Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 USC § 1 et seq.); Appellate jurisdiction; §§ 16 (a)(1)(A) & (B); ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher’s, Inc.; Van Dusen v. Swift Transp. Co. (9th Cir.); Simon v. Pfizer, Inc.; Turi v. . Main St. Adoption Servs., LLP; Taylor v. Pilot Corp.; Conrad v. Phone Directories Co. (10th Cir.); Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. The Health Plan of the Upper OH Valley, Inc. (4th Cir.); Devon Robotics, LLC v. DeViedma (3d Cir.); West Sec. Bank v. Schneider Ltd. P’ship (9th Cir.); Retaliation claim under the False Claims Act; 31 USC § 3730(h)
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review defendant-Miraca’s appeal of the district court’s order denying its motion to dismiss where it was not a final order, and the narrow provision of the FAA that authorizes appeal of certain interlocutory orders did not apply where Miraca never sought a stay or an order compelling arbitration. Plaintiff-Dorsa, a former employee, sued Miraca for retaliation under the False Claims Act. Miraca moved to dismiss, citing the parties’ arbitration clause in the employment agreement. It also argued that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim because of the arbitration agreement. In denying the motion, the district court ruled that the agreement did not cover the retaliation claim. A prior panel held that the denial of the motion to dismiss was not a “final order,” and referred the appeal to a merits panel. The court first held that § 16 of the FAA only provides jurisdiction where there has been an order denying a party’s request to stay proceedings pending arbitration, or where an order denied “a petition ‘for an order directing that . . . arbitration proceed.’” Here, the district court only denied Miraca’s motion to dismiss. “Nowhere in its motion to the district court or briefing in support thereof did Miraca seek the relief provided for in the FAA.” Thus, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Legal malpractice; Statute of limitations (SOL); MCL 600.5805(8); Accrual; MCL 600.5838(1); Rejection of a complaint for failing to comply with MCR 1.109(D); Effect of MCR 1.109(G)(5)(b); A claim involving harm to an interest differing from a breach of the standard of care; Brownell v Garber; Breach of contract; Barnard v Dilley; Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, & civil conspiracy; Service of process; MCR 1.105(A)(1) & (2); MCR 1.105(D)(1) & (2); Bullington v Corbell; Dismissal for improper service; MCR 2.105(J)(3)
While the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim as untimely, it concluded that the six-year SOL for contract breach claims applied to her allegations of a “special agreement” and that she alleged intentional conduct that might “be sufficient to establish causes of action distinct from” the malpractice claim. It instructed the trial court on remand to address defendants’ argument that her claims should be dismissed for failure to serve them before the summons expired. The court reversed summary disposition for defendants on the breach of contract and tort claims, and remanded. Plaintiff retained defendants to represent her in a divorce case in Barry County. She asserted that she specifically requested that they move to change venue from that county. No such motion was ever filed. There was some uncertainty as to whether a stipulated order allowing them to withdraw was entered on 9/6 or 9/8/16. On 9/7/18, plaintiff submitted a complaint against them in the trial court via its electronic filing system, but it was rejected. She successfully filed a complaint on 9/11/18. The court held that it was untimely. While she asserted that 9/7/18 “should be considered the operative filing date for determining compliance with the” SOL, the court found that she read too much into MCR 1.109(G)(5)(b). If “a filing is accepted, the filing date is the date of submission. This clause does not support plaintiff’s proffered interpretation, which is essentially that an accepted filing should relate back to the date that a prior, rejected document was filed.” The 9/11/18 accepted complaint was the operative one for SOL purposes, and clearly fell outside the applicable two-year period. But her contract claim was supported by the engagement agreement in which she “requested that defendants represent her ‘with respect to a divorce/Motion to Dismiss matter.’” She alleged that they failed to seek a change of venue despite promising to do so and indicating to her that they were doing so. These “allegations would establish a ‘special agreement’” the breach of which was distinct from the malpractice claim. In addition, she “alleged intentional conduct that may be sufficient to establish” claims for IIED, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. On remand, the trial court must “determine when defendants received actual notice of the action pending against them.”
Sentencing; Reasonableness of a departure sentence; People v Steanhouse; Sentencing after probation revocation; People v Hendrick; Failure to rehabilitate during probation; People v Dixon-Bey
Holding that defendant’s 16 violations during an intensive probation supervision program and further charges since he pled guilty to first-degree retail fraud in this case showed that the trial court’s departure sentence was reasonable and proportionate, the court affirmed. In sentencing him after he pled guilty to the probation violations, the trial court departed from his guidelines range of 5 to 28 months and sentenced him to 60 to 90 months. The court denied his application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded for consideration as on leave granted. The court noted that his “failure to rehabilitate during probation was a proper reason to depart from the guidelines’ recommended range, and the trial court articulated as much.” In addition to the probation violations, he “had another felony file at the same time that he ‘had retail fraud, third, pending in Battle Creek,’ and had a new felony conviction of ‘delivery/manufacture marijuana’ while on probation.” The trial court noted that, while his violations were based on “drugs, and his original plea dealt with retail fraud, defendant was given ‘chance, after chance, after chance,’ to ‘correct his behavior,’ ‘and he didn’t do it.’” It also noted that he was offered “a lot of help and programs,” but elected not to take advantage of them, and thus, the trial court “had no reasonable belief that [defendant] was going to change at all.” In addition, it believed there to was a “high likelihood” he would engage in more crimes in the future, The trial court further noted that when it placed him in the probation program, “it made sure that defendant understood that if he ‘screwed up,’ he would go to prison. The court indicated that it had focused on rehabilitating defendant, but that following probation, it had to focus on ‘consequences and protection of the community.’” The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the guidelines and imposing the sentence it did.
Sufficiency of the evidence; CCW in a motor vehicle; MCL 750.227(2); Presence of a weapon; Whether defendant knew or was aware of its presence; “Carrying”
Holding that there was sufficient evidence that defendant was guilty of committing all the elements of CCW in a motor vehicle, the court affirmed. As to the first element, there was no dispute that there was a gun in the car at the time he occupied it. As to the second element, he “testified that he owned the gun, put it in his car when leaving his home, brought it into [passenger-G’s] workplace, put it back into his car, drove with it to the grocery store, openly carried it in the grocery store, and then gave it to [G], who placed it in the glove compartment before they drove off in defendant’s car. Coupled with the officers’ testimony that defendant told the officers there was a handgun in the glove box, defendant’s own testimony supports a reasonable finding that he knew there was a gun in the car.” Finally, as to the third element, there was sufficient evidence that defendant carried the gun. Testimony supported a finding that he “continuously retained control over the pistol and that it was readily accessible to defendant, even while it was in the glove compartment.” Other evidence also suggested that he constructively possessed the gun in the car. While he “offered some evidence that could have led the jury to find that the handgun was in the sole possession of [G] after she allegedly took it from defendant, the totality of evidence” supported a finding that he “at least shared possession of it while it was in the glove compartment.”
Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); People v Crawford; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v VanderVliet; Evidence of uncharged sexual offenses against minors; MCL 768.27a; Notice; MRE 404(b)(2); People v Waltonen; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Randolph; Trial strategy; People v Trakhtenberg; Failure to raise a meritless objection; People v Ericksen; Evidence of rehabilitation; Principle that a defendant’s prior statement does not constitute a prior act; People v Goddard; Relevance; MRE 401; Hearsay; Admission by a party-opponent; MRE 801(d)(2)
The court held that the trial court did not err by admitting other act evidence, by admitting evidence that defendant attended rehabilitation, or by admitting evidence of his prior interactions with law enforcement, and he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of two counts of CSC III for twice engaging in sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old girl when he was 23. The trial court sentenced him as a second-offense habitual offender to 120 to 270 months. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court improperly permitted the prosecution to admit evidence regarding a third incident between him and the victim at trial. First, “the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of its unfair prejudice.” The uncharged conducted was “briefly described by the victim and was only referred to briefly in the prosecution’s opening statements when it stated that defendant and the victim had sex at least on two occasions.” In addition, “evidence regarding defendant penetrating the victim while she slept was not a true surprise and . . . defendant had proper notice of the evidence.” Further, because defendant “was unable to prove that defense counsel’s performance was objectively deficient, defendant cannot prove that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.” The court also rejected his claim that the prosecution improperly admitted evidence that he attended rehabilitation, noting his statement was an admission by a party-opponent and “defense counsel’s failure to object to references to defendant’s time in rehabilitation was not objectively deficient.” Finally, it rejected his contention that the prosecution improperly admitted evidence that he had prior interactions with law enforcement. “The statements defendant made about his prior interactions with law enforcement were properly admitted into evidence through the interrogation” video, the detective’s “statements about interacting with defendant at the police station were relevant and not unfairly prejudicial[,]" and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to advance a meritless argument. Affirmed.
Assignment to youthful trainee status pursuant to the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA) (MCL 762.11 et seq); Eligibility MCL 762.11(1); “Shall”; Whether the prosecution waived its right to withhold “consent”; Jurisdictional nature of the authority to sentence an offender under the HYTA; People v Martinez
Holding that the trial court assigned defendant to youthful trainee status in violation of MCL 762.11(1), the court reversed his assignment to that status and remanded for resentencing. He was charged with CCW. He pled guilty to attempted CCW “in exchange for a sentence of 18 months’ probation and 40 hours of community service.” But the trial court decided at the sentencing hearing to sentence him under the HYTA. The court noted that under MCL 762.11(1), an otherwise eligible defendant committing a crime on or after his 21st “birthday ‘shall not be assigned to youthful trainee status without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.’” It was undisputed that the trial court did not obtain this consent. While defendant argued that the prosecutor waived the right to withhold it, the prosecutor’s “response that assigning defendant to HYTA status was not his decision to make cannot be construed as ‘agreement to an action or opinion.’” The prosecutor at the sentencing hearing was not the one who negotiated the plea agreement, there was “no evidence that defendant petitioned for assignment to HYTA status, and the plea agreement did not include assignment to HYTA status. Under these circumstances,” the prosecutor’s statement (“It’s not my call, your Honor”) likely indicated that he did not have the authority to change the agreement's terms. The court also noted that the trial court’s subsequent comments indicated its “awareness that it was sua sponte taking the decision upon itself, not that the prosecuting attorney had ceded the decision to the court, and that its assignment of defendant to HYTA status did not strictly accord with the requirements of MCL 762.11(1).” Further, the prosecutor objected after the trial court made its ruling. The court likewise rejected defendant’s contention that this “generic objection” was insufficient. It held that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning him to HYTA status where his plea agreement did not provide for it, “his age at the time he committed the charged offense prohibited [it] from assigning him to HYTA status without the” prosecutor’s consent, and the prosecutor did not give his consent. Under the circumstances, the trial “court lacked the power to assign defendant to HYTA status.”
Denial of motion to disqualify the sentencing judge from hearing the motion for resentencing; Sentencing judge’s remarks & behavior at sentencing; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) & (b); Postsentencing activities & comments
The court concluded that the denial of defendant-Nassar’s motion to disqualify the sentencing judge from hearing his motion for resentencing was not erroneous. He pled guilty to seven counts of CSC I. He received concurrent sentences of 40 to 175 years for each conviction. Nassar argued that “the sentencing judge exhibited actual bias and prejudice by openly lamenting that she could not impose cruel and unusual punishment on him.” The court held that although the comments should not have been made, they “did not indicate the existence of actual bias or prejudice.” Nassar also asserted that the “judge expressed an expectation that Nassar would be harmed in prison, without condemning such possible harm to him.” The court did not view the “comment as suggesting or hoping that Nassar would be physically harmed in prison. The comment does not indicate the existence of actual bias.” Nassar next noted that the “judge stated, after announcing the sentence of 40 to 175 years’ imprisonment, that Nassar’s ‘death warrant’ had just been signed.” The court found that this reflected the judge’s belief that, due to “the lengths of his federal and state sentences, Nassar will likely live the remainder of his life in prison.” He failed to establish plain error given that the “comments did not indicate actual bias or prejudice.” Further, it held that Nassar “failed to establish that the alleged actual bias and/or prejudice affected his substantial rights.” As to his arguments that the judge violated Canon 2 and several other judicial canons, the court held that, “when viewed in the context of the entire sentencing hearing, the judge’s statements and conduct did not create a reasonable perception that her integrity, impartiality, or competence was impaired.” Thus, it found no plain error. Also, it held that any error did not affect Nassar’s substantial rights. Finally, he argued that the “judge should have been disqualified from deciding his motion for resentencing because the judge was biased and that there was an appearance of impropriety as a result of her postsentencing behavior and statements, including the judge’s social media activity, statements to the press, and public appearances.” The court held that he “failed to overcome the strong presumption of impartiality and that the decision to deny Nassar’s motion did not amount to an abuse of discretion.” Affirmed.
Sentencing; Consecutive sentencing; People v Mayes; People v Parker; Whether the definition of the word “prison” in MCL 750.193(2) controls the meaning of the term “penal or reformatory institution” in MCL 768.7a(1); People v Johnson; “Misdemeanors”; People v Smith; Felony-firearm; People v Washington; The doctrine of in pari materia; People v Rahily
The court held that because the probation program in which defendant participated fell within the definition of the term “penal institution” pursuant to MCL 768.7a(1), he was subject to consecutive sentencing under that statute. He pled guilty to AWIM and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 15 to 40 years for the former and 2 years for the latter. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to a sentence defendant was serving for a probation violation. The court previously denied leave, but the Supreme Court remanded for the court to consider whether MCL 768.7a authorized the trial court to require defendant’s sentences to run consecutively with his sentence for violating probation in the earlier case. On remand, the court noted that, “‘[a]ccording to the plain language of MCL 768.7a, a person is subject to consecutive sentencing when that person is convicted of a crime committed during the person’s incarceration in a penal or reformatory institution or during the person’s escape or parole from such an institution.’” It found that, “in this case, the definition of the word ‘prison’ in MCL 750.193(2) is not controlling of the term ‘penal or reformatory institution’ in MCL 768.7a(1).” The court then concluded that testimony “provided at the evidentiary hearing makes it evident that the [probation] program defendant was ordered to participate in—a residential in-patient program through the MDOC—clearly falls under the definition of the term ‘penal institution’ used in MCL 768.7a(1).” Thus, consecutive sentencing was appropriate. Affirmed.
Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Unger; People v Duncan; People v Fisher; References to Larry Nassar
Holding that the prosecution properly argued the evidence and reasonable inferences as they related to its theory of this case, the court rejected defendant’s claim that its closing argument remarks about the Larry Nassar case constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, the court affirmed his CSC I convictions. It concluded that the reference to Nassar did not imply, as defendant asserted, that his “actions equated with that of Nassar’s or that he acted in a similar manner.” Rather, the prosecution used the Nassar case (which was first referred to by victim-JM “during her testimony when she stated, ‘[s]o I had been watching the Larry Nassar trial to watch sentencing and all that kind of stuff’) to refute defense counsel’s closing argument to the jury that, on the basis of defendant’s ‘schedule and the kids’ and family’s schedule’ defendant did not have the opportunity for the abuse to occur. The prosecutor used the Nassar case to show that it was entirely plausible for defendant to commit the abuse and inappropriate touching while other members of the household were in the home or present in the same room.” The court further concluded that the reference “was harmless. Taken in context, the prosecutor’s statement that Nasser ‘had 332 victims, and he was victimizing the majority in an examination room with the parent in the room,’ was a proper response to a defense argument.” As noted by the trial court, “the prosecution’s reference was in ‘direct rebuttal of some of the points that’ defense counsel raised during its closing arguments to the jury. Although this statement did refer to a high-profile individual, the prosecution need not use the least prejudicial evidence available to establish a fact in issue.” In addition, both victims provided very detailed testimonies about what happened, and the trial court instructed the jurors that the attorneys’ statements were not evidence and that the jurors should only accept things said that were supported by the evidence or their “own common sense and general knowledge.”
Sufficiency of the evidence; CCW; MCL 750.227; People v Nimeth
Holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing all the essential elements of CCW, the court affirmed. His conviction stemmed from a traffic stop. The court held that there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings that he “had the pistol, pulled it out, and put it under his seat, and that only defendant would have had access to the area in which the gun was found.”
Dismissal for mootness; B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery; The Adoption Code (MCL 710.21 et seq)
The court dismissed this appeal in an adoption case for mootness. B, born out of wedlock in 2020, was at the center of the case. The day after B’s birth, petitioner-mother filed a petition under the Adoption Code for a hearing to identify the child’s father and to determine or terminate his parental rights. Petitioner identified respondent as the putative father. The trial court dismissed her petition as it determined respondent had provided substantial and regular support to B. Petitioner then moved for a rehearing. In the meantime, respondent filed a paternity action under the Paternity Act, but he did not request a stay of the adoption proceedings, and the trial court in the adoption action denied petitioner’s request for a rehearing. She sought “an order terminating respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 710.39(1). By its terms, this statute only concerns the termination of the parental rights of putative fathers.” Because respondent is B’s “biological and legal father pursuant to an order of filiation entered by the Kent Circuit Court, MCL 710.39(1) is no longer applicable and it is impossible for us to grant the relief” petitioner requested, making this appeal moot.
Rescission of a no-fault policy based on material misrepresentation; Titan Ins Co v Hyten; An independent insurance agent as the agent of the insured rather than the insurer; Assertions that the agent completed the application & guided the insured through the process; Claim that the insured failed to read the application; Materiality; Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co of MI; Reliance on an affidavit; Due process; Notice & an opportunity to be heard; Balancing the equities; Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Wright; Effect of plaintiff being deemed uninsured at the time of the accident; MCL 500.3135(2)(c)
The court held that defendant-insurer (Progressive) was entitled to void its insured’s (nonparty-J) no-fault policy based on a material misrepresentation in the policy application. But as the trial court did not specify whether it determined plaintiff was or was not an innocent third party, or apply the balancing test set forth in Pioneer, remand was required. Plaintiff was dating J when she purchased a car, and she was added to his policy. She was later involved in the accident giving rise to this case. Progressive sought rescission of the policy on the basis that J “and plaintiff made material misrepresentations in the procurement of the policy.” It contended that J “misrepresented that plaintiff was a member of his household and that plaintiff’s vehicle was garaged at his home, and that” they both participated “in making false representations, innocent misrepresentations, and silent fraud.” The court concluded that either J or his insurance agent (R) gave Progressive incorrect information “with the result that Progressive acted upon that information and issued a policy to [J] that covered plaintiff and her vehicle.” The unambiguous policy language allowed Progressive to void it if J “made incorrect statements or representations to Progressive as to any material fact or circumstance.” Further, the misrepresentation was material. According to the testimony of Progressive’s litigation underwriting specialist (C), “the real determining factor in Progressive’s decision to issue a policy of insurance is the location where a vehicle is garaged.” It was clear that plaintiff did not garage her car at J’s “address because she was not living there; she was instead garaging it” where she lived. C’s affidavit was clear that had Progressive known “plaintiff was not living at [J’s] address as represented, and also was garaging” the car elsewhere, it would not have added her car to J’s policy. The court rejected plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred in relying on C’s affidavit, and her claim that she was deprived of due process as to the issue of whether R was the agent of J or Progressive. However, on remand the trial court must determine whether plaintiff was an innocent third party, and if so, weigh the Pioneer factors before deciding whether Progressive may rescind the policy as to plaintiff.
Auto negligence; Applicability of MCL 257.672(2) (making it a civil infraction to stop or park a vehicle on the paved or main portion of a highway when it is possible to stop or park off the paved or main traveled portion)
Concluding that plaintiff did not create a fact issue as to her theory that defendant-Alphonse Pulaski stopped his truck in the road in violation of MCL 257.672(2) or made an improper U-turn, the court reversed the denial of defendants’ summary disposition motion and remanded for entry of an order granting their motion. They contended “there was no genuine issue of fact that Alphonse was making a legal continuous left-hand turn into a driveway from the right side of the road. They asserted that plaintiff lacked evidence to support a finding that Alphonse breached any duty of care.” They produced deposition testimony from Alphonse, plaintiff, and the deputy who responded to the scene, as well as an accident reconstruction expert’s report. The burden then shifted to plaintiff to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. “The trial court found there may have been a fact question as to whether Alphonse ‘was parked somehow in a manner that crossed the road’ and that if Alphonse had stopped midturn, it may have constituted a civil infraction under MCL 257.672.” However, nothing in MCL 257.672(2) suggests that it “applies to a vehicle that stops in its lane before making a left-hand turn. There is nothing in the plain language of the statute to suggest that a violation of MCL 257.672 occurs absent evidence of stopping or parking. There was no evidence that Alphonse stopped or parked his vehicle on the highway.” In his deposition testimony, he “testified that he did not stop his vehicle during the left turn into the driveway and that he did not stop the vehicle at a moment when both lanes of the road were blocked. Plaintiff did not produce evidence to counter this factual assertion. Although plaintiff characterized the turn as a U-turn, her only” supporting evidence was “her deposition testimony that it was her ‘theory’ that Alphonse was attempting to make a U-turn because the truck and trailer were ‘across the whole road’ from ‘dirt to dirt.’ However, plaintiff did not dispute that a truck that is pulling a trailer will cross both lanes of traffic as it makes a left-hand turn.” While her expert’s affidavit seemed to assume that Alphonse was making a U-turn, it provided no support for this assumption. Absent evidence disputing “Alphonse’s testimony that he made a continuous left turn into a driveway[,]” the trial court erred in denying defendants summary disposition.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); In re Hudson; In re Williams; Failure to advise that a jurisdictional plea can be used as evidence in a termination proceeding; MCR 3.971(B)(4); In re Ferranti; Prejudice; In re Pederson; Right to counsel in a child-protective proceeding; MCL 712A.17c; MCR 3.915(B)(1); A parent’s significant interest in the companionship, care, custody, & management of his or her children; In re JK; Best interests of the children; In re Trejo Minors; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White
The court rejected respondent-mother’s claims that she was entitled to relief on the basis that the trial court erred by failing to advise her of the effect of her jurisdictional plea, failed to ensure she was properly represented, or improperly conducted in camera interviews with the children. It also held that at least one statutory ground was met as to each respondent, and that termination of their parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The mother’s parental rights were terminated based primarily on substance abuse and neglect. Respondent-father was incarcerated. On appeal, the mother argued that the trial court failed to advise her that her jurisdictional plea could be used against her during subsequent termination proceeding. But unlike the respondents in Ferranti and like those in “Pederson, ‘this is not a case involving a complete failure to address the requirements listed in MCR 3.971(B)(4).’” And she was not prejudiced. As to her claim that the trial court erred by failing to ensure she was properly represented by a court-appointed attorney at each stage of the child protective proceeding, the court failed “to see how the result of the proceeding would have been different had [she] been provided with counsel at every” hearing. As to her contention that the trial court erred by conducting “unlawful in camera interviews with” the children, in light of “the overwhelming evidence in this case,” the court could not say that the mother’s “substantial rights were affected or that the interviews ‘seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” It further rejected her argument that no statutory ground for termination was shown, concluding that § (j) was established. Lastly, it rejected her claim that termination was not in the children’s best interests. Given the testimony and her history, it was unlikely she “would have been able to continue making progress while caring for all of the children and their extensive needs.” Finally, the court held that § (c)(i) was established as to the father, and that terminating his rights was in the children’s best interests. Given their “need for permanency, they could not wait an indefinite amount of time for [him] to be able to provide them with proper care and custody.” Affirmed.