Cross-examination of defendant’s wife about whether she knew him to carry guns & her knowledge of his prior weapons convictions; Harmless error; MCL 769.26; People v. Lyles; People v. Lukity; People v. Denson; Felon in possession (FIP); MCL 750.224f; People v. Bass; Felony-firearm; MCL 750.227b(1); People v. Burgenmeyer; Possession; People v. Johnson; FIP as a predicate felony for felony-firearm; People v. Calloway; Evidence of flight; People v. Unger

On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, the court held that the error in admitting defendant’s wife’s (T) cross-examination testimony about her knowledge of his prior felony-firearm convictions was harmless given the overwhelming untainted evidence of his guilt. Thus, it affirmed his FIP and felony-firearm convictions. In a prior appeal, it had found that the testimony was not admitted in error. However, the Supreme Court reversed that part of its judgment and remanded for the court to determine whether the error was harmless. The court concluded that the “convictions were strongly supported by the untainted and unequivocal testimony of two police officers who observed defendant in possession of the firearm.” Officers F and S testified that they saw a person, “later identified as defendant, pull a handgun from his pocket and place it in the trunk of a car” as they approached. They did not see “anyone else walk near the trunk of the car.” They handcuffed defendant. F opened the car trunk, and S “recovered a handgun from inside. The gun was the only item in the trunk.” The parties stipulated “that defendant had a prior felony conviction and was not eligible to possess a firearm at the time of his arrest;” thus, the relevant element at issue for both the FIP and felony-firearm charges was whether he carried or possessed the gun. Examining T’s erroneously admitted testimony, the court noted it was “worth emphasizing that the jury was independently apprised that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony and was ineligible to possess a firearm at the time of his arrest.” The references to his prior convictions during T’s testimony “were relatively brief, and the convictions were from several years before” this incident. While the prosecution argued in closing argument that T’s admission that she knew about the prior convictions showed that she lied, T’s “credibility was essentially inconsequential in this case because the evidence for which defendant sought to rely on her was extremely weak for his defense.” The court held that he failed to show it was more probable than not that the error in admitting T’s cross-examination testimony was outcome determinative.