Custody; Yachcik v. Yachcik; Shade v. Wright; Lieberman v. Orr; Moote v. Moote; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Whether the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary method constituted domestic violence; Corrie v. Corrie; In re Gould; Department of Soc. Servs. v. Emmanual Baptist Preschool; People v. Green; MCL 722.23(k); The Child Custody Act (MCL 722.21 et seq.); Domestic violence defined; The Domestic Violence Prevention & Treatment Act (MCL 400.1501 et seq.); MCL 400.1501(d); “Family or household member”; MCL 400.1501(e); Abusive treatment of family pets; MCL 400.1501(e)(i) & (e)(ii)-(vii); Proper cause to revisit the custody order on the basis of the children’s living conditions; Best interests factors (MCL 722.23); Foskett v. Foskett; Griffin v. Griffin; In re Martin; Fletcher v. Fletcher

Holding that “domestic violence” as used by MCL 722.23(k) includes “domestic violence” as defined in MCL 400.1501, the court concluded that the trial court’s findings as to domestic violence and the deficiencies in the care the children received from plaintiff-father were well-supported by the record. Thus, the trial court did not err by finding proper cause to revisit the custody arrangement. Also, except for best-interest factor (e), it did not commit clear legal error or make findings against the great weight of the evidence. That error was harmless and did not require reversal, because in all other respects the factors overwhelmingly supported defendant-mother’s motion for change of custody. Thus, the decision to award her sole legal and physical custody was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court held that plaintiff’s use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary method constituted domestic violence. Plaintiff asserted that he always acted in good faith and based on his religious beliefs as to “the propriety of corporal punishment.” The court found his argument unavailing. “However sacrosanct parental rights may be, they do not extend to abusing one’s children.” The court held that the “state’s interest in protecting children from harm outweighs any religious beliefs regarding the propriety of corporal punishment.” Further, the court noted that it “has long been established that a parent may not administer excessive physical discipline, or physical discipline that actually harms a child, no matter what the parent might subjectively believe.” The trial court did not err by characterizing his use of corporal punishment as domestic violence. It was undisputed that his “standard response to ‘willful disobedience’ involved discussing with the child the reason he or she was being punished, prayer, spanking the child on the buttocks approximately five times with a PVC pipe, and expressions of love at the end of the ritual. Plaintiff commonly used sufficient force to leave red marks on the children’s skin for the rest of the day, and his spankings once left a child with bruises.” Even if he was acting based on “his religious beliefs and without malicious intent, the fact remains that his corporal punishment involved the infliction of injury on members of his household.” The court further observed “that ‘domestic violence’ unambiguously includes the infliction of mental harm, and it is obvious that a combination of cruelty and serious physical harm with expressions of love would further inflict mental harm upon any reasonable person.” Affirmed.