Whether the defendant-City’s “lawn mowing” ordinance violated the plaintiff-property owner’s “procedural due process” rights; Han v. Star Bank; Mathews v. Eldridge; Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.; Sickles v. Campbell Cnty.; Const. 1963, art. VI, § 28; Carleton Sportsman’s Club v. Exeter Twp.; Silvernail v. County of Kent; Graham v. Mukasey; Whether the ordinance violated “substantive due process”; Loud v. Brooks; Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc; 2000 Baum Family Trust v. Babel; Sheffield v. City of Fort Thomas; Rowe v. City of Elyria (Unpub. 6th Cir.)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The defendant-City of Howell’s ordinance requiring plaintiff-Shoemaker to mow his lawn did not violate his procedural or substantive due process rights. Shoemaker refused to mow his curb strip after a dispute with the City. Under the City’s ordinance, it could, and did, have the grass mowed by a contractor and assessed Shoemaker fees and fines. The district court found that the ordinance violated his procedural due-process rights because it did not provide for a hearing. The court disagreed, finding that the City provided Shoemaker “with ample notice of the violation and an adequate opportunity to be heard[.]” While the City may not have fully complied with all the terms of its own ordinance, the notice was “‘reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity’” to appear and object. The plaintiff knew that “the City considered him to be in violation of the Ordinance. The mailed notices of violation and the door-hanger notices informed him of the nature of the alleged violation and the relevant section of the City Code. These notices also included the phone number of City Hall. Finally, the notices refer to the City’s Municipal Civil Infraction Ordinance, where Shoemaker could have learned about the procedures for objecting to the allegations against him.” Further, the City’s procedures for challenging violations of the Ordinance were “constitutionally sufficient under the Mathews test.” The amount at issue ($600) was “relatively minor[,]” and the Ordinance presented “a minimal risk of an erroneous deprivation.” Michigan law also provides an opportunity for review. “Requiring additional procedures—such as an evidentiary hearing for each unkempt yard prior to the City having it mowed—would . . . impose substantial costs with little corresponding benefit.” Further, “by not disputing the charges against him, Shoemaker is precluded from mounting a procedural-due-process claim against the City, even if a due-process violation had in fact occurred.” The City also did not violate Shoemaker’s substantive due process rights. Under Michigan law, he “technically owned the property at all relevant times and the City simply possessed a right of way for public use.” The ordinance did not impair a fundamental right, and its purpose was “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose[.]” Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.