drugs until they were deeply in debt, and then he cut them off, demanding that K pay through “sexual favors.” The issue was whether the conspiracy charge could be applied to Aldridge where both his and K’s opiate addictions were exploited. The court held that, in this case, there was sufficient evidence that “Aldridge voluntarily joined the conspiracy with the intent to further its goal of coercing” K. The court noted that K “had marks on her body and suffered permanent hearing loss as a result of [P’s] physical abuse and threats of violence.” She was living with Aldridge at the time, “they were in a romantic relationship and shared a bed.” The court further noted that P “left his guns in the open where Aldridge could see them whenever Aldridge was in [P’s] home.” It concluded that from “this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Aldridge knew that [P] was threatening or harming” K. The court also upheld the district court’s application of the “vulnerable victim” sentencing enhancement where K’s “physical and mental conditions, as well as her financial dependence on Aldridge, place her squarely within the vulnerable-victim category.” It also upheld the application of the two-level enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), finding there was sufficient evidence that “Aldridge used a computer to ‘entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with’ each of” K’s daughters. The court rejected his arguments that the enhancement did not apply “because he did not communicate directly with a minor” or someone exercising supervising control over the minor to facilitate the minor’s travel to engage in sexual conduct. While this would be correct under § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A), the district court applied § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). The court added that any error in applying the enhancements would be harmless where Aldridge would still have been “subject to the same guidelines range of life.” Affirmed.