Child custody; Subject-matter jurisdiction; The Paternity Act; MCL 722.720; Standing; Effect of an order of filiation; Glaubius v Glaubius; Motion to adjourn; MCR 2.503(B); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) & (b); Moot substituted service issue

The court held that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff-mother’s action, and she “had standing to bring a support action against defendant as the father.” Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment where he fired his attorney days before trial. The court also upheld the award of attorney fees to plaintiff. As to defendant’s argument for dismissal and summary disposition due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and standing, “plaintiff filed a complaint requesting child support and attorney fees on the basis of an order of filiation entered in a previous paternity action in which defendant was determined to be” the child’s biological father. Thus, the trial court “had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action.” Further, there was no merit in his claim plaintiff lacked standing “because the original paternity action did not establish” that he was the father. An “‘order of filiation is a judicial order establishing that a man has been determined in a court to be a child’s father.’” Defendant next asserted that he “had a legally sufficient or substantial reason for an adjournment after his attorney moved to withdraw on the first day of trial. This justification may constitute good cause in some cases, but not here because [he] fired his attorney just days before trial was scheduled with little or no justification provided.” He also did not give the court “reason to discount the trial court’s gamesmanship finding[.]” As to prejudice, he failed to explain “what exhibits he was unable to submit into evidence, which witnesses he was not allowed to call, or how they were necessary for the proper presentation of his case.” The court found no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney fees. As to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), plaintiff “testified that she did not have a current income, relied on financial assistance from her family, and used retirement funds, which amply supported a finding that attorney fees were necessary for [her] to defend her suit.” Further, her “imputed income was less than the amount of attorney fees owed, which the trial court was allowed to consider as a factor in” its decision. As to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b), “defendant’s actions and eventual payments under threat of court intervention demonstrate that he violated the trial court’s orders for tuition and child support[.]” Affirmed.

Child custody; Subject-matter jurisdiction; The Paternity Act; MCL 722.720; Standing; Effect of an order of filiation; Glaubius v Glaubius; Motion to adjourn; MCR 2.503(B); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) & (b); Moot substituted service issue

The court held that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff-mother’s action, and she “had standing to bring a support action against defendant as the father.” Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for an adjournment where he fired his attorney days before trial. The court also upheld the award of attorney fees to plaintiff. As to defendant’s argument for dismissal and summary disposition due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and standing, “plaintiff filed a complaint requesting child support and attorney fees on the basis of an order of filiation entered in a previous paternity action in which defendant was determined to be” the child’s biological father. Thus, the trial court “had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action.” Further, there was no merit in his claim plaintiff lacked standing “because the original paternity action did not establish” that he was the father. An “‘order of filiation is a judicial order establishing that a man has been determined in a court to be a child’s father.’” Defendant next asserted that he “had a legally sufficient or substantial reason for an adjournment after his attorney moved to withdraw on the first day of trial. This justification may constitute good cause in some cases, but not here because [he] fired his attorney just days before trial was scheduled with little or no justification provided.” He also did not give the court “reason to discount the trial court’s gamesmanship finding[.]” As to prejudice, he failed to explain “what exhibits he was unable to submit into evidence, which witnesses he was not allowed to call, or how they were necessary for the proper presentation of his case.” The court found no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney fees. As to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), plaintiff “testified that she did not have a current income, relied on financial assistance from her family, and used retirement funds, which amply supported a finding that attorney fees were necessary for [her] to defend her suit.” Further, her “imputed income was less than the amount of attorney fees owed, which the trial court was allowed to consider as a factor in” its decision. As to MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b), “defendant’s actions and eventual payments under threat of court intervention demonstrate that he violated the trial court’s orders for tuition and child support[.]” Affirmed.

Surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty; MCL 700.5416; In re Conservatorship of Murray; Fiduciary standards for conservators; MCL 700.1212(1)

Holding that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by surcharging respondent for penalties, interest, and fees incurred during her conservatorship, the court affirmed. The protected individual’s (Hyden) successor conservator discovered outstanding federal income taxes and, with the probate court’s permission, paid the debt and sought a surcharge for the interest and penalty portion accruing while respondent served as conservator. The probate court found respondent in civil contempt and surcharged her for amounts tied to her tenure after reconsidering its initial, broader ruling. The court noted that a conservator must “act as a fiduciary and observe the standard of care applicable to a trustee” and “shall discharge all of the duties and obligations of a confidential and fiduciary relationship[.]” The probate court found that “[s]he had a fiduciary duty to make sure that the taxes were paid on behalf of [Hyden] and they were not done.” The court agreed that respondent’s “generic assertions of relying on others to determine the taxability of Hyden’s settlement” did not show reasonable care. It rejected respondent’s arguments that the tax issue was merely “marital debt” that should have been addressed in divorce court and that she was “in contact” with the IRS to get the penalties and fees reduced. The court noted that the surcharge arose from her fiduciary failures while conservator, not the propriety of the tax debt itself.

Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(ii); Setting aside polygraph evidence; Credibility determinations; Children’s best interests; Consideration of relative placement; In re Olive/Metts

Holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under § (b)(ii) and that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed. As an initial matter, she asserted “the trial court erroneously decided not to credit” her polygraph exam, which she contended showed “she was not lying about her knowledge of” the sexual abuse of one of the children and that she did not coach them. The court rejected this argument “for multiple reasons. First, respondent stipulated to the trial court only considering the polygraph evidence for best-interest findings, so she” could not now rely on it as to statutory grounds. Further, “the trial court did not find that respondent actually knew her husband was abusing [the child] and rather found that, when she was told about her husband’s sexual abuse of [the child’s] sibling, respondent disbelieved the sibling and covered up the abuse.” Thus, the court found that the trial court “did not err by setting aside the polygraph evidence when considering the statutory grounds for termination.” And while she pointed “to evidence from which the trial court arguably could have supported a different conclusion,” this assertion invited the court “to make impermissible independent factual findings and our own assessment of the relative credibility of the witnesses.” Thus, it found “no clear error in the trial court’s resolution of the conflict in favor of the children who described respondent engaging in abuse and manipulation.” The court also held that ample evidence supported “the trial court’s conclusion that respondent could have prevented” the sexual abuse. The “trial court resolved the witnesses’ conflicting testimony by crediting those who stated respondent affirmatively acted to conceal her husband’s sexual abuse of [the child’s] sibling and should have believed the sibling[.]” The court was not persuaded by the fact that “no outsiders noticed the abuse, as respondent insists,” given that this “would be the expected outcome of actively covering up the abuse.” In addition, the record showed “all three children would likely be harmed if returned to respondent’s care.” As to their best interests, the “trial court was plainly aware of the” children’s relative placements and the requirement to consider them in making its decision.

Preliminary removal probable cause; MCR 3.965(C)(3); In re Benavides; Due process opportunity to explain; MCR 3.965(B)(9); In re Ferranti; Reasonable efforts findings; MCR 3.965(C)(4); In re Barber/Espinoza

Holding that there was no due process violation, that probable cause supported removal, and that the trial court’s order as to reasonable efforts was sufficient, the court affirmed the “order finding probable cause to support the allegations in the petition for removal” as to respondent-mother’s six children. The petition alleged that on multiple dates respondent called police and told them “to contact CPS to come get her children” because she was “refusing to care for them,” left children at relatives’ homes without arranging care, and exhibited alarming behavior including banging her head in a cruiser and tying a sheet around her neck in the hospital. The referee recommended authorization of the petition and removal, and the trial court affirmed. On appeal, the court rejected respondent’s due process claim because she was allowed to deny the allegations and “make a statement of explanation,” and because the excluded testimony concerned matters not relevant to probable cause. On the children’s welfare/removal finding, the court quoted the trial judge that while there may have been disagreements with the father, “that is no justification to not care for these children and call the police[.]” The court held that the record supported that it was “contrary to the welfare of the children to remain with” respondent. As to reasonable efforts, the order properly incorporated prior findings that the DHHS “tried to make a safety plan,” provided a “community resource guide,” and offered mental health and counseling. And no findings as to reasonable efforts were required for the other three children who were placed with their father rather than in foster care.