Criminal contempt; Summary contempt of court; A court’s common-law authority to punish contempt; A court’s statutory authority to punish contempt; MCL 600.1701(a); MCL 600.1711; MCL 600.8317; A court’s responsibility to apply the contempt power judiciously; Principle that summary & nonsummary criminal contempt proceedings must be found beyond a reasonable doubt; Porter v Porter; The trial court’s findings of fact & conclusions of law; Whether an appellate court may remand for nonsummary proceedings after vacation of a summary contempt conviction when summary proceedings were initially appropriate; United States v Camil (5th Cir); In re Shafer (GA App)

Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that the circuit court properly vacated appellant’s contempt conviction on the basis of insufficient findings, but that remand “to give the district court an opportunity to provide adequate evidence to support the conviction would be futile, because the proceedings where the alleged contumacious conduct occurred concluded years ago and the purpose of the contempt proceeding—to preserve order in the courtroom—has been fully served.” Thus, it vacated Parts II(B) and II(C) of the Court of Appeals’ opinion as unnecessary and reversed Part III of that opinion, which affirmed the circuit court’s order remanding for nonsummary contempt proceedings. It also reversed the circuit court’s order to the extent that it remanded this matter to the district court. Appellant, an attorney who was representing a criminal defendant, was summarily convicted of criminal contempt in the district court for purportedly engaging in disrespectful conduct in direct view of the judge. The judge did not describe her “conduct with any particularity on the record.” The circuit court vacated her conviction, finding the district court’s findings were insufficient to support it, and remanded for nonsummary contempt proceedings. Appellant claimed further proceedings on remand would violate double jeopardy. The circuit court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that “the prohibition against double jeopardy does not bar subsequent nonsummary contempt proceedings after vacation of a summary contempt conviction.” On leave, the court declined to reach the constitutional question and instead held that “remand for nonsummary proceedings after a summary contempt conviction has been vacated for insufficient findings is improper because it would be futile and exceed the scope of the judiciary’s inherent contempt powers.” The proceedings “where the alleged contumacious conduct occurred concluded years ago and there is no allegation that [defendant] refused to comply with a lawful order of the court.” Finding the reasoning of its sister courts to be persuasive, it concluded that “remand to the district court for nonsummary proceedings is not appropriate in this instance because the original purpose of the contempt proceedings has been served. Any remand would therefore be nothing more than an exercise in futility.”

Concurring, Justice Welch noted her agreement “with the majority’s well-reasoned determination that a remand for nonsummary proceedings would be futile.” She wrote separately “to explain why the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions also bar remand.”

Dissenting, Justice Bernstein, joined by Justice Zahra, found “the majority’s decision simply to vacate [defendant’s] criminal contempt conviction to be both unsupported and premature. In the end, the majority cannot say with any more certainty than I can that the conviction was unsupported.” He would have “affirmed the lower courts’ decisions to remand this case for nonsummary proceedings, which would have allowed the district court to place the relevant evidence on the written record and facilitated further appellate review, if necessary.”

Criminal contempt; Summary contempt of court; A court’s common-law authority to punish contempt; A court’s statutory authority to punish contempt; MCL 600.1701(a); MCL 600.1711; MCL 600.8317; A court’s responsibility to apply the contempt power judiciously; Principle that summary & nonsummary criminal contempt proceedings must be found beyond a reasonable doubt; Porter v Porter; The trial court’s findings of fact & conclusions of law; Whether an appellate court may remand for nonsummary proceedings after vacation of a summary contempt conviction when summary proceedings were initially appropriate; United States v Camil (5th Cir); In re Shafer (GA App)

Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that the circuit court properly vacated appellant’s contempt conviction on the basis of insufficient findings, but that remand “to give the district court an opportunity to provide adequate evidence to support the conviction would be futile, because the proceedings where the alleged contumacious conduct occurred concluded years ago and the purpose of the contempt proceeding—to preserve order in the courtroom—has been fully served.” Thus, it vacated Parts II(B) and II(C) of the Court of Appeals’ opinion as unnecessary and reversed Part III of that opinion, which affirmed the circuit court’s order remanding for nonsummary contempt proceedings. It also reversed the circuit court’s order to the extent that it remanded this matter to the district court. Appellant, an attorney who was representing a criminal defendant, was summarily convicted of criminal contempt in the district court for purportedly engaging in disrespectful conduct in direct view of the judge. The judge did not describe her “conduct with any particularity on the record.” The circuit court vacated her conviction, finding the district court’s findings were insufficient to support it, and remanded for nonsummary contempt proceedings. Appellant claimed further proceedings on remand would violate double jeopardy. The circuit court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that “the prohibition against double jeopardy does not bar subsequent nonsummary contempt proceedings after vacation of a summary contempt conviction.” On leave, the court declined to reach the constitutional question and instead held that “remand for nonsummary proceedings after a summary contempt conviction has been vacated for insufficient findings is improper because it would be futile and exceed the scope of the judiciary’s inherent contempt powers.” The proceedings “where the alleged contumacious conduct occurred concluded years ago and there is no allegation that [defendant] refused to comply with a lawful order of the court.” Finding the reasoning of its sister courts to be persuasive, it concluded that “remand to the district court for nonsummary proceedings is not appropriate in this instance because the original purpose of the contempt proceedings has been served. Any remand would therefore be nothing more than an exercise in futility.”

Concurring, Justice Welch noted her agreement “with the majority’s well-reasoned determination that a remand for nonsummary proceedings would be futile.” She wrote separately “to explain why the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions also bar remand.”

Dissenting, Justice Bernstein, joined by Justice Zahra, found “the majority’s decision simply to vacate [defendant’s] criminal contempt conviction to be both unsupported and premature. In the end, the majority cannot say with any more certainty than I can that the conviction was unsupported.” He would have “affirmed the lower courts’ decisions to remand this case for nonsummary proceedings, which would have allowed the district court to place the relevant evidence on the written record and facilitated further appellate review, if necessary.”

Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Warrantless arrest; Reasonable suspicion; Terry v Ohio; Distinguishing People v Prude; Probable cause; Warrantless search; Legitimate expectation of privacy; Principle that visitors in a house do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; People v Parker; Exigent circumstances; People v Trapp (On Remand); Potential destruction of evidence; People v Blasius; Kentucky v King; Comparing People v Houze; The protective-sweep exception; People v Beuschlein

Holding that the trial court did not err by denying defendant-Hall’s motion to suppress, but did err by denying defendant-Williams’s motion to suppress, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in these consolidated appeals. Defendants were charged with operating a chop shop and other offenses. The trial court denied their motions to suppress. On appeal, the court rejected Hall’s argument that he was seized without a warrant, without reasonable suspicion pursuant to Terry, and without probable cause. It found the “officers had probable cause to believe [he] was involved in the operation of a chop shop and the receiving or concealing of stolen property.” It also rejected his claim that the warrantless search of Williams’s property violated his (Hall’s) constitutional rights. To the extent he claimed the search was illegal, he “waived this issue because he specifically stated that he did not have standing to challenge the search. That being said, had [he] not waived the issue, we would be required to hold that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy[.]” The court next rejected Williams’s contention that no warrant exception applied to the warrantless search of his backyard. “Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the defendants appeared to be actively stripping a vehicle when the officers arrived (which inherently constitutes destroying evidence of the stolen vehicle), and the fact that the helicopter pilot witnessed one of the suspects try to get rid of a firearm, they supported the officers' assertion that there was an imminent risk of removal of evidence pursuant to Blasius, or the imminent destruction of evidence pursuant to King.” Finally, however, the court agreed with Williams that the police violated his rights by entering his home and garage without a warrant, finding the prosecution did not meet its burden to show that the searches were justified by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

An “employer” under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); MCL 15.361; Whether defendant-county was an “employer” of plaintiff-former assistant prosecuting attorney (APA); Reliance on the economic-reality test; Wrongful termination in violation of public policy; Suchodolski v Michigan Consol Gas Co; Claim of retaliation for attempting to prevent or remedy a violation of law; Public policy that criminal prosecutions comport with the law; False imprisonment; Length of confinement; Burden to prove lawful authority; Assault & battery; Level of connection between an object & the complainant

The court held that defendant-county fit “the definition of an ‘employer’ under the statutory language in the WPA” as to plaintiff-former APA, “and the Court of Appeals erred by using the economic-reality test to determine whether” it was an employer. Further, “a plaintiff can state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy where they allege that they were terminated based on their actions to prevent or remedy a violation of the law.” Finally, it found that plaintiff established genuine issues of material fact as to her claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery. Thus, it reversed Parts III(A), III(B), and III(D) of the Court of Appeals’ judgment on remand, vacated Part IV, and remanded the case to the trial court. This was the second time the case was before the court. Plaintiff’s claims arose from her handling of a CSC prosecution “and the alleged actions defendants took against [her] in response to her handling of that case.” Defendant-Boyd was the chief APA. The court first addressed whether the county was plaintiff’s employer such that it was susceptible to her WPA claims. It noted that the “the Legislature defined ‘employee’ and ‘employer’ as used in the WPA” in MCL 15.361, and it found that “the WPA’s plain text establishes that Saginaw County was [plaintiff’s] employer, such that it is subject to suit.” The court next considered her public policy claim. It held that “a plaintiff claiming retaliation for attempting to prevent or remedy a violation of law” has to satisfy “three criteria to survive summary disposition. A plaintiff must make a prima facie showing (1) that the law was or would have been violated, (2) that they reasonably and in good faith believed they were remedying or preventing a violation of law, and (3) that their actions regarding the alleged violation were the basis for an adverse employment action.” Given that “the trial court and the parties did not have the benefit of” this test, the court remanded “to the trial court to consider in the first instance the question of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact under MCR 2.116(C)(10)” as to plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. Finally, the court held that her intentional tort claims survived summary disposition. The length of time she “was detained is immaterial to liability for false imprisonment and Boyd lacked lawful authority to detain” her. As to her assault and battery claim, while merely “touching a door that another is touching could not support a claim for battery[,] . . . [plaintiff’s] allegations, if true, bring the door into the realm of objects held in the victim’s sole physical possession.”

Concurring, Justice Welch joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to provide an explanation for her vote as to Part III(B), concerning the wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim.

Dissenting, Justice Zahra agreed “with the majority opinion’s interpretation of the term ‘employer’ under the WPA” but dissented from its “decision to sustain plaintiff’s public-policy claim and intentional-tort claims.”

Divorce; Division of the marital estate; Reeves v Reeves; Korth v Korth; Marital property; Cunningham v Cunningham; The trial court’s findings of fact; MCR 2.517(A)(1) & (2); Triple E Produce Corp v Mastronardi Produce, Ltd; Judgment of divorce (JOD)

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-ex-wife half of the “net marital equity” in the parties’ marital home, and that its findings of fact were adequate. In the JOD, the trial court awarded plaintiff-ex-husband the house, but ordered him to pay defendant $123,571 “‘representing one-half of the net marital equity.’” It also awarded him $38,098.84 from plaintiff’s 401(k), which equalized the marital increase in their 401(k) accounts. Lastly, it awarded the parties their own respective personal property and bank accounts, and awarded defendant a life insurance policy. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court: (1) erred by awarding defendant half of the increase in the value of the home’s equity that occurred during the marriage, and (2) “failed to articulate adequate findings and conclusions regarding the marital or separate character of the increase in the home’s equity value, because it merely adopted the law, logic, and rationale of” her trial briefs. The court agreed “with plaintiff that the trial court certainly could have presented its findings more fully and explicitly. We believe, however, that they make sufficiently clear in this case that the trial court found that the increase in the value of the home’s equity that occurred during the marriage was marital property.” Indeed, the trial “court reinforced that understanding of its determination in its subsequent opinion denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration when it stated that ‘[t]he division of the marital estate is not one of pinpoint precision of one asset but an assessment of the entire estate including offsets where equity can be had and supported by the evidence at hand.’” Moreover, the JOD “awarded $123,571 to defendant ‘representing one-half of the net marital equity’ in the house. We note that $123,571 is exactly half of the increase in the home’s equity value that occurred during the marriage, as calculated by defendant in her supplemental trial brief—further signaling that the [trial] court, consistent with defendant’s briefing, properly distinguished the home equity plaintiff built up before the marriage from the increase in equity that took place during the marriage, and treated only the latter as marital property subject to equitable division.” The trial “court’s findings were adequate in this case to demonstrate that [it] ‘was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law,’ and ‘appellate review would not be facilitated by requiring further explanation.’” Affirmed.

Notice to a governmental entity of bodily injury caused by a defective highway; MCL 691.1404; Rowland v Washtenaw Cnty Rd Comm’n; Argument that defendant had constructive notice under MCL 691.1403

Holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff failed to give the required notice of her injury to defendant-city under MCL 691.1404, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. It concluded that the case, which arose from plaintiff’s trip and fall while crossing a city street, was “squarely controlled by Rowland and the plain language of MCL 691.1404.” Plaintiff contended that her phone call to defendant 10 “days after her fall (the only communication with defendant within 120 days of her injury) satisfies the requirements of MCL 691.1404(1), because nothing in the language of the subsection requires written notice.” The court disagreed. It found that her argument ignored “the fact that MCL 691.1404(1) explicitly requires that a notice be served on the governmental agency. The very next subsection provides that such service may be made ‘either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested . . . .’” She did not offer any authority, and the court “found none, for the proposition that personal service in Michigan may be accomplished via a telephone call.” Thus, it did not need to “go beyond the plain language of the statute to find plaintiff’s argument meritless and to affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition.” But the court added that she “testified at her deposition that she did not remember calling defendant at all, and defendant’s call log contains only a terse phrase ‘Trip and fall on Marlborough/Jefferson.’ Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” the evidence before the trial court showed that her “purported oral notice to defendant fell woefully short of providing an adequate description of the location and nature of the defect, and neglected entirely to provide a description of the injury suffered or a list of any known witnesses to the injury.” The court also rejected her argument under MCL 691.1403. Nothing in that statute “indicates that the notice requirement of MCL 691.1404 is waived or otherwise inapplicable if a plaintiff can show that the governmental agency knew or should have known of the defect. In fact, to hold otherwise would (1) render MCL 691.1404(1)’s requirements concerning notice of the nature of the injury and potential witnesses nugatory and (2) engraft a requirement onto the statute very similar to the actual prejudice requirement rejected by Rowland.”

An “employer” under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); MCL 15.361; Whether defendant-county was an “employer” of plaintiff-former assistant prosecuting attorney (APA); Reliance on the economic-reality test; Wrongful termination in violation of public policy; Suchodolski v Michigan Consol Gas Co; Claim of retaliation for attempting to prevent or remedy a violation of law; Public policy that criminal prosecutions comport with the law; False imprisonment; Length of confinement; Burden to prove lawful authority; Assault & battery; Level of connection between an object & the complainant

The court held that defendant-county fit “the definition of an ‘employer’ under the statutory language in the WPA” as to plaintiff-former APA, “and the Court of Appeals erred by using the economic-reality test to determine whether” it was an employer. Further, “a plaintiff can state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy where they allege that they were terminated based on their actions to prevent or remedy a violation of the law.” Finally, it found that plaintiff established genuine issues of material fact as to her claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery. Thus, it reversed Parts III(A), III(B), and III(D) of the Court of Appeals’ judgment on remand, vacated Part IV, and remanded the case to the trial court. This was the second time the case was before the court. Plaintiff’s claims arose from her handling of a CSC prosecution “and the alleged actions defendants took against [her] in response to her handling of that case.” Defendant-Boyd was the chief APA. The court first addressed whether the county was plaintiff’s employer such that it was susceptible to her WPA claims. It noted that the “the Legislature defined ‘employee’ and ‘employer’ as used in the WPA” in MCL 15.361, and it found that “the WPA’s plain text establishes that Saginaw County was [plaintiff’s] employer, such that it is subject to suit.” The court next considered her public policy claim. It held that “a plaintiff claiming retaliation for attempting to prevent or remedy a violation of law” has to satisfy “three criteria to survive summary disposition. A plaintiff must make a prima facie showing (1) that the law was or would have been violated, (2) that they reasonably and in good faith believed they were remedying or preventing a violation of law, and (3) that their actions regarding the alleged violation were the basis for an adverse employment action.” Given that “the trial court and the parties did not have the benefit of” this test, the court remanded “to the trial court to consider in the first instance the question of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact under MCR 2.116(C)(10)” as to plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. Finally, the court held that her intentional tort claims survived summary disposition. The length of time she “was detained is immaterial to liability for false imprisonment and Boyd lacked lawful authority to detain” her. As to her assault and battery claim, while merely “touching a door that another is touching could not support a claim for battery[,] . . . [plaintiff’s] allegations, if true, bring the door into the realm of objects held in the victim’s sole physical possession.”

Concurring, Justice Welch joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to provide an explanation for her vote as to Part III(B), concerning the wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim.

Dissenting, Justice Zahra agreed “with the majority opinion’s interpretation of the term ‘employer’ under the WPA” but dissented from its “decision to sustain plaintiff’s public-policy claim and intentional-tort claims.”

Notice to a governmental entity of bodily injury caused by a defective highway; MCL 691.1404; Rowland v Washtenaw Cnty Rd Comm’n; Argument that defendant had constructive notice under MCL 691.1403

Holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff failed to give the required notice of her injury to defendant-city under MCL 691.1404, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. It concluded that the case, which arose from plaintiff’s trip and fall while crossing a city street, was “squarely controlled by Rowland and the plain language of MCL 691.1404.” Plaintiff contended that her phone call to defendant 10 “days after her fall (the only communication with defendant within 120 days of her injury) satisfies the requirements of MCL 691.1404(1), because nothing in the language of the subsection requires written notice.” The court disagreed. It found that her argument ignored “the fact that MCL 691.1404(1) explicitly requires that a notice be served on the governmental agency. The very next subsection provides that such service may be made ‘either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested . . . .’” She did not offer any authority, and the court “found none, for the proposition that personal service in Michigan may be accomplished via a telephone call.” Thus, it did not need to “go beyond the plain language of the statute to find plaintiff’s argument meritless and to affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition.” But the court added that she “testified at her deposition that she did not remember calling defendant at all, and defendant’s call log contains only a terse phrase ‘Trip and fall on Marlborough/Jefferson.’ Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” the evidence before the trial court showed that her “purported oral notice to defendant fell woefully short of providing an adequate description of the location and nature of the defect, and neglected entirely to provide a description of the injury suffered or a list of any known witnesses to the injury.” The court also rejected her argument under MCL 691.1403. Nothing in that statute “indicates that the notice requirement of MCL 691.1404 is waived or otherwise inapplicable if a plaintiff can show that the governmental agency knew or should have known of the defect. In fact, to hold otherwise would (1) render MCL 691.1404(1)’s requirements concerning notice of the nature of the injury and potential witnesses nugatory and (2) engraft a requirement onto the statute very similar to the actual prejudice requirement rejected by Rowland.”

Property valuation; True cash value (TCV) & taxable value (TV); Highest & best use; Menard, Inc v City of Escanaba; Detroit Lions, Inc v Dearborn; Use of the sales-comparison approach; Required findings of financial feasibility & maximal productivity; Findings as to the probability of the property becoming vacant in the near future; The Tax Tribunal’s (TT) adjustment of raw data

The court held that the TT’s finding as to the highest and best use of the property at issue was supported by substantial evidence and that it did not err in relying on the sales-comparison approach. The court rejected petitioner-property owner’s claims that the TT’s analysis omitted “the required findings of financial feasibility and maximal productivity.” But it found that the TT “ failed to make adequate findings of fact on the record to explain how it adjusted the raw data to arrive at its conclusion regarding the property’s TCV.” The property “is a 27-hole public golf course.” Petitioner asserted “that its highest and best use is continued use as a golf course.” Petitioner presented testimony from an appraisal expert (R). Respondent-township’s assessor (H) determined that the property’s highest and best use “was as vacant land for residential development.” The TT rejected both parties’ conclusions “and came up with a middle position, that the property would be most profitably held ‘as vacant land but not necessarily for immediate residential development.’” It determined that H’s “valuation was too high because he made unrealistic assumptions regarding such planning, but [R’s] valuation also was unrealistic and inconsistent with present conditions in the township.” The court noted that the TT’s finding was consistent with R’s “expert opinion that the highest and best use of the property, considered as vacant, was to be held for future development.” It concluded that, on this record, the TT’s finding was “supported by substantial evidence.” Next, the court noted that while the TT “did not make an explicit statement regarding financial feasibility and maximal productivity, such findings are implicit from [its] conclusions that respondent failed to prove financial feasibility for residential development and that petitioner failed to prove that the golf course was the most profitable use.” But the TT did not make any findings of fact as “to how it adjusted the raw data to reach the TCV. Rather, it simply stated that it was ‘necessary to make these qualitative adjustments’ because respondent’s ‘adjustments were not supported by any objective, verifiable data and were largely simple estimates described.’ The [TT’s] failure to explain the reason why it chose a value of $2,000,000 from the raw data range” fell short of what is required by MCL 24.285. Thus, the court found that “remand for further factual findings related to the property’s TCV” was required. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Child’s best interests; Claim that a guardianship pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(8) & (9) was appropriate; In re Rippy

Concluding that respondent-father’s guardianship argument was misplaced, and that the trial court did not err in finding that terminating his parental rights was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. Respondent contended “he was making ‘substantial progress towards reunification’ and, instead of terminating his parental rights, a guardianship pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(8) & (9) was appropriate.” The court rejected this argument “for several reasons. First, the proceedings to terminate [his] parental rights had already been initiated by the time [he] started asserting that a guardianship was more appropriate than adoption. Additionally, the agency and case service plans cautioned against a guardianship, and instead advocated for adoption as the goal, counter to MCL 712A.19a(8).” The court noted it did not appear from the record that he advocated for a guardianship before “his best-interest hearing. Further, a guardianship contemplated by MCL 712A.19a(8) is permissive, not obligatory, as a ‘compelling reason’ for a trial court to refrain from ‘order[ing] the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights.’” In addition, the trial court concluded a guardianship was not in the child’s best interests and that, instead, terminating respondent’s rights and adoption were in her best interests. Apart from the guardianship argument, respondent only made “a generalized challenge to the trial court’s best-interest analysis. As the trial court noted, [he] had not found adequate employment, and he acknowledged that he had no plan to make his residence suitable for” the child. He also admitted that it was in her “best interests to remain with fictive kin.” The court noted that he “was largely absent from [the child’s] life, admitting that he had not visited [her] for over a year at one point. [She] was bonded with fictive kin, and [her] needs were being met.”

Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); MCR 3.977; Aggravated circumstances; MCL 722.638; Effect of a no-contest plea; In re MJC

The court held that the trial court erred by concluding the DHHS did not have to make reasonable reunification efforts based on its finding of aggravated circumstances. The court agreed with respondent-mother that the DHHS failed to make reasonable reunification efforts in the absence of aggravated circumstances. There was no evidence of reunification efforts or any case plan in the record, and while there was testimony “that respondent was referred for parenting classes, the only real” mention was from respondent at the “best interests hearing that she participated in parenting classes since November, with no progress notes or testimony from caseworkers.” Further, she was correct “that she does not meet any of the circumstances listed in MCL 712A.19a(2)(b), like murder of a child or placement on the sex offender registry. The only mention of specific aggravated circumstances” was the trial court’s finding “following the preliminary hearing that reasonable efforts were not required to prevent the children’s removal from the home with regard to both respondent and the putative father as provided in MCL 722.638(1) and (2), and evidenced by the ‘[u]nfit home, failure to protect, dependency, abandonment, [and] severe physical abuse[.]’” The court noted that abandonment “only relates to the children’s putative father, as respondent’s leaving the children home alone for a night, on its own, is not tantamount to abandonment. And, although [she] does not make this argument specifically, the petition on which the [trial] court’s finding was based, and to which respondent waived any challenge, provides only that” one of the children “suffered a skull fracture of unknown cause, not that the injury was caused by abuse perpetrated by a parent, guardian, custodian, or other adult residing at the home.” Indeed, there was testimony “that doctors could not rule out or definitely conclude the skull fracture was the result of abuse, which is uncontradicted and confirmed by other evidence in the record, including [the child’s] medical records and the CPS investigation report. Nor does MCL 722.638(2) affect our conclusion on the basis of any argument that respondent failed to take reasonable steps to eliminate the skull fracture risk, because where a petition is not mandated under subsection (1), subsection (2) does not apply.” As such, the record did not support the trial “court’s finding that MCL 722.638(1) and (2) applied to respondent.” It also showed that the trial “court did not explain to respondent that pleading no contest to statutory grounds would preclude a challenge to reasonable efforts.” And there was “no indication that physical injury or abuse under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and (ii) equates to abuse which includes” the aggravated circumstances in MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii) and (v). Reversed and remanded.