Adoption; Appeal of the trial court’s order declining to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights under MCL 710.39(1); Mootness based on the fact that the father was the legal father; Effect of the court’s order in a related case; Binding precedent as to the effect of the fact respondent was now the child’s legal father; In re MGR

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the court’s order in a related case, the court found that the reasoning of its prior opinion (see e-Journal # 66043 in the 9/22/17 edition) remained undisturbed. Further, it was bound by MGR, in which the relevant facts were the same. Because respondent-father was the child’s (LMB) legal father, it was impossible to grant petitioners-prospective adoptive parents’ requested relief. Thus, it again dismissed their appeal as moot. Respondent objected to their adopting LMB, and sought custody. The trial court was asked to decide whether terminating his “parental rights was appropriate under MCL 710.39(1), which applies to putative fathers.” It declined to do so, and petitioners appealed. “However, while the adoption proceeding was pending,” respondent filed a second action in a different division of the county circuit court. After petitioners filed their appeal in this case, the trial court in that case entered an order of filiation declaring respondent LMB’s legal and biological father. The court concluded that petitioners’ appeal here was moot because, by its terms, MCL 710.39(1) “only concerns the termination of the parental rights of putative fathers.” Thus, it no longer applied. After the court released its prior opinion, and while petitioners’ application for leave to appeal it to the Supreme Court was pending, they “filed an appeal in their separate paternity action in Docket No. 341211.” They argued there “that the trial court in the paternity action erred by entering” (1) the order of filiation and (2) a later order denying their motion to stay the paternity proceedings. The court issued a peremptory order (the one referenced by the Supreme Court) providing some of their requested relief. That order “did not vacate the order of filiation.” In fact, it said “nothing about vacating or otherwise disturbing any orders entered in the paternity case other than the order denying a stay. Because this Court’s order did not disturb the order of filiation, that order is still in effect.” Further, under MGR, the court could not remand for a determination of whether the legal father’s rights “should be terminated under a section only applicable to [a] putative father.”