Fall while riding a defendant-SMART bus; Governmental Tort Liability Act (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); MCL 691.1407(1); Motor vehicle exception in MCL 691.1405; Whether defendant-bus driver’s operation of the bus was negligent; Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC; Duty; Frederick v. Detroit; Ottinger v. Detroit United Ry.; Getz v. Detroit; Seldon v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp.; Russ v. Detroit; Zawicky v. Flint Trolley Coach Co., Inc.; Sherman v. Flint Trolley Coach, Inc.; MCL 257.612(1)(b); Gross negligence; Tarlea v. Crabtree; Maiden v. Rozwood; MCL 691.1407(8)(a)

The court held that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity did not apply, and plaintiff’s claim was barred by governmental immunity. Also, the trial court erred in holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether defendant-Thomas (bus driver) was grossly negligent where no reasonable juror could conclude that she “simply did not care about the safety or welfare” of plaintiff. The case concerned injuries sustained by plaintiff when he fell while riding a defendant-SMART bus. “While the trial court was correct that Thomas owed plaintiff a duty of care, it erred by holding that Thomas breached that duty by beginning to move before plaintiff paid for his ticket.” The court held that plaintiff "did not offer sufficient evidence establishing a special and apparent reason that Thomas should have waited for plaintiff to reach a seat before moving the bus, so Thomas’s act of moving the bus before plaintiff reached a seat was not negligent. With this error corrected, the outcome on appeal is straight forward.” While operating the bus, she “braked for a yellow light that was turning red, causing plaintiff to fall.” The court noted that it “is well settled that, absent evidence of other negligence pertaining to the operation of a bus, a plaintiff bus passenger may not recover for injuries sustained when the bus suddenly stopped because such stops are normal incidents of travel.” The record contained “no evidence that, other than stopping, Thomas operated the bus negligently; there is no evidence that she was intoxicated or otherwise impaired, she was traveling well within the 35 mile-per-hour speed limit, and she began braking for a yellow light that was turning red, as required by law.” While her “stop may arguably have been sudden, sudden stops are normal incidents of travel.” The court held that no “reasonable juror could conclude that the stop was so sudden as to be considered ‘unnecessarily sudden or violent’ such that defendants could be liable.” Thus, based on the evidence presented, no reasonable juror could determine that she was negligent in her operation of the bus. Reversed.