The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA); Unfair labor practice (ULP) claim; MCL 423.210(1)(a) & (c); Adverse treatment of an employee for engaging in PERA-protected activity; International Union, UAW v Sterling Hts; Finding that the charging party was engaged in a “strike” (MCL 423.201(k)); MCL 423.202; MCL 423.202a; Irregularities in the denial of a Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) request; Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC)

The court held that MERC did not err in finding that charging party-Bulger’s “work stoppage was not a protected activity, and that respondent’s decision to terminate his employment for absenteeism was not motivated by antiunion animus or hostility toward [his] protected concerted activity.” It further concluded that any error respondent may have made as to his “request for FMLA leave did not equate with a violation of PERA.” Thus, the court found that MERC properly dismissed his ULP claim. Bulger contended “that respondent terminated his employment in violation of MCL 423.210(1)(a). MERC also addressed MCL 423.210(1)(c) as a possible basis for a ULP.” MERC determined that Bulger did not meet his burden of showing antiunion animus. The principal (A) at the school where Bulger had worked “was the only individual with any direct connection to the termination decision who knew that Bulger was involved in the protest activity outside of the school. Bulger’s evidence of [A’s] bias mainly consisted of testimony regarding their confrontation outside the school building and another” employee’s testimony that A “said, ‘[W]e finally got [Bulger], he just got terminated this morning.’ The ALJ’s and MERC’s findings that this evidence was less than convincing are not contrary to the evidence. [A] praised Bulger and described him as a ‘valuable’ employee. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [A] found Bulger’s protest disruptive and unnecessary, without also finding that [A] wanted to fire him. A reasonable trier of fact also could conclude that [A] reported Bulger’s absenteeism because it was a duty of his job as principal.” Thus, the court concluded MERC did not err in finding “that Bulger failed to establish a prima facie case that respondent retaliated against him under PERA §§ 10(1)(a) and (c).” It further determined that evidence supported “MERC’s finding that his work stoppage met the” PERA’s definition of striking. Bulger also argued that “respondent adopted the FMLA requirements, and that [its] breach of its own standards demonstrates that it lacked a legitimate basis for terminating him. However, to prove violation of PERA § 10, Bulger still needs to prove that irregularities in respondent’s denial of his FMLA request were motivated by antiunion animus.” He failed to do so. Affirmed.

Landlord rental license denial; Requests for declaratory relief; Mootness; Whether the city code required plaintiff to get a “general business license”; Whether plaintiff had Article III standing to vindicate its tenants’ rights; Claim that the tenants were licensees; “Preexisting, nonconforming use”; Heath Twp v. Sall (MI); Estoppel & laches; Due process; Liberty or property interest; MCL 117.3(k); Legislative acts equally affecting many people; Bi-Metallic Inv Co v State Bd of Equalization; Equal Protection Clause claim; “Class-of-one” theory; Contracts Clause claim under 42 USC § 1983; Kaminski v Coulter; Inverse condemnation; Civil conspiracy

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff-Lathfield Investments’ claims against defendant-City of Lathrup arising from the denial of landlord rental and general business licenses, holding among other things that it could not bring a Contracts Clause claim under § 1983. The prior owner of Lathfield’s business properties had been involved in disagreements with the City over outstanding code violations. Lathfield went ahead and closed on its purchase of the property. The City later denied its “applications for general business and landlord rental licenses” due to its failure to comply with a City Code requirement “to list names and the principal businesses of its tenants.” In addition, because “Lathfield did not have a landlord tenant license, the City also denied its tenants’ general business license applications.” The court first affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Lathfield's request for a declaration that it was not subject to the City's site plan approval process as moot. Such a declaration would not affect its legal interests where the City had already approved its site plan. Lathfield also argued that the City Code did not require that it get a general business license because it was not “conducting business” within the City. But the court held that Lathfield’s business fell within the broad category of “performing a trade” and thus, required a business license. It also found no error in the denial of a declaration that the City prejudiced the tenants’ rights because Lathfield lacked a landlord rental license. It agreed with the district court that Lathfield lacked standing to litigate this issue. Further, it concluded that since “Lathfield was ‘leasing’ Property space as a landlord, it is subject to the City Code’s landlord rental requirements, including [the] tenant registration requirement.” It also rejected the claim that the property was “permitted as a preexisting, nonconforming use” where there was no evidence the property, “as currently constructed and operated, existed as a lawful use before the City Zoning Ordinance’s effective” date. Lathfield’s estoppel and laches argument also failed. As to its procedural due process claim, it did not identify “either a liberty or property interest of which it has been deprived.” The court noted it was “long ago held that legislative acts equally affecting many people, such as the City’s adoption of § 14-26 of the City Code, do not implicate procedural due process concerns.” Further, Lathfield failed to satisfy “the first element of its ‘class-of-one’ equal protection claim” and the district court did not err in granting the City summary judgment on both its Contracts Clause claims. Finally, it did not meet the first or second elements of an inverse condemnation claim and its civil conspiracy claim also failed.

Habeas corpus; Moses v Department of Corr; Radical jurisdictional defect; Alleged fraud by court officers & the prosecutor; Fabrication of evidence; Whether the trial court should have conducted an in-person evidentiary hearing before dismissing the petition; Moot pending motions

The court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing petitioner-Hornsby’s habeas complaint “without an evidentiary hearing because it determined, based on [his] allegations of error, that there was no radical jurisdictional defect in [its] authority to charge, try, convict, and sentence him.” He was convicted of armed robbery, CCW, and felony-firearm in 2000. He asserted he was “entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because a radical jurisdictional defect was created when court officers and the prosecutor allegedly committed fraud in fabricating evidence to charge, convict, and sentence him.” He specifically contended on appeal that “the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition without first holding an in-person evidentiary hearing to allow him to demonstrate how his convictions were obtained through fraud.” The court disagreed. It determined that “a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate means for Hornsby to seek exoneration. His claim that his convictions were achieved through fraud and deception by the Genesee County Prosecutor’s Office does not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” The court noted that he did “not allege he was unaware of the charges he was facing and unable to put forth a defense, nor does he allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel at any point in the pre-bindover stage of his criminal proceedings that would constitute a radical jurisdictional defect.” It found that the trial court correctly dismissed his “complaint for a writ of habeas corpus because his judgment of sentence ‘remains a valid judgment, allegations of fraud notwithstanding,’ and that ‘the question of whether the government engaged in fraud must be answered in the first instance by the trial court.’ Any challenge to the evidence used to charge, convict, and sentence Hornsby is more appropriately reserved for a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court under MCR 6.500 et seq.” As to the failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to MCR 3.303(D)(1), a trial “court need not even entertain responsive pleadings regarding a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus if ‘it appears that the prisoner is not entitled to relief.’” Finally, the court found that all pending motions in the trial court “were appropriately dismissed as moot.” Affirmed.

Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Reasonable suspicion verses probable cause; Reasonable suspicion for a seizure & investigatory stop; Relief under the plain-error rule

The court concluded “that the trial court correctly identified the seizure as an investigatory stop and correctly assessed its validity for reasonable suspicion.” It also determined “that the trial court correctly found that there was reasonable suspicion supporting the investigatory stop.” Defendant-Poston argued “that the trial court erred by applying the wrong standard when evaluating the validity of the warrantless seizure.” He asserted that it “incorrectly applied the lower reasonable suspicion standard, which applies to investigatory stops, when it should have applied the higher probable cause standard because Poston was arrested, not merely detained.” He claimed Sergeant M arrested him because M “(1) used a ‘strong showing of physical force over’ him when he grabbed Poston, spun him around, pushed him against the car, handcuffed and searched him, and (2) failed to question Poston about his presence at the scene.” His claim failed on the first two prongs of the plain error rule “because an error did not occur, let alone a plain one.” The court held that the “trial court did not plainly err by analyzing Poston’s motion to suppress under a reasonable suspicion standard.” This issue essentially asked whether M’s “conduct elevated this seizure from an investigatory stop to an arrest, which would require a heightened standard.” Although M “asked Poston to get out of the car during the stop, this did not necessarily turn the detainment into an arrest.” On this record, Poston failed to show “that he was arrested rather than detained.” Thus, he did not establish “that the trial court clearly erred in applying the reasonable suspicion standard when considering his motion to suppress.” Having concluded that the “seizure—at least prior to the recovery of the gun—was an investigatory stop subject to reasonable suspicion,” the court turned to Poston’s next issue. He argued “that the trial court erred by finding that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the investigatory stop because [M] failed to articulate how Poston’s conduct constituted potentially criminal behavior, and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident did not provide reasonable suspicion supporting the investigatory stop.” The court disagreed, finding the record did “not contain any evidence that [M] lacks credibility. Giving deference to the trial court’s factual determinations,” the court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in relying on” M’s testimony. Affirmed.

The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA); Unfair labor practice (ULP) claim; MCL 423.210(1)(a) & (c); Adverse treatment of an employee for engaging in PERA-protected activity; International Union, UAW v Sterling Hts; Finding that the charging party was engaged in a “strike” (MCL 423.201(k)); MCL 423.202; MCL 423.202a; Irregularities in the denial of a Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) request; Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC)

The court held that MERC did not err in finding that charging party-Bulger’s “work stoppage was not a protected activity, and that respondent’s decision to terminate his employment for absenteeism was not motivated by antiunion animus or hostility toward [his] protected concerted activity.” It further concluded that any error respondent may have made as to his “request for FMLA leave did not equate with a violation of PERA.” Thus, the court found that MERC properly dismissed his ULP claim. Bulger contended “that respondent terminated his employment in violation of MCL 423.210(1)(a). MERC also addressed MCL 423.210(1)(c) as a possible basis for a ULP.” MERC determined that Bulger did not meet his burden of showing antiunion animus. The principal (A) at the school where Bulger had worked “was the only individual with any direct connection to the termination decision who knew that Bulger was involved in the protest activity outside of the school. Bulger’s evidence of [A’s] bias mainly consisted of testimony regarding their confrontation outside the school building and another” employee’s testimony that A “said, ‘[W]e finally got [Bulger], he just got terminated this morning.’ The ALJ’s and MERC’s findings that this evidence was less than convincing are not contrary to the evidence. [A] praised Bulger and described him as a ‘valuable’ employee. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [A] found Bulger’s protest disruptive and unnecessary, without also finding that [A] wanted to fire him. A reasonable trier of fact also could conclude that [A] reported Bulger’s absenteeism because it was a duty of his job as principal.” Thus, the court concluded MERC did not err in finding “that Bulger failed to establish a prima facie case that respondent retaliated against him under PERA §§ 10(1)(a) and (c).” It further determined that evidence supported “MERC’s finding that his work stoppage met the” PERA’s definition of striking. Bulger also argued that “respondent adopted the FMLA requirements, and that [its] breach of its own standards demonstrates that it lacked a legitimate basis for terminating him. However, to prove violation of PERA § 10, Bulger still needs to prove that irregularities in respondent’s denial of his FMLA request were motivated by antiunion animus.” He failed to do so. Affirmed.

Enforcement of a prenuptial agreement (PNA); Reed v Reed; Division of property; Balancing the equities; MCL 552.23(1); MCL 552.401; Spousal support

The court concluded that the trial court erred as a matter of law by disregarding the parties’ PNA when dividing their property, even after determining it was a valid and enforceable agreement. Also, revisiting the division of the property may affect the trial court’s determination as to the amount and length of any spousal-support. Thus, it vacated both the property and spousal-support awards and remanded for further proceedings. Defendant-husband argued “the trial court failed to enforce the plain, unambiguous language of the PNA when dividing the parties’ property, and the spousal-support award impoverished him.” Plaintiff-wife claimed “in the trial court that the PNA should be voided, citing some of the grounds in Reed[.]” Defendant asserted “the trial court erred as a matter of law because following its decision that the PNA was not void under Reed, [it] disregarded the PNA when dividing the parties’ property and debts.” The court agreed with him in this regard. “After deciding the PNA was a valid and enforceable contract, the trial court needed to enforce its terms—dividing property into marital and separate property based on their definitions in the PNA, before resorting to equitable considerations. It did not do so, instead resorting to equitable considerations right away and dividing property into marital and separate property based on its own judgment.” The court held that this was an abuse of discretion. It found that “the trial court’s failure to enforce the PNA as written impacted the trial court’s overall decision concerning equitable division of the parties’ property.” And while the court acknowledged “the parties agreed in the PNA that neither would ever seek spousal support, defendant’s[] challenge to the very fact the trial court awarded plaintiff[] spousal support” was misplaced. Case law makes it “clear that the trial court’s equitable authority to ensure neither party is impoverished by a property settlement overrides the parties’ ability to contract around spousal support.” The court noted that once “the trial court has devised a property settlement following the procedure outlined” by the court, “it may, on remand, determine whether a spousal-support award is equitable and award one accordingly.”

Medical malpractice; Proximate causation; Documentary evidence; Cause-in-fact; Legal cause; National Cancer Institute (NCI); The Surveillance, Epidemiology, & End Results Program (SEER); American Joint Commission on Cancer (AJCC); Carcinoembryonic antigen (CEA) level; Personal representative (PR)

In this traditional medical malpractice action, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants-Dr. Alsawah and Huron Medical Center. A review of decedent-Patricia’s medical records revealed “‘that she had a history of substantial medical conditions even before her cancer diagnosis.’” Alsawah (a board-certified medical oncologist) “was monitoring Patricia for cancer recurrence.” The court found “there was no testimony that the cancer was more likely than not present in the adrenal gland in 2015, nor was there any testimony that, more likely than not, cancer would not have spread to the adrenal gland if defendants had complied with the standard of care.” The court noted that when “asked to provide statistical survival rates in 2015 for a patient with recurrent rectal cancer that spread to the liver,” plaintiff’s expert (Dr. G, a board-certified medical oncologist and hematologist) “acknowledged that it depended ‘upon the situation.’” It also noted that when “asked to address Patricia’s specific situation if the cancer had been discovered in 2015, he acknowledged that it was possible that Patricia would have died even if curative-intent surgery was attempted.” Nonetheless, plaintiff asserted the trial court erred in granting defendants’ summary disposition motion “in light of the treatment Patricia received.” The court concluded “that plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that Dr. Alsawah’s conduct, in failing to diagnose the metastatic cancer in 2015, more likely than not caused Patricia’s death. Patricia was treated for colorectal cancer in 2012. Although her CEA levels were monitored in conjunction with other tests and began to rise substantially, the metastasis of the cancer was not confirmed until 2017. At that time, although surgery was deemed feasible, it was not recommended because of Patricia’s other health issues.” The court noted that after “the case was returned to the trial court for an evaluation of causation in a traditional medical malpractice action and not a loss-of-opportunity matter, the parties did not seek to retain new experts or re-depose experts to focus on this traditional theory of malpractice. Instead, defendants continued to rely on the NCI, SEER, and AJCC data that Patricia’s survival rate from metastatic colorectal cancer was less than 20%. [G], in his testimony and affidavit, seemingly attempted to avoid that statistic. And, he opined that the cancer had metastasized to the liver in 2015 in light of the CEA level and claimed that the cancer had not yet progressed to the adrenal glands. But, [G] did not have tests or other data to substantiate that opinion regarding progression. His opinion was merely conjecture and speculation.” 

Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; The No-Fault Act; MCL 500.3105(1); Injuries occurring when a moving vehicle hits a parked vehicle; Kalin v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Whether an injury arose from an intentional act; Distinguishing Thornton v Allstate Ins Co & Bourne v Farmers Ins Exch; University Rehab Alliance, Inc v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of MI; The actor’s intent; Miller v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co; Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc

The court held that plaintiff-Joseph established a genuine issue of material fact as to his entitlement to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3105(1) given the evidence his injuries arose out of the operation of another semitruck (a Volvo) and its collision with the one in which he was sleeping (a Freightliner). Further, as to a second incident, reasonable fact-finders could conclude neither he nor the driver of the Volvo semi (nonparty-B) “intentionally caused Joseph’s alleged injuries.” Thus, it found that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to (1) defendants-Progressive and National General as “to the collision that occurred while Joseph was inside” the Freightliner and (2) for National General on his claim for PIP benefits arising from alleged injuries he sustained when he later fell from the Volvo. The court concluded that pursuant to Kalin, although “the first collision involved a parked vehicle (i.e., the Freightliner semitruck), Joseph was entitled to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3105 because his injuries arose out of [B’s] operation of a motor vehicle (i.e., the Volvo semitruck).” The trial court erred in analyzing “the first collision by focusing on the Freightliner semitruck through the lens of MCL 500.3106 (the parked-vehicle exception) instead of focusing on the Volvo semitruck through the lens of MCL 500.3105 (ownership, operation, maintenance, or use).” It noted that “when a moving vehicle hits a parked vehicle, generally there is no need to engage with the parked-vehicle exception—MCL 500.3105 applies.” Here, the impact of the Volvo’s collision with the Freightliner “caused Joseph to fall out of the sleeper berth and onto his right side, resulting in alleged injuries. [His] injuries arose at least in part out of [B’s] operation of the Volvo semitruck as a motor vehicle.” As to the second incident, the court found this case was “distinguishable from Thornton and Bourne and akin to Univ Rehab Alliance, Inc because Joseph’s alleged injuries occurred when he fell from a moving vehicle used for transportation.” And there were “genuine issues of material fact as to whether [he] intentionally caused his own alleged injuries and whether [B] intentionally caused” them. Joseph testified that he stepped onto the Volvo’s “running board as the vehicle passed. Although [B] accelerated and applied the brakes multiple times while Joseph stood on the running board, Joseph opined that [B] did so in an attempt to flee the truck stop.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Opt-out of personal injury protection (PIP) coverage; MCL 500.3107c & 3107d; “Qualified health coverage” (QHC); MCL 500.3107e(2) & (3); Validity of electronic signatures on the PIP opt-out form; The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA); MCL 450.832(h) & 450.839; “Security procedure” (MCL 450.832(n)); MCL 450.837; Payment of a monthly premium reflecting the absence of PIP coverage; Effect of an affidavit; Effect of failing to timely submit proof of QHC; Michigan Department of Insurance & Financial Services Bulletin 2021-25-INS

The court held that defendant-Progressive Michigan’s insured (Michael) “properly opted out of PIP coverage for allowable expenses and thus,” his wife (plaintiff-Tiffany) was not entitled to coverage under the policy. His “electronic signatures were valid, [he] received the benefit of his bargain by paying lower premium payments, and his affidavit failed to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s order denying Progressive’s summary disposition motion and remanded. Tiffany asserted “Progressive failed to provide sufficient evidence proving the validity of Michael’s electronic signatures on the PIP selection form.” But the court agreed with Progressive that his “signatures on the opt-out form were valid.” It noted that Michael “used a third-party software, DocuSign, and included his initials and full name throughout the” insurance application. This is also an electronic signature as contemplated by the UETA. Under the terms of the application, he “acknowledged that his electronic signature had the same legal effect as his written signature on a paper version of the document” and that it was “valid evidence of his intent to enter an agreement with Progressive and” legally binding. The court concluded his “signatures and initials on the opt-out form complied with the UETA.” It noted that the “DocuSign secured-signature software Progressive and Michael used provides time stamps indicating when [he] was sent the application, when he viewed it, and when he signed it. It also indicates the security level used as ‘Email, Account Authentication.’ [His] DocuSign signature appears four times and his initials appear five times on the application and PIP-selection form, confirming his choices to opt-out of PIP coverage.” His lower premium payments were further evidence of the validity of the e-signed contract. Finally, the court concluded that his affidavit did not create a question of fact. Summary disposition could not be avoided by his conclusory denial “contrary to Michael’s historical conduct and signed documentary evidence in the form of his repeated signatures and initials throughout the insurance documents.” Finally, as to the effect of Progressive’s “failure to timely verify” his QHC, the court declined “to invalidate an otherwise valid opt-out because of a four-month delay in obtaining QHC that was valid at the policy inception and all relevant times thereafter.”

Medical malpractice; Proximate causation; Documentary evidence; Cause-in-fact; Legal cause; National Cancer Institute (NCI); The Surveillance, Epidemiology, & End Results Program (SEER); American Joint Commission on Cancer (AJCC); Carcinoembryonic antigen (CEA) level; Personal representative (PR)

In this traditional medical malpractice action, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants-Dr. Alsawah and Huron Medical Center. A review of decedent-Patricia’s medical records revealed “‘that she had a history of substantial medical conditions even before her cancer diagnosis.’” Alsawah (a board-certified medical oncologist) “was monitoring Patricia for cancer recurrence.” The court found “there was no testimony that the cancer was more likely than not present in the adrenal gland in 2015, nor was there any testimony that, more likely than not, cancer would not have spread to the adrenal gland if defendants had complied with the standard of care.” The court noted that when “asked to provide statistical survival rates in 2015 for a patient with recurrent rectal cancer that spread to the liver,” plaintiff’s expert (Dr. G, a board-certified medical oncologist and hematologist) “acknowledged that it depended ‘upon the situation.’” It also noted that when “asked to address Patricia’s specific situation if the cancer had been discovered in 2015, he acknowledged that it was possible that Patricia would have died even if curative-intent surgery was attempted.” Nonetheless, plaintiff asserted the trial court erred in granting defendants’ summary disposition motion “in light of the treatment Patricia received.” The court concluded “that plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that Dr. Alsawah’s conduct, in failing to diagnose the metastatic cancer in 2015, more likely than not caused Patricia’s death. Patricia was treated for colorectal cancer in 2012. Although her CEA levels were monitored in conjunction with other tests and began to rise substantially, the metastasis of the cancer was not confirmed until 2017. At that time, although surgery was deemed feasible, it was not recommended because of Patricia’s other health issues.” The court noted that after “the case was returned to the trial court for an evaluation of causation in a traditional medical malpractice action and not a loss-of-opportunity matter, the parties did not seek to retain new experts or re-depose experts to focus on this traditional theory of malpractice. Instead, defendants continued to rely on the NCI, SEER, and AJCC data that Patricia’s survival rate from metastatic colorectal cancer was less than 20%. [G], in his testimony and affidavit, seemingly attempted to avoid that statistic. And, he opined that the cancer had metastasized to the liver in 2015 in light of the CEA level and claimed that the cancer had not yet progressed to the adrenal glands. But, [G] did not have tests or other data to substantiate that opinion regarding progression. His opinion was merely conjecture and speculation.” 

Landlord rental license denial; Requests for declaratory relief; Mootness; Whether the city code required plaintiff to get a “general business license”; Whether plaintiff had Article III standing to vindicate its tenants’ rights; Claim that the tenants were licensees; “Preexisting, nonconforming use”; Heath Twp v. Sall (MI); Estoppel & laches; Due process; Liberty or property interest; MCL 117.3(k); Legislative acts equally affecting many people; Bi-Metallic Inv Co v State Bd of Equalization; Equal Protection Clause claim; “Class-of-one” theory; Contracts Clause claim under 42 USC § 1983; Kaminski v Coulter; Inverse condemnation; Civil conspiracy

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff-Lathfield Investments’ claims against defendant-City of Lathrup arising from the denial of landlord rental and general business licenses, holding among other things that it could not bring a Contracts Clause claim under § 1983. The prior owner of Lathfield’s business properties had been involved in disagreements with the City over outstanding code violations. Lathfield went ahead and closed on its purchase of the property. The City later denied its “applications for general business and landlord rental licenses” due to its failure to comply with a City Code requirement “to list names and the principal businesses of its tenants.” In addition, because “Lathfield did not have a landlord tenant license, the City also denied its tenants’ general business license applications.” The court first affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Lathfield's request for a declaration that it was not subject to the City's site plan approval process as moot. Such a declaration would not affect its legal interests where the City had already approved its site plan. Lathfield also argued that the City Code did not require that it get a general business license because it was not “conducting business” within the City. But the court held that Lathfield’s business fell within the broad category of “performing a trade” and thus, required a business license. It also found no error in the denial of a declaration that the City prejudiced the tenants’ rights because Lathfield lacked a landlord rental license. It agreed with the district court that Lathfield lacked standing to litigate this issue. Further, it concluded that since “Lathfield was ‘leasing’ Property space as a landlord, it is subject to the City Code’s landlord rental requirements, including [the] tenant registration requirement.” It also rejected the claim that the property was “permitted as a preexisting, nonconforming use” where there was no evidence the property, “as currently constructed and operated, existed as a lawful use before the City Zoning Ordinance’s effective” date. Lathfield’s estoppel and laches argument also failed. As to its procedural due process claim, it did not identify “either a liberty or property interest of which it has been deprived.” The court noted it was “long ago held that legislative acts equally affecting many people, such as the City’s adoption of § 14-26 of the City Code, do not implicate procedural due process concerns.” Further, Lathfield failed to satisfy “the first element of its ‘class-of-one’ equal protection claim” and the district court did not err in granting the City summary judgment on both its Contracts Clause claims. Finally, it did not meet the first or second elements of an inverse condemnation claim and its civil conspiracy claim also failed.