Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v Trakhtenberg; Failure to make a futile objection; People v Archer; Prejudice; People v Taylor; Expert testimony; MRE 702; Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of CSC I for sexually assaulting his then-girlfriend’s 8-year-old great niece. On appeal, defendant argued that his trial attorney performed deficiently by failing to offer evidence that the victim’s mother, H, had been arrested before the victim accused him of sexual abuse. “[H]ad evidence of [H’s] recent arrest been admitted, the jury would have had more information to determine” the victim’s credibility. Without such evidence, “the jury had less context for consideration of defendant’s key defense argument.” Defense counsel promised to establish that the victim “fabricated the allegations to ‘save’ [H] and prevent being removed from her care and custody, but failed to deliver some of the evidence supporting the argument that the accusations were manufactured. Because of these shortcomings . . . defense counsel’s failure fell below an objective standard of reasonable performance.” However, the court was “not convinced that the jury would have concluded that the [victim] manufactured her allegations of sexual abuse because of her mother’s arrest. Further, to conclude that [she] falsely accused defendant because of her concern that she would have to return to live with defendant, the jury would have had to discount [her] testimony about the process through which she actually disclosed the abuse.” Moreover, the prosecution “presented substantial evidence from which the jury could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of sexually abusing” the victim. Although defendant challenged her “credibility in multiple ways, the jury found her testimony credible and was not persuaded that she fabricated her allegations.” The court also rejected his claim that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the testimony of the prosecution’s expert, a licensed social worker, C, who it qualified as an expert in “child sexual abuse and the dynamics surrounding child sexually abusive episodes.” In light of C’s “extensive qualifications in the relevant field, defense counsel’s making an objection to [C’s] testifying as an expert would have been futile.” Affirmed.