Interpretation of partnership agreements; Actions impairing the status of a limited partnership; The Michigan Revised Limited Partnership Act (MRULPA); Partnership dissolution; MCL 449.1801; Effect of express termination dates in the agreements; Declaratory relief; MCR 2.605(A)(1); Receiver appointment; MCL 554.1016(1); Alternative remedies; Modification of the receivership order to allow the recording of a lis pendens; MCL 600.2701(1); Motion for relief from an order on the grounds of MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f)

Holding that defendants violated provisions of the partnership agreements, the court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the limited partnership amendments at issue were void. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver as to one of the partnerships involved in the case but did do so as to two others. Further, it “erred in refusing to modify the receivership order to” permit defendants to record lis pendens on the partnership properties. These consolidated appeals arose from a dispute over the terms of three limited partnership agreements, which established limited partnerships to own and operate three different apartment complexes. Defendants argued that the limited partners’ consent “was not required for the amendments increasing the terms of the limited partnerships because failing to increase the term ‘would impair the status of the Partnership as a limited partnership’ under the MRULPA.” The court disagreed, noting that the MRULPA “provides that the certificate of a limited partnership should include ‘[a]ny time at which or events upon the happening of which the limited partnership is to be dissolved and its affairs wound up.’” The partnership agreements here each contained “an express termination date in § 2.4. Giving effect to the termination dates explicitly contained in the limited partnership agreements, it is clear that the limited partnerships were meant to be dissolved on specified dates.” Given that they “all had set termination dates, allowing them to expire as planned did not impair [them]. Expiration on the previously agreed-upon dates was consistent with the terms of the partnership agreements. In addition, defendants acted in direct contradiction to plaintiffs’ refusal to consent to the extension of the partnership agreements. Though defendants could act without seeking consent in limited circumstances, this is not the same as ignoring plaintiffs’ explicit refusal after defendants sought consent.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded “with instructions for the trial court to consider alternative remedies on the record before appointing a receiver for Oakwood Partnership and Brunswick Partnership.”

Search & seizure; Inventory search; The inevitable discovery doctrine

The court concluded that “under the facts of this case . . . the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle because the evidence was not obtained in violation of [his] search and seizure rights under the United States and Michigan Constitutions.” Thus, it reversed the order of the trial court granting his “motion to suppress evidence found during the search of” his vehicle and remanded. This interlocutory appeal stemmed from a search of his SUV following a traffic stop. The court agreed “with the prosecution’s claim that the evidence found in defendant’s spare tire compartment would have inevitably been discovered during an inventory search.” Thus, it held that the “prosecution established that the search of [the] vehicle was justified under the inventory-search exception to the warrant requirement.” Therefore, it concluded “the evidence obtained by way of the search is admissible at trial.”

Jail credit under MCL 769.11b; People v Allen; People v Prieskorn; Whether cases were related; People v Raisbeck; Waiver; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to revoke bond; Failure to advance a meritless argument; Prejudice; Equal protection claim related to strict application of MCL 769.11b; Rational basis review; Sentencing; Proportionality & reasonableness; Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

While the court concluded that defendant did not waive her jail credit issue, it held that she was not entitled to additional credit. It rejected her related ineffective assistance of counsel and equal protection claims, and found that she did not show “that her within-guidelines sentence was unreasonable or disproportionate.” She appealed her sentence for her plea-based convictions for false application for a state identification card and identity theft, second offense. She was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 28 months to 40 years for each offense, to be served concurrently, with two days of jail credit. “Defendant was involved in two overlapping criminal cases, one in Wayne County and” this case in Oakland County. She first argued that she was “entitled to jail credit from the date that her bond was revoked,” 1/11/24, to her sentencing date, 8/28/24. The court disagreed, noting she was sentenced on 10/30/23 in the Wayne County case to 23 months to 5 years, with 164 days of jail credit. As a result, she was incarcerated in the MDOC “and was serving time solely on the Wayne County convictions. Although the trial court revoked defendant’s bond in” this case on 1/11/24, “defendant was not entitled to sentence credit from that date forward because her incarceration was attributable to the Wayne County sentences, not the charges in this case.” Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied her “additional sentence credit under MCL 769.11b.” The court also rejected her claim that she was entitled to additional “credit on the basis that the Wayne and Oakland cases were related, as she used” the same victim’s identity in both. It found the situation here was similar to that in Raisbeck. The time for which she sought credit was time that she served for the Wayne County convictions, not for the offenses in this case. While the crimes “in both counties involved the same victim, that factual overlap does not establish that defendant was confined ‘for’ the Oakland County offenses within the meaning of MCL 769.11b.” Further, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing “to move to revoke her bond after sentencing in the Wayne County case.” Given that she “was not entitled to credit for time served for her earlier related case,” an argument by her counsel “to the contrary would have lacked merit.” Affirmed.

Restitution; MCL 780.766(4)(f); People v Garrison; Statutory interpretation; Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Hague; “Actual”; “Interment”; In re White

The court held that an engraved granite bench and its installation at the victim’s gravesite qualified as “the cost of actual funeral and related services” under MCL 780.766(4)(f), so it was not erroneous to include that cost in restitution. Defendant pled nolo contendere to second-degree murder and felony-firearm, and the restitution request included invoices for a memorial bench described as “interment costs.” On appeal, defendant argued the bench was “outside [of] funeral expenses” and not authorized because there was “no proof” it was part of the funeral itself. The court rejected that framing, explaining defendant “misreads the statutory language” by treating it as limited to the funeral service itself, where the statute authorizes “the cost of actual funeral and related services.” It reasoned that “funeral” modifies “services,” and that “interment” concerns “the act or ceremony of interring,” i.e., burial as a component of or immediately following a funeral, making it “a service related to actual funeral services.” It also emphasized there is “nothing in the language of MCL 780.766(4)(f)” requiring the bench to have been completed or installed before the ceremony, and nothing supporting the “yearly memorial services in perpetuity” slippery-slope argument. Relying on the Supreme Court’s interpretation that “full restitution” is “maximal and complete,” the court concluded the trial court did not err in finding the bench-and-installation costs were actual costs of services related to the funeral. Affirmed.

Child custody; Parenting time; Proper cause or change of circumstances; Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Lieberman v Orr; Parenting time modification; Shade v Wright; Referee hearing review; MCL 552.507(4); MCR 3.215(F)(2); Operating while intoxicated (OWI)

The court held that plaintiff-mother failed to show “proper cause” or a “change of circumstances” with “a significant effect on the child’s well-being,” and that the trial court did not err in applying Vodvarka to deny requested custody and parenting-time changes. Plaintiff-mother moved to modify custody, parenting time, and support after learning defendant-father had been arrested for cocaine possession and was convicted of OWI and use of a controlled substance, but he presented evidence that he was “participating in monitoring and treatment through sobriety court” and remained compliant. On appeal, the court affirmed the custody ruling because the trial court’s findings did not “clearly preponderate in the opposite direction,” and plaintiff did not introduce evidence showing the substance-abuse issues or brief incarcerations “had or could have a significant effect on the child’s life,” where she testified the child was improving in school and speech therapy. It also held the trial court could review the referee record, including video, because MCR 3.215(F)(2) permits review of the referee hearing record when the parties have an opportunity to present live evidence, and plaintiff did not object despite notice. As to parenting time, the court held the trial court correctly applied the Vodvarka framework because plaintiff sought “limited, supervised parenting time” at the paternal grandmother’s home, a reduction and change in setting that would alter the ECE, making the proper-cause or change of circumstances standard applicable. Affirmed.

Divorce; Valuation & division of the marital estate; Parenting time; Custody; MCL 722.26a(7)(b); Judgment of divorce (JOD)

The JOD was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The parties challenged the trial court’s determinations as to “child custody, parenting time, and the valuation and division of the marital estate.” Defendant-ex-husband contended “that the trial court erred by including in the marital estate one bitcoin, which he asserts was his premarital asset.” He also argued “that the trial court erred by using different valuation dates for the cryptocurrency in comparison to other financial assets.” On cross-appeal, plaintiff-ex-wife argued “that the trial court erred by awarding defendant any amount of cryptocurrency as a separate asset because of defendant’s conflicting and disingenuous testimony on the subject of cryptocurrency.” Plaintiff requested that the court “reverse the trial court’s ruling awarding defendant the parties’ jointly held cryptocurrency.” The court vacated “the property distribution regarding the cryptocurrency and [remanded] for the trial court to redetermine the value of the cryptocurrency as of the time of trial and to modify the property distribution and equalization payment, if necessary.” Defendant next challenged “the trial court’s decision to allow plaintiff to look after the children during his summer parenting time while he is at work.” The court found that a “review of the record, including the trial court’s consideration of the best-interest factors, shows that the [trial] court determined allowing plaintiff to care for the children during defendant’s summer parenting time when he is at work is in the children’s best interests.” It noted that “the trial court’s ruling allowed the children to participate in extracurricular activities and allowed plaintiff to take them to their counseling sessions.” The court was “not persuaded that the record did not support the court’s factual findings, or that the court committed an abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a key issue.” Finally, plaintiff argued “that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the parties joint legal custody because the record establishes that they are unable to communicate and cooperate with each other.” On this close question, the court concluded “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” It found that “while the record demonstrated that the parties have difficulty cooperating, the trial court clearly saw that an effective coparenting relationship was possible. To this end, [it] ordered the parties to use AppClose to communicate with each other regarding the children.”

Stepparent adoption; Child support during the two-year “lookback” period under MCL 710.51(6)(a); MCL 710.51(6)(b); “Substantial” contact under MCL 710.51(6)(b)

Concluding that (1) in light of defendant-father’s (Saintclair) “limited ability to manage his money and his efforts to ensure that [the child] MSL had health-insurance coverage, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that he provided regular and substantial support for MSL based on his overall income, finances, and ability to support the child while incarcerated[,]” and (2) “the trial court properly determined that Saintclair did not regularly and substantially fail to contact MSL under MCL 710.51(6)(b)[,]” the court affirmed. Petitioners argued that the trial court erred by finding that Saintclair “provided regular and substantial support for MSL under MCL 710.51(6)(a).” They also argued “that Saintclair failed to ‘regularly and substantially’ ‘visit, contact, or communicate’ with MSL under MCL 710.51(6)(b).” The court noted that because “MCL 710.51(6) requires that both subsection (a) (lack of financial support) and subsection (b) (lack of contact) be satisfied before a court may terminate parental rights, and the trial court did not clearly err by finding that Saintclair provided regular and substantial support for MSL,” it did not “need not address petitioners’ argument that Saintclair regularly and substantially failed to maintain contact with MSL under MCL 710.51(6)(b).” It also noted, however, that, contrary to petitioner-mother’s testimony, phone records showed that Saintclair telephoned [her] at least 100 times, or roughly four or five times per month, during the two-year lookback period.”

Medical malpractice elements; Craig v Oakwood Hosp; Cause in fact/“but for” causation; MCL 600.2912a(2); Expert testimony; Kalaj v Khan; Specialty mismatch; Halloran v Bhan; National Institute of Health (NIH); Middle cerebral artery (MCA)

The court held that plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact on causation through expert testimony that earlier imaging and a code stroke in the ER would have altered monitoring and treatment and avoided death. Thus, summary disposition for defendant-ER physician and her employer was improper. The patient presented to the ER with facial droop, a low NIH Stroke Scale score, and a negative non-contrast CT. The ER physician diagnosed suspected stroke, noted she was outside the tPA window, gave aspirin, and admitted her without ordering a CT angiogram or calling a code stroke. The patient’s condition deteriorated overnight, imaging later showed a left MCA occlusion, consultants ultimately declined thrombectomy, and she later died after multiple worsening strokes. On appeal, the court held the trial court erred by treating the causation experts’ testimony as insufficient “but for” evidence and by failing to consider it in full. It emphasized plaintiff needed evidence permitting a “reasonable inference of a logical sequence of cause and effect.” It cited testimony that a CT angiogram “when she presented on the 10th” would have shown an MCA occlusion with distal flow and collaterals, prompting admission to “a highly monitored setting . . . with frequent neuro checks,” ensuring hydration and avoiding blood-pressure drops, and initiation of dual antiplatelet therapy, and that with proper early management she “would not have died.” It also cited testimony that early CT angiogram and stroke-team activation would have placed her in neuro critical care so deterioration would be recognized promptly and she would have been a candidate for mechanical intervention on the morning of 4/11, with “a significant chance of recovery of function.” The court rejected arguments that later consults declining intervention broke causation, noting expert testimony that earlier imaging and monitoring would have changed the treatment pathway and candidacy timing, creating a triable fact question. Reversed and remanded.

Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; MCL 500.3114(6); MCL 500.3109a(2) exclusions; Love v Rudolph; Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA)

Concluding the facts here were indistinguishable from those in Love, which was binding case precedent, the court held that plaintiff did “not fall into the category of persons excluded by MCL 500.3109a(1).” The plaintiff in Love was, like plaintiff here, “riding a motorcycle that was involved in an accident with a motor vehicle that was insured by a policy of insurance that contained an exclusion for allowable expenses benefits under MCL 500.3109a(2).” There was no dispute here “that plaintiff selected unlimited motor vehicle PIP coverage through” defendant-State Farm while the driver of the motor vehicle opted for coverage from defendant-ACIA “under the § 3109a(2) exclusion. Section 3109a(2) allows an insured who has qualified health coverage to cover injuries occurring due to a motor vehicle accident to select the $250,000-limit on allowable expenses and take an exclusion in exchange for a reduction in their premium, whereupon they are not eligible for PIP benefits.” The court held that, pursuant to Love, “ACIA was responsible for the payment of plaintiff’s no-fault benefits because it is the insurer of the owner and operator of the motor vehicle involved in the vehicle-motorcycle accident.” Thus, the trial court should have granted State Farm summary disposition instead of ACIA. The court reversed the order granting summary disposition against State Farm and the order denying summary disposition against ACIA, and remanded for entry of an order granting State Farm summary disposition.

Interpretation of partnership agreements; Actions impairing the status of a limited partnership; The Michigan Revised Limited Partnership Act (MRULPA); Partnership dissolution; MCL 449.1801; Effect of express termination dates in the agreements; Declaratory relief; MCR 2.605(A)(1); Receiver appointment; MCL 554.1016(1); Alternative remedies; Modification of the receivership order to allow the recording of a lis pendens; MCL 600.2701(1); Motion for relief from an order on the grounds of MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f)

Holding that defendants violated provisions of the partnership agreements, the court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the limited partnership amendments at issue were void. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver as to one of the partnerships involved in the case but did do so as to two others. Further, it “erred in refusing to modify the receivership order to” permit defendants to record lis pendens on the partnership properties. These consolidated appeals arose from a dispute over the terms of three limited partnership agreements, which established limited partnerships to own and operate three different apartment complexes. Defendants argued that the limited partners’ consent “was not required for the amendments increasing the terms of the limited partnerships because failing to increase the term ‘would impair the status of the Partnership as a limited partnership’ under the MRULPA.” The court disagreed, noting that the MRULPA “provides that the certificate of a limited partnership should include ‘[a]ny time at which or events upon the happening of which the limited partnership is to be dissolved and its affairs wound up.’” The partnership agreements here each contained “an express termination date in § 2.4. Giving effect to the termination dates explicitly contained in the limited partnership agreements, it is clear that the limited partnerships were meant to be dissolved on specified dates.” Given that they “all had set termination dates, allowing them to expire as planned did not impair [them]. Expiration on the previously agreed-upon dates was consistent with the terms of the partnership agreements. In addition, defendants acted in direct contradiction to plaintiffs’ refusal to consent to the extension of the partnership agreements. Though defendants could act without seeking consent in limited circumstances, this is not the same as ignoring plaintiffs’ explicit refusal after defendants sought consent.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded “with instructions for the trial court to consider alternative remedies on the record before appointing a receiver for Oakwood Partnership and Brunswick Partnership.”

Medical malpractice elements; Craig v Oakwood Hosp; Cause in fact/“but for” causation; MCL 600.2912a(2); Expert testimony; Kalaj v Khan; Specialty mismatch; Halloran v Bhan; National Institute of Health (NIH); Middle cerebral artery (MCA)

The court held that plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact on causation through expert testimony that earlier imaging and a code stroke in the ER would have altered monitoring and treatment and avoided death. Thus, summary disposition for defendant-ER physician and her employer was improper. The patient presented to the ER with facial droop, a low NIH Stroke Scale score, and a negative non-contrast CT. The ER physician diagnosed suspected stroke, noted she was outside the tPA window, gave aspirin, and admitted her without ordering a CT angiogram or calling a code stroke. The patient’s condition deteriorated overnight, imaging later showed a left MCA occlusion, consultants ultimately declined thrombectomy, and she later died after multiple worsening strokes. On appeal, the court held the trial court erred by treating the causation experts’ testimony as insufficient “but for” evidence and by failing to consider it in full. It emphasized plaintiff needed evidence permitting a “reasonable inference of a logical sequence of cause and effect.” It cited testimony that a CT angiogram “when she presented on the 10th” would have shown an MCA occlusion with distal flow and collaterals, prompting admission to “a highly monitored setting . . . with frequent neuro checks,” ensuring hydration and avoiding blood-pressure drops, and initiation of dual antiplatelet therapy, and that with proper early management she “would not have died.” It also cited testimony that early CT angiogram and stroke-team activation would have placed her in neuro critical care so deterioration would be recognized promptly and she would have been a candidate for mechanical intervention on the morning of 4/11, with “a significant chance of recovery of function.” The court rejected arguments that later consults declining intervention broke causation, noting expert testimony that earlier imaging and monitoring would have changed the treatment pathway and candidacy timing, creating a triable fact question. Reversed and remanded.

Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407(1); Pleading in avoidance; Mount Clemens Recreational Bowl, Inc v Director of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs; Motor-vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405

The court held that plaintiff pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity because, read as a whole, her second amended complaint stated a motor-vehicle-exception claim under MCL 691.1405. After the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to decide whether plaintiff should be allowed to amend to “more clearly plead” an exception, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding references to MCL 691.1405. The trial court dismissed again, reasoning that “[i]nserting random references to the Motor Vehicle Exception Statute does not transform inapplicable claims into valid motor vehicle exception claims.” On appeal, the court held that the trial court erred because “‘we disregard the labels given to the claims and instead read the complaint as a whole, seeking the gravamen of the claims[.]’” The pleading alleged the defendant-City was a governmental agency, defendant-driver was its employee, and she was “operating a motor vehicle (the City bus) when the collision occurred,” with factual allegations that, if proven, would establish negligence. The court emphasized that MCL 691.1405 provides that governmental agencies “shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation” of an agency-owned motor vehicle by an officer, agent, or employee. It then pointed to the complaint’s detailed negligence allegations against the driver, such as violation of MCL 257.627, failure to maintain control, failure to keep a proper lookout, and failure to equip adequate brakes under MCL 257.705, and its allegation that plaintiff’s “serious and lasting injuries” were caused by that negligence. Because those allegations sufficiently pleaded duty and breach and connected them to damages, the complaint stated a claim fitting the motor-vehicle exception, and the trial court’s contrary ruling resulted from failing to read the complaint “in its entirety.” Reversed and remanded.

Premises liability; Slip & fall on an icy mobile home community sidewalk; Effect of the fact the area was subject to a government easement; Morrow v Boldt; Lack of evidence defendant’s conduct increased the risk that day; Claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a); Common areas; Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, LLP

Concluding that plaintiff failed to show “that defendant owed her a duty under common law, statute, or voluntarily assuming maintenance of the sidewalk” where she fell, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. Plaintiff lived in defendant’s mobile home community. She “slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk while she took her dog on an early-morning walk along the outer boundaries of” the community. The court concluded the trial court was correct “that there was no genuine issue of material fact on whether defendant exercised possession and control over the sidewalk at issue.” Defendant presented evidence that the area where plaintiff fell was “subject to a government easement, and plaintiff did not offer evidence to dispute this. As the owner of the easement, the government had ‘the duty to maintain’” it. The court also concluded the trial court properly found “that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant voluntarily increased the dangerous conditions on the sidewalk where” she fell. While there was deposition testimony suggesting that it “occasionally maintained the sidewalks, plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant shoveled or salted the sidewalk before plaintiff slipped on that particular day. A photo more than 24 hours after the fall is too speculative and does not show who cleared the sidewalk and when and where they cleared it.” As to her argument based on MCL 554.139(1)(a), she failed to “provide sufficient evidence to support her claim that she fell in a common area. The owner and operator of defendant’s property testified that the only common areas were the office and the mailboxes.” While plaintiff offered “deposition testimony that defendant’s employees had occasionally removed snow and ice from the sidewalk as a courtesy[,]” even if it “‘routinely’ or ‘regularly’ maintained the area, that alone is not enough to establish the possession or control sufficient for a common area.”

Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407(1); Pleading in avoidance; Mount Clemens Recreational Bowl, Inc v Director of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs; Motor-vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405

The court held that plaintiff pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity because, read as a whole, her second amended complaint stated a motor-vehicle-exception claim under MCL 691.1405. After the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to decide whether plaintiff should be allowed to amend to “more clearly plead” an exception, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding references to MCL 691.1405. The trial court dismissed again, reasoning that “[i]nserting random references to the Motor Vehicle Exception Statute does not transform inapplicable claims into valid motor vehicle exception claims.” On appeal, the court held that the trial court erred because “‘we disregard the labels given to the claims and instead read the complaint as a whole, seeking the gravamen of the claims[.]’” The pleading alleged the defendant-City was a governmental agency, defendant-driver was its employee, and she was “operating a motor vehicle (the City bus) when the collision occurred,” with factual allegations that, if proven, would establish negligence. The court emphasized that MCL 691.1405 provides that governmental agencies “shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation” of an agency-owned motor vehicle by an officer, agent, or employee. It then pointed to the complaint’s detailed negligence allegations against the driver, such as violation of MCL 257.627, failure to maintain control, failure to keep a proper lookout, and failure to equip adequate brakes under MCL 257.705, and its allegation that plaintiff’s “serious and lasting injuries” were caused by that negligence. Because those allegations sufficiently pleaded duty and breach and connected them to damages, the complaint stated a claim fitting the motor-vehicle exception, and the trial court’s contrary ruling resulted from failing to read the complaint “in its entirety.” Reversed and remanded.