Constitutionality of 25-year mandatory minimum sentence; Cruel & unusual punishment; De facto life sentence

The court concluded that defendant-Dupree had “not satisfied his burden of showing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment or cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the federal or state constitutions.” He was convicted of armed robbery. Following a remand from the Supreme Court, he was resentenced as a fourth offense habitual offender to 25 years to 450 months. Dupree argued “that the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence required under MCL 769.12 is unconstitutional as applied to him because it constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment.” Other than stating the existence of the circumstance, he did “not explain how they are ‘unusual.’” As a result, he had “failed to overcome the presumption of proportionality. Moreover, the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence is not unduly harsh under the circumstances surrounding Dupree and the offense that he perpetrated.” The court concluded that although he suggested “that his case was unusual because the trial court’s discretion was restrained, the record reflects that the [trial] court retained some discretion and, given the circumstances surrounding the offender, i.e., Dupree, it exercised that discretion in [his] favor.” He next argued “that his sentence constituted a de facto life sentence that are disproportionate to him and his offense.” He provided “a cursory citation to an article by the Council on Criminal Justice[.]” The court held that the article did not support his “assertion that there is no functional distinction between a 12-year sentence and a 25-year year sentence on deterrence. Rather, it indicates that the issue has not been well researched.” He next maintained “that the length of his sentence will do little to protect society[.]” He cited “an article by the National Institute of Justice.” Given that he “is a demonstrated man of violence and a chronic offender, the article suggests that the sentencing consideration of protection of society is actually better served by a longer period of incarceration.” Dupree contended “that the length of his sentence will deny him an opportunity to reveal his rehabilitation to the parole board.” Yet, the record reflected “that he has had multiple opportunities to demonstrate that he had been rehabilitated while in prison. And, despite being paroled on multiple occasion, [he] has continued to commit crimes. Indeed, he was on parole when he committed the offense at issue in this case. Regardless, the fact that he will not be before the parole board until he is 74 years of age does not deny him an opportunity to show rehabilitative potential.” Affirmed.

Prosecutorial error; Vouching for the victim’s credibility & calling defendant a liar during closing argument; Sentencing; Habitual offender enhancement; MCL 769.12

Concluding that no plain error occurred as to prosecutorial error and defendant was not entitled to resentencing, the court affirmed. He was convicted of CSC I and sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 25 to 50 years. Defendant first contended “that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the prosecutor improperly vouched for the victim’s credibility and asserted that defendant was a liar during closing argument.” The record did not support his “claim that the prosecutor committed error during its closing argument. The prosecutor did not claim special insight into the victim’s or defendant’s credibility. Rather, he argued that the victim and other prosecution witnesses did not ‘have a special interest in the outcome of this case, other than the fact that they are just here and they’ve been told to tell the truth.’” He further claimed “that the victim was motivated to tell the truth to protect herself, while defendant, facing serious consequences, had an incentive to lie. Those arguments responded to the defense theory that the victim fabricated the allegations and were permissible.” Next, the court did not need “address the merits of defendant’s OV challenges because any error would be harmless.” The trial court sentenced him to 25 to 50 years for both CSC I convictions. “For the conviction under MCL 750.520b(1)(a), the trial court was required to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years under MCL 750.520b(2)(b). Additionally, the habitual offender statute, MCL 769.12, mandates a 25-year minimum for a defendant with at least three prior felony convictions—one of which is a ‘listed prior felony’—who is subsequently convicted of a serious crime. Because defendant was a fourth-offense habitual offender with a prior conviction of first-degree home invasion under MCL 750.110a—a listed prior felony—the trial court was required to impose a minimum sentence of 25 years for each” CSC I conviction. The court held that because “the trial court lacked discretion to impose a lower minimum sentence, any error in scoring the OVs would be harmless.” It found that even if the guidelines range had changed, the trial “court could not have imposed a lesser sentence.”

Deadlocked-jury instruction (Allen instruction); M Crim JI 3.12; Allen v United States; People v Sullivan; Whether a deviation from the standard instruction was coercive; People v Walker

The court held that the trial court’s deviation from the standard Allen instruction was not unduly coercive. Defendant was convicted of arson of an insured dwelling and second-degree arson and sentenced to 7 to 20 years. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court provided an unduly coercive Allen instruction. He claimed “the trial court’s deviation from the standard instruction was unduly coercive because it impermissibly threatened the jurors by indicating they would be called to return and sit through a new trial if they failed to reach an agreement.” Viewed in isolation, this “statement could be read as insinuating the jury would have to sit through another trial. However, after this remark, the trial court separately referred to the jury as ‘you,’ stating, ‘I’m going to ask you to please return to the jury room and resume your deliberations . . . .’ This distinction reflects that the trial court was referring to the parties and their attorneys when stating, ‘[T]hey have to do this all over again.’ In examining the ‘factual context in which the instruction was given,'” the trial court “did not impermissibly threaten or imply that the jury would be required to hear the case again if it failed to reach a unanimous agreement.” Further, its “Allen instruction was not otherwise unduly coercive.” It read “M Crim JI 3.12 nearly verbatim, pausing only to clarify that it could not resolve disputed factual issues. There is no basis to conclude that the jury’s knowledge of a potential mistrial would cause a reasonable juror to give up their objections solely to reach an agreement. Indeed, after its initial statements, the trial court explicitly reminded the jurors that they should not give up their honest beliefs in order to reach an agreement.” Nor did its “commentary threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable amount of time.” Affirmed.

Challenges to a probate court order approving a personal representative’s (PR) fiduciary fees, discharging the PR from liability, & closing the estate; Abandonment of an issue; In re Temple Marital Trust; Effect of an appeal from a probate court ruling; MCR 5.801(A); Surman v Surman

Holding that appellant’s claims were either abandoned, precluded, or meritless, the court affirmed the probate court’s order. Appellant filed 16 prior appeals in this case challenging “his mother’s guardianship, death, estate, and family trusts, and the probate court’s handling of those matters.” In the present appeal, he specifically challenged the probate court’s order approving the PR’s request for fiduciary fees, discharging the PR from liability, and closing the estate. The court noted that he made 27 separate claims in this appeal. It found the majority of his claims were abandoned. “An appellant may not merely announce his or her position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his or her claims. And, where a party fails to cite any supporting legal authority for its position, the issue is deemed abandoned.” It also found many of his claims were “precluded by MCR 5.801(A) because they relate to earlier probate-court orders that are not subject to review on this appeal.” And it found his remaining claims meritless, including his assertion that he “was somehow prohibited from investigating his mother’s death, and was ‘schemed’ into having money taken from [her] estate to pay for an investigation into her cause of death.” It noted that his “dissatisfaction with the results does not mean that his efforts were frustrated, or that a scheme was concocted to siphon money from” his mother’s estate.

Class certification; FedRCivP 23(b)(2) & (3); Claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA); 42 USC § 3604; Rule 23(a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, & adequate representation requirements; Article III standing

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying a class (the Water Lien Class) under Rules 23(b)(2) and (3) in this challenge to defendant-City of Cleavland’s water lien assessments. It found that plaintiffs alleged a disparate-impact claim under § 3604 of the FHA that featured a common question and supported standing under Article III. Plaintiffs alleged that the City’s “‘disproportionate assessment of water liens on Black homeowners in Cuyahoga County, under [its] facially neutral water lien policy, violates the FHA.’” The court noted that statistics show “White residents make up approximately 59% of the population of Cuyahoga County, while Black residents make up 29%. Still, roughly 18% of water liens are placed in majority White neighborhoods, while 68% of water liens are placed in majority Black neighborhoods.” The court first reviewed the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. It found that where plaintiffs “identified ‘at least 943 residents who would belong to the proposed’” class, there was a sufficient number. Further, they suffered “according to a common theory of injury under the FHA whose answer will resolve the suit ‘in one stroke’ for all members of the Class.” In addition, their “claims fairly encompass the claims of all unnamed class members.” Finally, they “established the adequacy of class representation because the named representatives share common interests with the unnamed interests of the Water Lien Class and appear able to ‘vigorously’ assert those interests for all.” The court also concluded that the class, “‘all Black homeowners or residents in Cuyahoga County’ who suffered the placement of a water lien within the past two years[,]” met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). And as to (b)(3), there was a “common question” at the center of the litigation. The court rejected the City’s standing argument, holding that plaintiffs “have standing to pursue their FHA claim on a disparate-impact theory, and questions of economic harm are irrelevant at this stage.” Affirmed.

Whether a county’s legislative branch has authority to require its executive branch to provide digital real-time, read-only access to financial information it deems necessary for budgeting; The Uniform Budgeting & Accounting Act (UBAA); County Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H); County Charter, § 3.5(a); County budgeting requirements & responsibilities; Whether the term “law” in the County Charter encompasses ordinances validly enacted by the Commission; “Law” & “ordinance”; Clam Lake Twp v Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs

Holding that the County’s Charter gives defendant-County Commission legal authority to require plaintiff-County Executive to provide access to digital real-time, read-only access to financial information it deems necessary for budgeting, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court. In its counterclaim, defendant sought declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus ordering plaintiff to comply with the UBAA, the County Charter, and a County ordinance by granting real-time, read-only access to the county’s financial management software to the Commission’s director of legislative affairs. The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s motion and dismissed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals. “When concluding that the County Executive’s supervisory power could not be limited in any way by an ordinance passed by the Commission, the Court of Appeals failed to give the proper meaning to Charter, § 3.5(a). The majority’s analysis failed to consider relevant context and principles of statutory interpretation and thus failed to respect the status of county ordinances as binding ‘law’ within the county.” The court concluded that “Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H) was validly adopted as a law within” the county. It “imposes a degree of restriction upon the County Executive’s control over the county’s information technology and finance departments.” Charter, § 3.5(a) “permits such restriction if it is accomplished by the ‘Charter or law’ and does not create a conflict between the ordinance and the Charter. Nothing in Charter, § 3.5 clearly indicates that ‘law’ was intended to be so narrow as to exclude validly enacted ordinances.” As such, “after its adoption Ordinance No. 2017-04, § 10(H) was effective and enforceable absent a clear conflict with a Charter provision other than § 3.5(a) or a superior form of law.” Although the parties disagreed about the meaning of Charter, § 3.5(a), neither party suggested the ordinance was “otherwise in conflict with or preempted by another Charter provision or a state law. Section 3.5(b) of the Charter further implies that the County Executive has some form of a legal duty to enforce Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H), irrespective of whether the ordinance requires more of the County Executive than the UBAA or Charter, § 8.6.1.” Thus, the court held that “the plain language of Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H) requires the County Executive to provide the Commission or its agent with access to real-time, read-only access to financial software programs used by the county.” This conclusion made it unnecessary for the court “to address whether Charter, § 8.6.1 separately imposes such a requirement.”

Challenges to a probate court order approving a personal representative’s (PR) fiduciary fees, discharging the PR from liability, & closing the estate; Abandonment of an issue; In re Temple Marital Trust; Effect of an appeal from a probate court ruling; MCR 5.801(A); Surman v Surman

Holding that appellant’s claims were either abandoned, precluded, or meritless, the court affirmed the probate court’s order. Appellant filed 16 prior appeals in this case challenging “his mother’s guardianship, death, estate, and family trusts, and the probate court’s handling of those matters.” In the present appeal, he specifically challenged the probate court’s order approving the PR’s request for fiduciary fees, discharging the PR from liability, and closing the estate. The court noted that he made 27 separate claims in this appeal. It found the majority of his claims were abandoned. “An appellant may not merely announce his or her position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his or her claims. And, where a party fails to cite any supporting legal authority for its position, the issue is deemed abandoned.” It also found many of his claims were “precluded by MCR 5.801(A) because they relate to earlier probate-court orders that are not subject to review on this appeal.” And it found his remaining claims meritless, including his assertion that he “was somehow prohibited from investigating his mother’s death, and was ‘schemed’ into having money taken from [her] estate to pay for an investigation into her cause of death.” It noted that his “dissatisfaction with the results does not mean that his efforts were frustrated, or that a scheme was concocted to siphon money from” his mother’s estate.

Finding as to the existence of a statutory basis for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3); Children’s best interests; Effect of relative placement

While the court rejected the DHHS’s argument “that the trial court failed to determine that a statutory basis for termination” was established, it concluded “that the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal framework” in assessing the children’s best interests. Thus, it vacated the orders declining to terminate respondents’ parental rights and remanded “for redetermination of the children’s best interests applying the proper legal framework.” It first found that the trial court “made brief, definite, and pertinent findings on the record, sufficient to satisfy MCR 3.977(I)(1) and MCL 712A.19b(1), when it accepted” respondents’ no-contest pleas and found they “were not contesting that a statutory basis had been established.” As a result, it “did not fail to find that a statutory basis for termination of respondents’ parental rights to the four children under MCL 712A.19b(3) had been established by clear and convincing evidence.” But it did clearly err “when it concluded it was not in the children’s best interests to terminate respondents’ parental rights because [its] analysis focused almost exclusively on the children’s placement with relatives. In doing so, [it] incorrectly surmised that this Court has a policy favoring guardianships over termination of parental rights.” The court noted that it “does not have a ‘policy’ favoring (or disfavoring) guardianships. Rather, [it] considers each case on its own merits, as should a trial court assessing” a child’s best interests. The court found that “by focusing on the perception that guardianship was a preferred outcome, the trial court failed fully to consider other relevant and important factors. The children have spent virtually no time in respondents’ care because each of [them] was removed from respondents’ custody shortly after birth.” In addition, respondents failed to comply with their case service plans, which were designed “to address their substance abuse, mental health, and homelessness.” As of the time the trial court made its ruling, they had shown “no progress toward overcoming their substance abuse, had not obtained suitable housing, and had not demonstrated that they will ever be able adequately to care for the children.” The court also noted that the record suggested “concerns with the relative placement.” It retained jurisdiction and issued an order as to the proceedings on remand.