Refusal to bind defendant over for trial on the manufacturing or delivering marijuana (less than 5 kilograms or fewer than 20 plants) charge; Terry v. Ohio; Whren v. U.S.; Maryland v. Wilson; Pennsylvania v. Mimms; Warrantless arrest for a felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation committed in the arresting officer’s presence; MCL 764.15(1)(a); Whether defendant’s statement that he was in possession of the marijuana & the underlying physical evidence of the crime were admissible; Right against self-incrimination; U.S. Const amend. V; Const. 1963, art. I, § 17; Miranda v. Arizona; People v. Mendez; Rhode Island v. Innis; “In custody”; Effect of failing to provide Miranda warnings; People v. Elliott; The public-safety exception to Miranda; People v. Attebury; New York v. Quarles; Voluntary statement; Oregon v. Elstad

The court affirmed the circuit court’s order to the extent that defendant’s unwarned statement was “subject to suppression[.]” However, it reversed the circuit court’s suppression of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and remanded. The prosecution argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to bind him over for trial on the charge of manufacturing or delivering marijuana (less than 5 kilograms or fewer than 20 plants). The court agreed. “Defendant told the officers about the marijuana and they found it in his vehicle. Using this evidence, a district court could reasonably find the existence of probable cause that defendant violated MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii) and bind him over for trial.” Thus, the issue was whether his “statement that he was in possession of the marijuana, and the underlying physical evidence of the crime, are admissible.” There was no dispute that he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes, and he was not given Miranda warnings before he was questioned. The prosecution argued that the questioning fell under the public-safety exception to Miranda. But the court could not “conclude that the officers’ question was necessary to secure the officers’ safety or the safety of the public.” They did not have any “articulable reason to believe that this particular defendant was potentially armed or dangerous. The officers conducted a traffic stop because they observed defendant violate traffic laws. The dark conditions, unsecured passengers, and defendant’s nervous behavior could objectively make the officers generally concerned for their safety.” However, when they conducted the stop, he “provided a valid license, registration, and proof of insurance.” There was no testimony suggesting they suspected that he “was armed, and their question was not aimed to discover any weapons. Rather, the officers asked a vague, catch-all question, asking for ‘anything’ they ‘should know about,’ which defendant reasonably understood to include drugs.” They should have known that this “question was just as likely to elicit incriminating evidence as it was to secure a threat.” Thus, it was not outside the range of reasoned and principled outcomes for the district court to hold that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation before being advised of his Miranda rights, and thus, his responsive statement should be suppressed. But the court held that the marijuana and other paraphernalia seized in the search were not subject to suppression. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by suppressing the physical evidence and dismissing the charge.