Sentencing; Proportionate & reasonable; Operating while intoxicated (OWI)

The court held that defendant did not demonstrate error warranting resentencing. This case arose out of a hit-and-run resulting in the death of a pedestrian. Defendant was convicted of OWI causing death. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 200 to 400 months with credit for 345 days served. He argued that his sentence, though within the guidelines range, was disproportionate and unreasonable. He asserted it was “disproportionate because his substance abuse and mental health issues were mitigating factors that the trial court either rejected or treated as aggravating factors.” After reviewing the record, the court concluded that he had “not established that either of these issues were the type of ‘unusual circumstances’ that would render his presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.” Il noted that “a trial court is not required to consider a defendant’s mental health or substance abuse history when imposing a sentence.” Further, he overlooked that “trial courts are not required to expressly or explicitly consider mitigating factors at sentencing.” It appeared “that the trial court reviewed the PSIR and considered its contents when imposing defendant’s sentence.” He failed to establish “that the trial court was required to consider his substance abuse history and mental health when imposing his sentence, nor does the record support defendant’s contention that the trial court failed to consider these factors.” Thus, he had “not established that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider these factors at sentencing.” Defendant also argued “that his sentence violates the principle of proportionality because it was based on general principles, rather than individualized considerations.” The court held that he “failed to establish that the trial court based his sentence on general principles rather than the individualized circumstances of the offense and the offender.” Defendant finally argued “that the trial court abused its discretion by noting during sentencing that ‘there is an argument for second-degree murder[.]’” He contended that its “comments suggest that it considered the original charge of second-degree murder, rather than the lesser charge of OWI causing death to which defendant pleaded no contest.” Defendant mischaracterized the trial court’s statements. Even if his interpretation of its statement was “correct, however, ‘a sentencing court may consider the nature of a plea bargain and the charges that were dismissed in exchange for the plea for which the court is sentencing.’” Defendant pled “no contest to OWI causing death in exchange for the dismissal of the count of second-degree murder. Thus, even if the trial court considered the second-degree murder charge in imposing defendant’s sentence,” he did not show that it “abused its discretion by doing so.” Affirmed.