Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; Strickland v. Washington; Factual predicate; People v. Carbin; Failure to call a witness; People v. Dixon; A substantial defense; People v. Chapo; Matters of trial strategy; People v. Unger; People v. Payne; People v. Williams; Failure to call an expert; Distinguishing People v. Ackley; Requirements for establishing an insanity defense; People v. Lacalamita; MCL 768.21a(2); Temporary insanity; Distinguishing People v. Conrad; Sentencing; Cruel & unusual punishment; People v. Bullock; People v. Nunez; People v. Bowling; Effect of the fact defendant was 19 years old at the time of the crimes; United States v. Miller; Admission of a 911 call & a video defendant recorded of his own conduct; People v. Bergman; People v. Douglas; Relevant evidence; MRE 401 & 402; Exclusion under MRE 403; People v. Vasher; Unfair prejudice; People v. Mills; Presumption a jury follows its instructions; People v. Unger

The court rejected defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert to testify that he was temporarily insane at the time of the crimes, and held that he failed to show his sentence was cruel or unusual, declining his invitation to extend Miller. It also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a 911 call or a video he took before the shooting. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder and other crimes for forcing entry into a home and firing “a handgun multiple times, while streaming live video of his conduct on social media.” On appeal, he essentially argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a defense strategy of temporary insanity. The court found that defense “counsel presented a substantial defense that defendant lacked the requisite intent to establish premeditation and deliberation.” It would not substitute its judgment for that of defense counsel as to the choice of trial strategy. Arguing “that defendant lacked the requisite intent, which led to [his] acquittal of first-degree premeditated murder, was a reasonable trial strategy.” While defendant relied on Ackley in asserting that defense counsel should have called an expert “to opine that defendant was temporarily insane at the time of” the incident, that case was distinguishable. Here, “defense counsel stated on the record at a pretrial motion hearing that he thoroughly researched defendant’s medical issues and considered raising an insanity defense, but decided against it because of defendant’s voluntary intoxication.” The court concluded that he did not have a potential temporary insanity defense. He also contended that his mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for his felony murder conviction constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment because he was only 19 at the time of the crime. He did not compare his sentence “to the penalties imposed for other crimes in this state and the same crime in other states.” He also did not show that he had “the maturity of the typical defendant under the age of 18, or that he has lessened culpability or a greater capacity for change than other persons.” In the absence of any proof as to “his intelligence, maturity level, impulse control, appreciation for the consequences of his actions, appreciation for delayed gratification, and ability to control his actions,” he failed to establish that he was entitled to relief. Affirmed.