Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Taylor; People v. Jordan; People v. Rodgers; Failure to object to other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. Sabin (After Remand); People v. Houston; People v. Knox; A proper purpose; People v. Johnigan; Relevance; MRE 401; People v. Aldrich; MRE 403; People v. Watkins; Unfair prejudice; People v. Wilson; Lewis v. Legrow; People v. McGhee; Failure to object to a statement by the prosecutor; Failure to make a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); People v. Stamper; Sentencing; Life without parole for a first-degree murder committed when defendant was under the age of 18; Miller v. Alabama; MCL 769.25; Double jeopardy; People v. Nutt; Multiple punishments; People v. Ream; People v. Herron; Dual convictions for first-degree premeditated murder & first-degree felony murder; People v. Coomer; One conviction & sentence supported by two theories; People v. Williams; Correcting the presentence information report (PSIR); People v. Lampe; Judgment of sentence (JOS); Department of Corrections (DOC)

The court rejected defendant’s claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise various objections, and held that the trial court did not err in sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole for a first-degree murder committed when he was less than 18 years old. However, the trial court violated his constitutional protections against double jeopardy by sentencing him twice for the same crime. Thus, it ordered his JOS “amended to specify a single conviction, supported by two theories, and a single sentence for the killing of one victim. The PSIR must also be amended” and sent to the DOC. As to his claim that defense counsel should have objected to other acts evidence of his participation in an assault about five hours before the murder of victim-G, the court concluded that because it was presented “for the purpose of establishing defendant’s link to the murder weapon, not to show a propensity to murder, the evidence was admitted for a proper purpose.” He also argued that this evidence, as well as evidence of another murder he committed, was unfairly prejudicial. “However, all three crimes were committed over the course of only six days, and there was no evidence of any intervening acts that would discount the relevance that the same gun used to kill [G] was used in the assault” and the other murder. The firearm evidence appeared to be “scientifically based and very reliable. Furthermore, it was necessary because it showed that defendant was known to have possessed, and used in recent crimes, the same gun used to kill” G. There was no indication that the evidence injected issues broader than his guilt or innocence into the case, or “of a danger of confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or creating too much empathy, which could have required exclusion of the evidence under MRE 403. The evidence was strongly probative because it” showed the likelihood that he used the same gun “to commit serious crimes, including the charged crimes, in the same area over the course of six days. Although the evidence was prejudicial, it was not unfairly prejudicial.” As to his sentence, in light of “the trial court’s thorough consideration of the Miller factors and detailed findings in support of” his sentence, the court held that it did not abuse its discretion. But dual convictions of first-degree premeditated and felony murder for the death of one victim violate double jeopardy. Remanded for amendment of the JOS and PSIR, but otherwise affirmed.