Habeas corpus; 28 USC § 2254; Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); Standard of review; Brecht v. Abrahamson; Davis v. Ayala; Chapman v. California; Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger; Hollman v. Sprader (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Reiner v. Woods; Sifuentes v. Brazelton (9th Cir.); Shackling; Deck v. Missouri; Holbrook v. Flynn; Coffin v. United States; Illinois v. Allen; Whether petitioner’s shackling had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict; McCarley v. Kelly; O’Neal v. Balcarcel; Robinson v. Gundy (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Lakin v. Stine; Ruimveld v. Birkett; Hammonds v. Commissioner, AL Dep’t of Corr. (11th Cir.); Malone v. Carpenter (10th Cir.); Evidence of guilt; Distinction between first- & second-degree murder under Michigan law; People v. Morrin (MI App.); MI Crim. JI 16.6; People v. Hoffmeister (MI); People v. Plummer (MI App.); People v. Tilley (MI); People v. Johnson (MI); People v. Furman (MI App.); Juror testimony; Rhoden v. Rowland (9th Cir.)

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court reversed the district court and granted petitioner-Davenport a conditional writ of habeas corpus from his first-degree murder conviction because his appearance at trial in shackles was “inherently prejudicial,” and the State of Michigan failed to show that the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” During his trial, one of Davenport’s hands was shackled, and there were shackles around his waist and ankles. A privacy curtain was placed around the defense table. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his arguments as to the shackles, but the Michigan Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for a hearing, after which the trial court concluded that the shackling had not affected the jury’s verdict. The court first noted that the State conceded that Davenport’s constitutional rights were violated, and that it only had to apply the “Brecht test” to evaluate harmless error on collateral review, even where AEDPA applies. Noting that it is well established shackling is inherently prejudicial, and that it was the State’s burden to show that the error did not affect the jury’s decision, the court cited cases holding that “the shackling of a defendant without justification is highly prejudicial if viewed by the jury because it vitiates the presumption of innocence and undermines the fairness of the factfinding process.” It then considered the evidence of guilt, and found that under Michigan law, “evidence of manual strangulation alone is not enough to prove premeditation[,]” and that the jury in this case could have easily returned a verdict of second-degree murder. The court saw the issue as “‘not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusions, but rather whether the evidence is so strong that a reviewing court can be assured that the shackling did not affect the jury’s conclusions.” The court rejected the State’s claim that jurors’ evidentiary hearing testimony supported that they were not adversely influenced by the shackling because the Supreme Court in Holbrook has held that “jurors will not necessarily be fully conscious of the effect [that shackling] will have on their attitude toward the accused.” Thus, it held that “the shackles branded Davenport as having a violent nature in a case where the crucial point of contention was whether he engaged in deliberate and premeditated murder. Given the closeness of this question, the number of jurors who observed the restraints, and the inherently prejudicial nature of shackling, the State has failed to carry its burden to show that the shackles did not have a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’”