Dispute between no-fault insurers over their respective liability for first-party no-fault benefits; The No-Fault Act (NFA) (MCL 500.3101 et seq.); Docket No. 319709 (Plaintiff/third-party defendant-State Farm Automobile Insurance Agency) - Whether a vehicle is "involved" in a motor vehicle accident so as to trigger entitlement to personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Detroit Med. Ctr. v. Progressive MI Ins. Co.; MCL 500.3114(5); Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n; Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.; MCR 7.215(J)(1); Const. 1963, art. 6, § 6; DeFrain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Docket No. 319710 (Defendant/third-party plaintiff-QBE Insurance Corporation) - "Innocent third-party rule"; MCL 500.3114(5)(a); MCL 500.3115(1)(a); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.; MCL 500.3114(6); MCL 500.3115(2); Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten; Harris v. ACIA; Municipal Risk Management Authority (MMRMA)

In Docket No. 319709, the court reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiff/third-party defendant-State Farm's motion for summary disposition as to the issue of priority and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of State Farm. In Docket No. 319710, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of summary disposition to defendant/third-party plaintiff-QBE relative to the "innocent third-party rule." The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident and presented a priority dispute among three insurers - State Farm, QBE, and defendant-MMRMA. Third-party defendant-Johnson, who was being chased by Officer A, ran a red light and collided with a motorcycle being operated by third-party defendant-Bongers. In Docket No. 319709, State Farm argued that the trial court erred in failing to hold as a matter of law that A's vehicle was "involved" in the accident for the purposes of the NFA, and thus that MMRMA (the insurer of A's vehicle) was at a higher level of priority than State Farm as to liability for PIP benefits paid to Bongers. The court agreed. "Because the accident involved no physical contact between Bongers and the police vehicle," and the incident concerned "the potential roles of multiple vehicles, whether the police vehicle was 'involved' in the accident" required a determination under the principles set forth in Turner. As in Turner, this case involved "an officer who decided to pursue a vehicle with activated lights and sirens." Johnson testified that he decided to flee A and knew he was being pursued. He also testified that A "was 'right behind' him for the whole chase, and admitted that he ran the red light because he was being pursued." MMRMA's reliance on pre-Turner cases was misplaced. They were non-binding and "specifically distinguished by Turner as relating to single vehicle accidents, rather than multivehicle accidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle other than the police vehicle." Further, MMRMA's argument, supported by the affidavit of a mechanical engineer and accident reconstruction expert, that unlike the car thief in Turner, Johnson formed the decision to flee while A was outside (and thus not operating) his vehicle, was "a distinction without a difference." Even if his initial decision to flee was not prompted by A's use of a motor vehicle, "his continuing flight, and specifically his decision to run the red light that caused the accident, certainly was." Thus, A's use of his vehicle "prompted [Johnson] to ignore the red light and collide with the other vehicle[]." Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to MMRMA, there existed no material basis to distinguish this case from Turner. The court also was not at liberty to find that Turner was wrongly decided.