Contract dispute; Contract interpretation; Latent ambiguity; City of Grosse Pointe Park v Michigan Mun Liab & Prop Pool; Use of extrinsic evidence to show that a latent ambiguity exists; Shay v Aldrich; Distinguishing Teachworth v Citizens Ins Co of Am (Unpub)

Holding that the insurance “contract in question does not obligate defendant[-insurer] to buy a new van that is modified to accommodate plaintiff’s wheelchair,” the court reversed and remanded “for entry of judgment in defendant’s favor.” Plaintiff was seriously injured in an auto accident in 1973, and has since driven a modified van. In 2018, defendant refused to purchase a third modified van for her. After her second van was stolen in 2021, she sued defendant claiming its failure to purchase the third van breached certain contracts, and that it unlawfully failed to pay certain PIP benefits. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding the parties’ 2012 agreement required that it purchase another new van for her. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. First, its “framing of the purported ambiguity as ‘latent’ was error.” There was “no latent ambiguity in the contract, and the appropriate inquiry is whether the agreement is patently ambiguous, or ambiguous on its face.” It was not. “Viewing the provisions of the agreement as a whole, the parties contemplated that defendant, or even plaintiff, might buy another van. But nothing in the agreement could be read as obligating defendant to do so. Moreover, defendant disclaimed any liability to plaintiff.” Because the “contract terms are clear, we must enforce them as written.” In sum, “the trial court erred by finding an ambiguity in the contract, whether framed as latent or patent. The agreement by its plain terms is silent as to defendant’s obligation to buy another van, which means that it has no obligation under the agreement to do so.”

Sentencing for armed robbery; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D)(2); Juvenile sentencing; Miller v Alabama; Montgomery v Louisiana; Distinguishing People v Turner; Cruel or unusual punishment; Distinguishing People v Eads; Proportionality; Appellate jurisdiction; Appeal of right; Application for leave; MCR 6.509(A)

Holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider defendant’s sentencing challenges because he filed a claim of appeal of right, rather than an application for leave to appeal, as required by MCR 6.509(A), the court dismissed the appeal. He was convicted of a variety of crimes for breaking into the home of an 85-year-old woman, threatening to kill her with a knife, raping her, tying her up in a chair, and ransacking her home. He was 17 at the time. The trial court sentenced him to 125 to 250 years for CSC I, 50 to 100 for armed robbery, and 10 to 15 for breaking and entering. In a prior appeal, the court vacated the sentence for CSC I, but upheld the sentence for armed robbery. On remand, the trial court imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for CSC I, which the court affirmed. The trial court subsequently granted relief from the CSC I sentence and imposed a new term of 40 to 60 years, leaving in place the sentence for armed robbery. In the present appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to resentence him for armed robbery. The court noted it had repeatedly affirmed that sentence “on direct appeal, explaining that it was proportionate and constitutionally sound. Because of those rulings on the merits,” MCR 6.508(D)(2) precluded defendant from seeking relief in a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court “did not abuse its discretion, as a matter of procedure, by leaving undisturbed the sentence for armed robbery despite defendant’s procedural objections based on Turner.” The court refused to consider his claim that his 50 to 100-year sentence for armed robbery was disproportionate and constituted cruel or unusual punishment, noting he “filed a claim of appeal of right, disregarding the requirement in MCR 6.509(A), and depriving” the court “of its authority to consider whether to grant or deny an application for leave to appeal. Defendant’s failure to comply with the universal mandate in MCR 6.509(A) forecloses appellate review of his constitutional challenges at this juncture.”

Motion for relief from judgment; Motion to amend pending motion; MCR 6.502(F); Motion for reconsideration

Given that there was “no order denying the original motion for relief from judgment[,]” the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to amend his motion for relief from judgment as well as his motion for reconsideration. The court did not address his substantive arguments as it was “impossible to review whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment because the trial court’s order doing so was previously vacated and defendant’s motion was not addressed again.” The trial court’s 5/23 order addressed his 5/22 motions to amend his motion for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. But in ruling on those motions, it did not acknowledge that the court had already vacated its 12/21 order addressing the original motion for relief from judgment. It did “not appear that the trial court was even aware of” the court’s 8/22 order. “The trial court erred by holding that defendant’s [5/22] motion to amend his motion for relief from judgment should be denied because his motion for relief from judgment had already been denied.” Given that its order as to his “motion for relief from judgment had been vacated and no new order had been issued, defendant could now move to amend his pending motion for relief from judgment.” Further, in denying his motion for reconsideration, the trial court “did not appear to be aware that its order denying relief from judgment had already been vacated. It did not consider the matters alluded to in” the court’s 8/22 order. Thus, its “order denying reconsideration fell outside the range of reasonable and principled and outcomes.” Vacated and remanded. On remand, “the trial court must permit defendant an opportunity to again move to amend his motion for relief from judgment. After deciding whether to grant the motion to amend, the trial court then must consider anew [his] motion for relief from judgment, whether amended or not, and in accordance with the instructions in” the court’s prior remand order.

Contract dispute; Contract interpretation; Latent ambiguity; City of Grosse Pointe Park v Michigan Mun Liab & Prop Pool; Use of extrinsic evidence to show that a latent ambiguity exists; Shay v Aldrich; Distinguishing Teachworth v Citizens Ins Co of Am (Unpub)

Holding that the insurance “contract in question does not obligate defendant[-insurer] to buy a new van that is modified to accommodate plaintiff’s wheelchair,” the court reversed and remanded “for entry of judgment in defendant’s favor.” Plaintiff was seriously injured in an auto accident in 1973, and has since driven a modified van. In 2018, defendant refused to purchase a third modified van for her. After her second van was stolen in 2021, she sued defendant claiming its failure to purchase the third van breached certain contracts, and that it unlawfully failed to pay certain PIP benefits. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding the parties’ 2012 agreement required that it purchase another new van for her. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. First, its “framing of the purported ambiguity as ‘latent’ was error.” There was “no latent ambiguity in the contract, and the appropriate inquiry is whether the agreement is patently ambiguous, or ambiguous on its face.” It was not. “Viewing the provisions of the agreement as a whole, the parties contemplated that defendant, or even plaintiff, might buy another van. But nothing in the agreement could be read as obligating defendant to do so. Moreover, defendant disclaimed any liability to plaintiff.” Because the “contract terms are clear, we must enforce them as written.” In sum, “the trial court erred by finding an ambiguity in the contract, whether framed as latent or patent. The agreement by its plain terms is silent as to defendant’s obligation to buy another van, which means that it has no obligation under the agreement to do so.”

Personal jurisdiction; Yoost v Caspari; Whether the alleged business activities of one corporate entity could be attributed to another corporate entity; Limited personal jurisdiction under Michigan’s long-arm statute (MCL 600.715); “The transaction of any business within the state”; Oberlies v Searchmont Resort, Inc; Due process; Jeffrey v Rapid Am Corp; Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz; Starbrite Distrib, Inc v Excelda Mfg Co

In these consolidated appeals, the court held that defendants (collectively, Domtar) made out a prima facie case that third-party defendant-Terrico “engaged in the transaction of business within the state, and exercising limited personal jurisdiction over Terrico under the circumstances shown does not violate [its] right to due process.” Thus, it concluded the trial court erred in granting Terrico’s motions for summary disposition for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appeals concerned Domtar’s third-party claims for against Terrico “and specifically whether the trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Terrico, the Canadian corporation, to adjudicate those claims. Much of the dispute” here arose from two entities’ “nearly identical business names and the unclear identity of the entity Techni-Comp Environmental, which is listed on a majority of the documents detailing the alleged business activities at issue in the 1990s.” Central to the appeals was whether those alleged business activities “at issue can be attributed to Terrico, the Canadian corporation.” The court noted that “Domtar ‘need only present evidence sufficient to establish prima facie [its] jurisdictional claims notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving party.’” The evidence here included, among other things, “several pieces of correspondence detailing the composting business dealings in the 1990s listed the same Canadian address for Techni-Comp Environmental that Terrico currently uses, supporting a reasonable inference that Terrico operated as Techni-Comp Environmental during the relevant time period.” The court concluded that, relying “on the uncontroverted allegations, resolving factual disputes in Domtar’s favor, and viewing the evidence (including the identical Canadian addresses, previous Canadian business activities, and incorporation timeline) in a light most favorable to Domtar,” it made out “a prima facie case that Terrico operated as Techni-Comp Environmental at the time of the activities in question.” The court further concluded “the trial court had limited personal jurisdiction over Terrico under” MCL 600.715. Domtar’s evidence showed “Terrico sought out and negotiated with [defendant-]Eddy Paper to transact business at a Michigan composting site, secured conditional approval to establish the site from” a township, and notified the county “about the site development.” Finally, the court held that “the trial court erred by finding that the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over Terrico was inconsistent with due process.” Reversed and remanded.

Motion for a default judgment as a sanction for discovery abuses; MCR 2.313(B)(2); MCR 2.504(B)(1); Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin; Traxler v Ford Motor Co; Swain v Morse

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting plaintiff’s request for a “default judgment against defendants as a sanction for discovery abuses.” Plaintiff sued defendants for medical malpractice. A jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. The court noted the factors to be considered by a trial court when asked to impose a discovery sanction, and that sanctions “such as dismissal or default should be imposed only when the conduct at issue is flagrant or involves wanton refusal to facilitate discovery, typically involving repeated violations of a court order.” After reviewing the record, the court could not “say that there was an abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for default judgment when the trial court correctly considered, albeit implicitly, the factors outlined in Perrin, regarding whether to impose a discovery sanction, and Traxler, regarding whether to impose a default judgment. The trial court appropriately weighed relevant considerations including the timing of plaintiff’s motion, the timing of defendants’ purported violation, defendants’ efforts to cure any discovery defects, and prejudice.” Further, the court did not “find that the trial court’s rejection of plaintiff’s request falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” It noted that a “trial court has discretion to impose a default but ‘only where the conduct at issue is flagrant or involves wanton refusal to facilitate discovery.’” Plaintiff did not obtain “an order to compel following violations of discovery nor was there another ‘compelling circumstance’ when the trial court determined that defendants produced the information promptly after discovering it.” While plaintiff argued that their “failure to comply with discovery was willful, meaning ‘conscious or intentional, and not accidental,’ the trial court rejected this characterization.” The court found “no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings underpinning its reasoning.” Comparing this case to Traxler, where it upheld a default judgment sanction, the court found that it was “not evident from the record here that defendants’ failure to produce the documents and witnesses earlier was similarly ‘flagrant’ or involved ‘wanton refusal to facilitate discovery’ such that [it] should overturn a jury verdict and order entry of a default against defendants.” Affirmed.

Challenge to a trust amendment; Sanctions for filing a frivolous action; MCR 1.109; MCL 600.2591; “Frivolous”; MCL 600.2591(3)(a); Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Michalek; LaRose Mkt, Inc v Sylvan Ctr, Inc; Interpretation of a trust; Testamentary capacity; In re Sprenger’s Estate; Whether an action was initiated for an improper purpose; MCR 1.109(E)(5)(c)

The court held that the probate court did not err by granting in part respondent’s motion for sanctions and imposing a sanction of $105,136 on petitioners, jointly and severally. In 2023, petitioners filed a verified petition with the probate court contesting the validity of a trust amendment on the grounds that the grantor (M) lacked sufficient mental capacity to amend the trust and remove them as beneficiaries in 2019. In 2024, after 8 months of discovery, petitioners filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their suit, stating that their belief that M lacked testamentary capacity had been based on “the medical records in their possession at the time the verified petition was filed, but that ‘discovery did not confirm this belief.’” They also stated that their expert “was unable to conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that” M lacked testamentary capacity when he amended the trust. They requested an order dismissing the case. Shortly thereafter, respondent filed a motion for sanctions, arguing that the lawsuit was initiated in violation of MCR 1.109 and MCL 600.2591. The probate court dismissed the case and awarded respondent sanctions. On appeal, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that the probate court erred by finding their action was frivolous and awarding sanctions. The mere fact that M “had at some point in his life been diagnosed with a condition that could have affected his testamentary capacity was insufficient to support a claim for lack of capacity, but in this case it was not only insufficient, but it was contradicted by petitioners’ own testimony about their own experiences with” M. On this record, the court could not “say that the probate court clearly erred by holding that petitioners knew or should have known that their verified petition was not well-grounded in fact.” Finally, although a “closer call,” the court was ultimately “not left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made” as to one petitioner’s purpose in filing the petition, and any error as to the other petitioner was harmless given “the probate court’s findings under MCR 1.109(E)(5)(b) and MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii).” Affirmed.

Petitions for a nondomestic personal protection order (PPO); MCL 600.2950a; Stalking; MCL 750.411h; PF v JF

The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in making its findings of fact as to the petitions for nondomestic PPOs against petitioner’s neighbors (respondents-AR and ER), or abuse its discretion in denying the petitions. Petitioner argued on appeal that he provided sufficient evidence of stalking to support his petitions. The court disagreed. Among other things, he asserted “that his survey stakes, or property markers, were removed and destroyed on” 1/11/24. While it was undisputed that his “property was destroyed, there was no persuasive evidence showing that respondents were responsible for these incidents.” He further “alleged several incidents in which ER harassed him by running toward him and yelling.” However, he failed to “provide exact dates or times. Petitioner did not provide sufficient details for his claims that AR and ER yelled at him and insulted him. When the trial court asked for exact dates, petitioner did not remember, only noting that the last time this happened was in the ‘[l]ast year or something.’ Thus, given this lack of detail, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that these allegations did not rise to the level of ‘stalking’ under MCL 750.411h(1)(e).” The petition against ER also “alleged that respondents ‘installed powerful spot lights that are aimed [at] [petitioner’s] house,’ causing [him] to ‘[b]lack out my windows so [he] can [s]leep.’ In his petition against AR, petitioner alleged that the spot lights ‘are aimed at [his] house.’” He contended that the light from their flood lights constituted unconsented contact under MCL 750.411h(1)(f)(vii). But the court agreed “with the trial court that such allegations, if true, might constitute some type of ‘ordinance violations’ but do not necessarily rise to the level of requiring a PPO.” Petitioner asserted that the totality of the incidents constituted “stalking and has caused him emotional distress. [He] testified that he is ‘very fearful’ and has endured ‘repeated emotional stress and trauma.’ However, worth noting, when asked by the trial court if there was anything respondents actually did to him, he replied: ‘No.’ Petitioner admitted that neither AR nor ER physically harmed or threatened him. Nor has [he] sought any medical treatment or counseling.” Affirmed.

Challenge to a trust amendment; Sanctions for filing a frivolous action; MCR 1.109; MCL 600.2591; “Frivolous”; MCL 600.2591(3)(a); Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Michalek; LaRose Mkt, Inc v Sylvan Ctr, Inc; Interpretation of a trust; Testamentary capacity; In re Sprenger’s Estate; Whether an action was initiated for an improper purpose; MCR 1.109(E)(5)(c)

The court held that the probate court did not err by granting in part respondent’s motion for sanctions and imposing a sanction of $105,136 on petitioners, jointly and severally. In 2023, petitioners filed a verified petition with the probate court contesting the validity of a trust amendment on the grounds that the grantor (M) lacked sufficient mental capacity to amend the trust and remove them as beneficiaries in 2019. In 2024, after 8 months of discovery, petitioners filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their suit, stating that their belief that M lacked testamentary capacity had been based on “the medical records in their possession at the time the verified petition was filed, but that ‘discovery did not confirm this belief.’” They also stated that their expert “was unable to conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that” M lacked testamentary capacity when he amended the trust. They requested an order dismissing the case. Shortly thereafter, respondent filed a motion for sanctions, arguing that the lawsuit was initiated in violation of MCR 1.109 and MCL 600.2591. The probate court dismissed the case and awarded respondent sanctions. On appeal, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that the probate court erred by finding their action was frivolous and awarding sanctions. The mere fact that M “had at some point in his life been diagnosed with a condition that could have affected his testamentary capacity was insufficient to support a claim for lack of capacity, but in this case it was not only insufficient, but it was contradicted by petitioners’ own testimony about their own experiences with” M. On this record, the court could not “say that the probate court clearly erred by holding that petitioners knew or should have known that their verified petition was not well-grounded in fact.” Finally, although a “closer call,” the court was ultimately “not left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made” as to one petitioner’s purpose in filing the petition, and any error as to the other petitioner was harmless given “the probate court’s findings under MCR 1.109(E)(5)(b) and MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii).” Affirmed.