Expert testimony about “abusive head trauma”; People v. Unger; MRE 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.; Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.; Chapin v. A & L Parts, Inc.; Review of a trial court’s decision to admit evidence; People v. Burns; People v. Fomby; Plain error review; People v. Carines; Admission of testimony from the victim’s mother; MRE 801(d)(2); People v. Schaw; Relevance & unfair prejudice; MRE 401-403

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that abusive head trauma was supported by sufficiently sound principles and methodology to warrant admission of testimony about it. Also, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting another doctor to testify as an expert in child abuse and that certain of victim-B’s injuries were indicative of abuse. Finally, it was not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from B’s mother as to defendant’s statements about not going to prison. He was convicted of first-degree child abuse and first-degree felony murder for the death of 3-½ year-old B, the younger of his girlfriend’s daughters. He argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. C to testify as to “abusive head trauma.” Defendant pointed out, “accurately, that it is impossible to conduct any kind of actual experiment on children to determine what kind of intentional trauma will cause any given presented injury.” C conceded that “most of the supporting studies were case studies. However, while controlled experiments are the ‘gold standard’ for scientific evidence, they are hardly the only source of valuable and reliable scientific data, including drawing statistical inferences from case studies, especially where some other evidence establishes at least part of the conclusions drawn therefrom. . . . There was ample testimony to the general effect that although abusive head trauma had encountered some doubt and skepticism in the scientific community, and it was not necessarily correctly predictive in every case,” it was backed by several studies and “not widely regarded as refuted.” Defendant’s argument that a statistically predictive model can easily be wrong in any particular instance was “well-taken. However, that does not make it unscientific, but rather appropriate for an argument to be made to the jury that they should be cautious about giving it much weight. Likewise with the fact that it was not universally well-regarded. The courts would do well to be suspicious of a theory widely deemed to be a ‘fringe’ position or otherwise taken seriously only by an extreme minority of the relevant scientific community. However, many now-accepted theories began as minority views, so a lack of universal acceptance does not per se establish that it is unscientific or unsound. Scientific disputes should be resolved by scientists, not by lawyers.”