Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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“Excessive force” claim under 42 USC § 1983; Whether videocam footage should have been considered in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings; Qualified immunity; A constitutional violation; Graham v Connor; Whether plaintiff was “actively resisting” arrest; Whether plaintiff sufficiently pled an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
The court held that the district court erred by considering the video footage of the encounter that gave rise to this § 1983 case when ruling on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings where the footage did not “blatantly contradict or utterly discredit” the allegations in plaintiff-Saalim’s complaint. It also concluded that defendant-Bretzloff was not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the case and that the municipal liability claim against the defendant-sheriff likewise should not have been dismissed. Saalim drove passengers to the Walmart pharmacy and parked his cab in a loading zone. Bretzloff, an off-duty deputy working security for Walmart, approached and asked to see his license. Bretzloff was wearing his full sheriff’s uniform. Saalim asked why he needed to produce his license, explaining that he was waiting for his passengers. Bretzloff eventually tried to pull him out of the taxi and threatened to tase him. Saalim exited the taxi. Bretzloff’s bodycam fell to the ground but continued to film. He tased Saalim and accused him of resisting. At no point in their “approximately three-minute interaction did Bretzloff tell Saalim that he was under arrest.” Saalim eventually pled no contest to disorderly conduct. He then filed this action against Bretzloff and others. On appeal, Saalim challenged the district court’s grant of defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings. The court first noted it has consistently held that it “may only consider the video footage over the pleadings when ‘the videos are clear and “blatantly contradict[]” or “utterly discredit[]” the plaintiff’s version of events.’” If they do not, the court can only consider the pleadings on a Rule 12 motion. In this case, “the complaint faithfully describes the account depicted in the video footage, even using time stamps to denote the corresponding portions of the video it discusses.” As a result, the court found the district court erred in considering it and the court did not consider it on appeal. As to whether there was a constitutional violation, the court held that, considering “the totality of the circumstances, and the application of all three Graham factors, the use of force against Saalim was unreasonable. First, [he] had not been stopped for a severe crime. Second, he did not pose an immediate threat to Bretzloff’s safety. And third, . . . he did not actively resist arrest at any point in the interaction.” Further, given that he “was not actively resisting arrest, his right to be free from tasing and physical force was clearly established” at the time of the incident. Thus, the district court erred by ruling that Bretzloff was entitled to qualified immunity. But the court upheld the dismissal of Saalim’s equal-protection claim. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Alleged breach of the parties’ Long-Term Supply & Accommodation Agreement (LTSA); Principle that when a claim is based on a written instrument, the instrument must be attached to the pleading; MCR 2.113(C)(1); Contract interpretation; Whether the parties’ “nomination agreement” constituted a “resourcing”; Whether summary disposition was appropriate; General Motors (GM); JD Norman Industries, Inc. (JDN)
The court held that the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim against defendants-GM. Plaintiff made numerous loans to an auto supplier (nonparty-JDN) that provided parts to GM. Plaintiff and JDN entered into a LTSA with GM. Plaintiff sued GM alleging GM breached the LTSA when it signed a nomination agreement with another supplier (AAM) because that “agreement constituted a prohibited ‘resourcing.’” The court held that the trial court did not err by granting GM summary disposition because plaintiff’s pleading did not identify a claim on which relief could be granted. First, “since plaintiff attached the LTSA and nomination agreement to its first amended complaint and adopted both as true, authentic instruments, both documents” were part of the pleading and “the trial court was permitted to analyze both when determining whether plaintiff stated a claim on which relief could be granted.” As such, it “was permitted to analyze the LTSA and nomination agreement to determine whether the nomination agreement constituted a resourcing.” Second, the trial properly found the nomination agreement was not a resourcing. “[S]ince GM reserved the right to execute agreements with alternative suppliers in preparation for resourcing its component parts, including the Tier II parts that JDN was supplying, GM’s nomination agreement with AAM, although it constituted a binding contract with an alternative supplier, did not automatically violate the LTSA.” In fact, since GM “continued sourcing its Tier II parts from JDN until JDN became unable to supply the Tier II parts, the nomination agreement, signed nearly a year before GM resourced its Tier II parts to AAM, did not constitute a resourcing, but rather, was executed in preparation for resourcing.” The court found it was “evident that the nomination agreement was nothing more than an agreement made in preparation of resourcing, which GM was expressly permitted to do under the LTSA. This conclusion is consistent with the trial court’s ruling.” As a result, plaintiff “failed to allege a cause of action on which relief could be granted because the documents it incorporated in its pleading demonstrate that GM did not breach the LTSA.” Affirmed.
Custody modification; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Proper cause or change of circumstances; Established custodial environment (ECE); The statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Factors (c), (i), & (l); Legal custody; MCL 722.26a(1)(b); Parenting time; MCL 722.27a(1) & (7)
Holding that the trial court clearly erred in maintaining “an untenable status quo[,]” the court reversed the order denying plaintiff-mother’s motion for sole legal custody of the parties’ child and restrictions on defendant-father’s parenting time, and remanded. The “child has identified as female since the child was a toddler despite having been born with male anatomy.” The court first found that to the extent the trial court determined “there was not proper cause or a change of circumstances necessitating a review of the custody arrangement, this finding was against the great weight of the evidence.” Even if there was not a change of circumstances, it was “undeniable from the record that the current arrangement is not working, and this is proper cause.” The court noted the child had been taken to the ER “three times due to suicidal ideation, and suicidal ideation was regularly documented at school. The child’s thoughts continued to escalate, and the child was eventually hospitalized for six days. The parents were perpetually unable to agree on how to proceed, with plaintiff[] advocating for gender-affirming care while defendant[] insisted on providing an ‘alternate path.’” The court rejected plaintiff’s contention the trial court erred in finding an ECE, but concluded it abused its discretion by not granting her sole legal custody. The court determined the trial court made findings as to MCL 722.23(c) and (l), and MCL 722.26a(1)(b), that were against the great weight of the evidence. The “record overwhelmingly established that plaintiff[] had a significantly greater disposition to provide the child with medical care.” The evidence suggested defendant “lacked insight into the sources of the child’s mental illness” and the court noted he “made numerous assertions that were directly contrary to the expert testimony.” In addition, the “evidence irrefutably established that the parties were incapable of agreeing with respect to hormonal medicate and psychiatric care.” Defendant admitted it was impossible for them to agree on an “approach to the child’s gender dysphoria.” The court determined the “only conclusion supported by the evidence is that plaintiff[] was substantially better equipped to make important decisions in the” child’s best interests. It also held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff’s request to put restrictions on defendant’s parenting time.
Attorney fees under the FOIA; MCL 15.240(6); Use of the date on which the requested records were disclosed as the cut-off date; Meredith Corp v City of Flint; Swickard v Wayne Cnty Med Exam’r; In re Sloan Estate; Hardy v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (D DC); Woodman v Department of Corrs; Reduction; Use of the Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n framework
Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using the date of disclosure as the cut-off for awarding plaintiff attorney fees under the FOIA, or in reducing the requested fees by 75%, the court affirmed. This was the third time the case had been before the court. The first issue here was whether plaintiff was “entitled to attorney fees incurred after [4/13/18], the date on which the requested records were disclosed, to litigate whether attorney fees are warranted under FOIA.” The court noted that neither it nor the Michigan “Supreme Court has directly answered” this question. It concluded it did not have to “resolve whether MCL 15.204(6) presumptively requires or prohibits an award of attorney fees incurred post-disclosure to establish entitlement to fees in the first instance. Even applying the” most favorable standard for plaintiff that the court found in the case law, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this particular case. Plaintiff’s post-disclosure presentation of the issues to the trial court and this Court has, in our view, needlessly protracted this litigation.” In addition, the court found that “the focus on whether defendant violated FOIA largely misses the mark as to plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney fees.” The Michigan Supreme Court recently addressed entitlement to attorney fees under MCL 15.240(6) in Woodman, and did not “reference a violation of FOIA as being a requirement for a recovery of attorney fees under that statute.” The standard of review for an attorney fees award under FOIA is abuse of discretion. The absence of Michigan case law “providing that the trial court is either required to award ‘fees for fees’ or prohibited from awarding such fees . . . suggests that the default principle is that an award of such fees remains within the trial court’s discretion.” In light of the case’s lengthy “procedural history” the court concluded “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to award plaintiff attorney fees incurred after [4/13/18], because plaintiff was largely responsible for prolonging the litigation.” As to the reduction in the fees awarded, “the trial court followed the Pirgu framework and determined that the awardable attorney fees should be reduced by 75%. After reviewing the” trial court record of the proceedings before 4/13/18, the court held that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
No-Fault Act PIP benefits; Assignments; Motion to reinstate certain medical bills; Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for Reg’l Transp; Sale or assignment of right to recover payment to a third party; Revocation of assignments of rights to the medical providers; One-year-back rule
In this no-fault case, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff-insured’s motion to reinstate certain medical bills. Plaintiff was in an auto accident. He was insured by defendant. He executed assignments to various medical providers including nonparties-Columbia Clinic and Capital Surgery (the providers). In each assignment, he “transferred his right to collect insurance benefits related to the treatment he received from each provider.” The court concluded that “the medical providers as assignees held the right to seek to recover the unpaid medical bills, and plaintiff no longer had a cause of action to pursue, having transferred it away to” the providers. The court also held that the providers’ claims “were barred by the one-year-back rule.” It found that the case was “similar to the circumstances in Wallace, which featured a claimant, like plaintiff, seeking the recovery of medical bills that were assigned before the initiation of litigation. However, at the time of the subsequent revocation of assignment, the medical providers no longer maintained a viable, transferrable right to recover PIP benefits because they failed to comply with the one-year-back rule.” Thus, the court held there that “the medical providers’ rights under the assignment were statutorily barred.” The court determined that here, “much like in Wallace,” when plaintiff obtained revocations of his assignments, “‘each provider’s right to collect on these claims for benefits had already been extinguished by the one year-back rule. Thus, there remained no actionable causes of action to give back to plaintiff.’” Finally, the providers filed suit on 7/22/21, “approximately one year and four months after they provided services to plaintiff, and any liability for their claims was extinguished by the time plaintiff received the revocations of the assignments in” 1/22. The court concluded that “even if the parties complied with” a mandated 3/3/22 deadline for “the dismissal of the provider suit, the matter of plaintiff bringing suit when he was not the real party in interest remains an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining relief due to the previous assignments.” Affirmed.
Timeliness of a petition to reform a trust; MCL 600.5813; The Powers of Appointment Act; MCL 556.112(c); Frank v Linkner; Discovery; Dismissal of petition for a declaration that the limited power of appointment (LPA) had been exercised in a way that violated the terms of the Vivian Stolaruk Living Trust (VSLT); In re Estate of Reisman
In Docket No. 361518, the court affirmed the probate court’s order granting summary disposition to appellee-Giarmarco (Trustee for one of the trusts at issue) as to a petition to reform a trust and its earlier order granting Giarmarco’s discovery motion. In Docket No. 365004, it also affirmed the probate court’s order denying petitioners’ (the adult children of the grantors of the trusts, the now-deceased Steve and Vivian Stolaruk) separate petition for a declaration that Steve exercised the LPA granted to him by the VSLT in a manner not permitted by the VSLT. These consolidated appeals arose from Steve’s exercise in 2017 of the LPA, “the effect of which deprived petitioners of their distributive shares under the VSLT.” In Docket No. 361518, petitioners argued that the probate court erred by holding that their 2019 petition to reform the VSLT was not timely filed under MCL 600.5813. But the court held that the “alleged wrong was the wrongful inclusion of the LPA in the VSLT, which allegedly conflicted with Vivian’s intentions, and the injury occurred in 2003, when Vivian died and the VSLT and accompanying LPA became irrevocable. It was at that point that petitioners were harmed because Steve then had the power to use the LPA to [their] detriment. Although Steve did not actually use this LPA until 2017, petitioners lost the certainty of any distribution under the VSLT in 2003, before” he exercised this power. Thus, the circumstances here were analogous to those in Frank. “As such, the probate court did not err by ruling that petitioners’ claim accrued in 2003, and as a result, their petition challenging the validity of the LPA, which was not filed until 2019, was untimely under MCL 600.5813.” As to petitioners’ arguments about discovery, the court noted “the probate court did not completely foreclose the possibility that petitioners could pursue their requested discovery in the future because it granted Giarmarco’s motions without prejudice, thereby permitting petitioners to again seek relevant discovery if future events justified it. Under these circumstances, [its] decision did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” In Docket No. 365004, involving Steve’s exercise of the LPA, petitioners argued “that Article Nine, Section 4 and Article 10, Section 3 unambiguously limit Steve to using the LPA only to appoint assets to Vivian’s descendants.” The court disagreed, concluding the probate court did not err in its interpretation. It also found the probate court did not err by determining “that Steve’s exercise of the LPA did not improperly expose the VSLT marital and family trust assets to Steve’s creditors.”