Claim for payment for legal services; Whether a complaint related back to the filing date of a prior complaint; MCR 2.118(A) & (D); Statute of limitations (SOL); Accrual of a breach of contract claim; Whether a personal representative (PR) hired or otherwise authorized plaintiff to perform any work; Stay of discovery; Whether summary disposition was premature; Timeliness of a conversion claim; MCL 600.5805(2)

The court found no merit in plaintiff-law firm’s assertion the complaint in this case related back to the date of a prior complaint. It further held that the trial court did not err in dismissing count I of the complaint (a breach of contract claim) based on the SOL. As to Count II, while the court agreed with plaintiff that it was not barred by the SOL, it concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing it under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there was “no evidence of an agreement or ‘engagement’ between plaintiff” and defendant-estate’s former PR. Further, the lack of discovery was not a bar to summary disposition of that claim. Finally, the court held that plaintiff’s conversion was time-barred. The court referred to the attorney who was the principal owner of the firm and acted on its behalf in the case as plaintiff. Plaintiff asserted he was “owed money for legal services purportedly rendered on behalf of” the late Aretha Franklin. Count I generally related to “$35,000 that plaintiff claimed he was owed for increasing Franklin’s advancement from $150,000 to $500,000” but it additionally “included allegations that a separate $26,690 was owed for other legal services rendered.” The court noted that “accepting plaintiff’s own allegations as true, the $26,690 was due in 2012. Therefore, Franklin was in breach of any repayment obligation for that amount in 2012, which renders the 2020 complaint untimely for this portion of” his claim. As to the $35,000 portion of the claim, had he “attached evidence of unfulfilled invoices sent to Franklin in 2014, or some other evidence suggesting that the breach occurred in 2014, there may have been enough evidence to preclude summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Instead, plaintiff presented a plethora of evidence showing that 2012 was the operative year for the breach-of-contract claim, thus contradicting his claim in the complaint that the breach occurred in 2014. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” the court found that plaintiff offered “no evidence to support the contention that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the date on which the” SOL started to run. As to Count II, the evidence did not show the former PR “authorized or requested” that plaintiff perform any work. There was no genuine issue of fact as to whether “a contractual relationship existed.” Affirmed.