Jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for early termination of supervised release; Abney v. United States; Flanagan v. United States; Limitations to review under 18 USC § 3742(a); United States v. Bowers; United States v. Martirossian; United States v. Ruiz; Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(A); Principle that declining to modify a sentence does not “impose” a sentence; United States v. Doe (5th Cir.); 28 USC § 1291; United States v. Uribe (Unpub. 9th Cir.); United States v. Spinelle; United States v. Reagan (Unpub. 11th Cir.)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of defendant-Marshall’s petition to end his period of supervised release. He pled guilty to a drug charge and was sentenced to a period of supervised release, which he violated by moving out-of-state. He received a prison sentence for this violation, and then was sentenced to another period of supervised release. With his probation officer’s recommendation, he filed an unopposed motion for an early termination of supervised release, which the district court denied. The court declined to review his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It first considered the availability of review under § 3742(a). The court noted § 3742(a)’s requirement that a sentence be imposed and that it be appealed within 14 days. The original period of supervised release was imposed in 2008, and Marshall did not appeal the sentence. Moreover, he did not appeal the amended order of supervised release issued in 2016. Additionally, “[t]he district court did not issue a new sentence or an amended sentence before this appeal. It merely denied Marshall’s request to reduce, in truth to end, the provision in his sentence about supervised release.” After imposing a period of supervised release, a district court retains authority to revoke it, extend it, or end it. But a defendant does not have the right to appeal every time the district court denies a motion to reduce a term of supervised release where that ruling is not “a new ‘otherwise final sentence’” as required under § 3742. The court held that “declining to modify a sentence does not ‘impose’ a sentence.” Additionally, it found that § “1291 does not fill this gap. In channeling criminal appeals through § 3742, Congress signaled that the specific appellate statute, not the general one, would govern most, if not all, appeals of convictions and sentences.” While Marshall cited some cases “that assume § 1291 provides authority to hear an appeal” such as his, most were unpublished and not even binding in their own circuits. Those that were published likewise “assumed jurisdiction to hear the appeal, nothing more.” Thus, they had no precedential effect.