Use of an officer’s testimony about an absent complainant’s statements as substantive evidence to establish probable cause for a bind-over; MCL 768.27c; People v. Meissner; Whether MCL 768.27c requires that the complainant-declarant be unavailable; Statutory interpretation; People v. Sharpe; The right of confrontation at the preliminary exam; Quantum of proof required to bind over a defendant; People v. Plunkett; Principle that the complainant’s testimony is not necessarily required at the preliminary exam; People v. Meadows; Applicability of the MREs at the preliminary exam; MCL 766.11b(1); MCR 6.110(C); U.S. Const. amend. VI; The right of confrontation as a trial right; Barber v. Page; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie; Precedent rejecting the applicability of the Confrontation Clause at preliminary exams; Commonwealth v. Ricker (PA Super.); State v. O’Brien (WI); Peterson v. California (9th Cir.); United States v. Andrus (7th Cir.); United States v. Harris (5th Cir.); Whitman v. Superior Court (CA)

Holding that MCL 768.27c does not require that the complainant-declarant be unavailable, and that the right of confrontation does not apply during a preliminary exam, the court reversed the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion to quash his bind-over and remanded for reinstatement of the charges. He was charged with first-degree home invasion, assault by strangulation, interfering with electronic communications, and domestic violence. In the complainant’s absence, the district court at the preliminary exam allowed the officer (T) who responded to the scene to testify, pursuant to MCL 768.27c, about statements the “complainant made as substantive evidence for the purpose of establishing probable cause.” In granting defendant’s motion to quash, the circuit court held that T’s testimony was inadmissible because (1) the district court did not declare the complainant-declarant “unavailable” and (2) T’s testimony violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The court agreed with the prosecution that the circuit court erred because “MCL 768.27c contains no requirement that the complainant-declarant be unavailable in order to admit evidence of a statement that otherwise satisfies the statutory requirements.” The circuit court added a condition not found in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Further, “imposing an unavailability requirement would essentially nullify the statute.” The court also agreed with the prosecution that the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that defendant’s right of confrontation was violated. T’s testimony about the complainant’s statement was legally admissible under MCL 768.27c, and the district court properly concluded that, based on this testimony, there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the charged crimes. The court noted that federal and state courts “have unanimously rejected the argument that the Confrontation Clause applies at preliminary” exams. Thus, while the MREs apply during a preliminary exam, “the right of confrontation does not.” The circuit court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to quash on the basis that his right of confrontation was violated.