Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Whether a taxpayer transitioning from the Michigan Business Tax (MBT) to the Corporate Income Tax (CIT) may claim prior losses calculated & submitted under the MBT as business losses to the first tax return it files under the CIT; Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEGA) employment tax credit under the Michigan Business Tax Act (MBTA); Replacement of the MBT with the CIT; MCL 208.1500; MCL 206.680; D’Agostini Land Co LLC v Department of Treasury; Calculation of a business’s tax liability; MCL 208.1500(4); “Business loss”; MCL 206.623(4); Calculating business income tax & CIT tax base; MCL 206.623; MCL 208.1201
Holding that a taxpayer transitioning from the MBT to the CIT may not claim prior losses calculated and submitted under the MBT as business losses to the first tax return it files under the CIT, the court affirmed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary disposition for defendant-Treasury. In 2007, plaintiff-auto supplier was awarded a MEGA employment tax credit under the MBTA. The credit was extended in 2008 for qualified jobs through the 2018 tax year. In 2012, Michigan replaced the MBT with the CIT, but did not immediately repeal the MBT, instead enacting provisions permitting businesses with tax credits to continue to file MBT returns until they had used up all of their credits. When the CIT became effective, plaintiff chose to pay the “greater of” tax as calculated under MCL 208.1500(4) for the tax years 2012 through 2018, when its MEGA credits were exhausted. Defendant denied plaintiff’s request for the business loss carryforward. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition for defendant, finding “the term ‘business loss’ under the CIT is a loss that is to be determined after calculations—allocation and apportionment—that are to be performed under the CIT, not under the MBT or some other act.” On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that it was subject to both the MBT and CIT with a setoff of the lower calculated tax liability amount against the greater. “[P]laintiff argues that no provision in either the MBT or CIT precludes it from carrying forward a business loss, as calculated in its ‘greater of’ 2018 MBT return to its 2019 CIT return. Defendant, on the other hand, claims that no provision can be found in the MBT or CIT allowing for the business losses calculated under the MBT to be carried forward as losses on a CIT return.” The Legislature “employed language in the CIT that supports a finding that a business loss calculated on an MBT tax base and used on MBT tax returns cannot carryforward on a CIT tax return in which a CIT tax base is used. Had the Legislature intended to permit plaintiff’s claimed carryforward, it could have easily specified so in either the MBT or CIT. That it did not do so defeats plaintiff’s claim.”
Mortgage interest rate dispute; Applicability of the law of the case doctrine; Judicial admissions; MCR 2.312(D)(1); Course of dealing; Compound interest & simple interest; Niggeling v Michigan Dep’t of Transp
While the court agreed with plaintiff-RJMC that the law of the case doctrine did not apply here, it disagreed that defendant-Dario Mortgages judicially admitted in its answer to the complaint that the interest rate on the mortgage at issue was simple versus compound. The court further concluded that the parties’ course of dealing established that they implicitly agreed to compound interest. Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for Dario Mortgages. The court noted it “did not decide the first appeal on the merits, and” did not determine “as a matter of law that the interest rate was compound versus simple; we ruled that factual questions existed that precluded summary disposition.” Thus, the trial court was not bound on remand by the law of the case doctrine. But as to RJMC’s judicial admission argument, the “complaint provided: ‘Pursuant to the terms of the Mortgage, the outstanding unpaid principal balance accrued interest at the simple rate of 12% per annum.’ In its answer, Dario Mortgages replied: ‘Admitted that pursuant to the terms of the Mortgage, the outstanding unpaid balance accrued interest at the rate of 12% per annum.’” The court concluded “Dario Mortgages merely admitted that the interest rate was 12%; it did not admit that the interest rate was simple.” As to the sufficiency of Dario Mortgages’ evidence, it was undisputed “the parties expressly agreed to a $500,000 loan with 12% annual interest, a minimum monthly principal and interest payment of $5,143.06 for 60 months, and a balloon payment due on [11/29/12]. The payment ledger” reflected monthly payments of $5,200 by RJMC from 12/07 through 10/09. After the last payment, the ledger reflected a balance of “$494,424.50. RJMC relied on the ledger in the trial court and on appeal. In fact, it introduced the ledger into the record and used the $494,424.50 figure as the starting point for its calculations for the surplus proceeds that it was allegedly owed from the foreclosure sale.” The court found that its “reliance on this figure reflects that the parties implicitly agreed to compound interest through their established course of dealing.” Further, Dario Mortgages “continued to show on remand and on appeal that the monthly payments would be $5,143.06 for a $500,000 loan with a 60-month loan period at 12% annual interest compounded monthly and a balloon payment at the end. This is the exact monthly payment” in the mortgage note.
Jury instructions; The transferred-intent doctrine; People v Welsh
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76242 in the 10/6/21 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Welsh.
Sentencing; Cruel & unusual punishment; People v Parks; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentences
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated Part II.B of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 72164 in the 2/5/20 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Parks. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Dissenting in part and concurring in part, Justice Zahra concluded that because defendant was over 18 when he committed first-degree murder, he was not entitled to relief under Parks. He would deny leave to appeal on all the issues raised in defendant’s application.
Also dissenting in part and concurring in part, Justice Viviano noted that he did not believe a mandatory LWOP sentence “for a defendant who committed first-degree murder when he was over the age of 17 is unconstitutional.” Thus, he would deny leave to appeal on all of defendant’s issues.
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated Part V of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 73468 in the 8/6/20 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Parks. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Admissibility of evidence; Motion to admit social media statements; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); People v VanderVliet; Materiality & probative value; Principle that a statement of general intent is not a prior act for purposes of MRE 404(b); People v Goddard; First-degree murder; People v Bennett; Second-degree murder; People v Werner; Self-defense; People v Riddle
The court held in this interlocutory appeal that one of defendant’s three social media statements was not admissible as other acts evidence, but that the other two (the “Imlay City statements”) were both material and probative. As such, they “were relevant under the second VanderVliet factor and the trial court erred when it concluded otherwise.” Thus, the court reversed and remanded “for consideration of whether the Imlay City statements satisfy the other three VanderVliet factors—proper purpose, probative value in relation to unfair prejudice, and limiting instructions.” Defendant was charged with a number of offenses, including open murder, arising out of a gas station shooting. The prosecution moved to admit three of his earlier social media statements, claiming they were “indicative of ‘defendant’s motive, preparation, and intent’ to harm someone at a gas station and they were necessary to ‘rebut defendant’s anticipated claim of self-defense.’” The trial court denied the motion, finding the statements were irrelevant to the theory of self-defense. On appeal, the court agreed in part and disagreed in part with the prosecution’s argument that the trial court erred denying its motion. It disagreed that the first statement was admissible because it did not describe any specific crime, wrong, or act. However, it agreed that the Imlay City statements were admissible, noting they were “material to the theory of self-defense. For example, defendant’s claim that the other individual was ‘lucky he stayed in the truck the way he was acting he would of ate a 45 auto if he would of approached my impala,’ is indictive of whether defendant was legitimately acting in self-defense or whether he had planned to use deadly force against anyone who approached his vehicle during a verbal confrontation.” They were also “probative because they make it more probable than not that defendant intended to harm someone at a gas station.” Indeed, his statement that “the other individual was ‘lucky he didn’t get out of that truck I had a .45 in the console and mama has a .38 Smith in the glove box’ makes it more probable than not that he intended to shoot someone at a gas station.”
Sentencing; Proportionality
The court held that because defendant’s sentence was “reasonable and proportionate to the offense and the offender, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing” him to a 10-year minimum sentence for the witness intimidation by threat to kill or injure conviction. He argued his minimum sentence was disproportionate and “the trial court did not consider certain mitigating factors in his favor in” determining his sentence. The record reflected that “during a four-month period, defendant made numerous threatening phone calls to his wife. In at least five of the calls, defendant threatened to kill her once released from jail. Defendant told several of his family members that he intended to kill his wife. Defendant also told his wife that his aunt would be waiting for her outside of her house and would hurt her.” In addition, he “used a texting app provided by the jail to send his wife death threats. He also used the app to text his children and told them that he intended to kill their mother.” The record also indicated he “attempted to intimidate his wife with his threats. Applying the proportionality factor that considers the seriousness of defendant’s offense, we conclude that defendant’s repeated threats over a fourth-month period through various means of communication establish the seriousness of the offense and the gravity of” his behavior. Thus, the record supported “the trial court’s determination to impose an upward departure minimum sentence.” Further, the record reflected he had “a pattern of assaultive behavior and domestic violence that led to multiple prior convictions for domestic violence and charges of several assault crimes which were reduced to disturbing the peace.” The court held that “defendant’s substance abuse issues, in light of the seriousness of the death threats to his wife and his pattern of domestic violence, did not outweigh the aggravating factors supporting the minimum sentence imposed by the trial court.” The court concluded the fact he “and his wife remain married is not a mitigating factor that outweighs defendant’s threats and prior abusive history.” Additionally, it was unpersuaded by his “argument that he is a good father to his children and that the trial court’s sentence will deprive his children of a loving father.” Defendant offered “no examples of his decency to his children other than the fact that he has not hit them.” No other evidence established he had “been a good father, and we conclude that defendant not hitting his children is not a mitigating factor that would outweigh defendant’s danger to his family and society.” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Prejudice
Concluding the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for a new trial because defense counsel was not ineffective, the court reversed and remanded. Because he failed to demonstrate prejudice, the court did “not consider the other prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test, whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The court first considered whether he showed prejudice such that he was entitled to a new trial. Defendant’s argument as to “prejudice was limited to half a sentence in his supplemental brief entered after the Ginther hearing: ‘[C]ounsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense[.]’” The court held that “the burden was on defendant to establish the factual predicate of an ineffective-assistance of counsel claim.” While he “offered extensive explanation alleging that counsel’s performance was unreasonable, he made no substantive argument that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for a new trial, in part, because defendant was presumptively prejudiced by counsel’s performance. However, defendant did not make this showing and it was an error for the trial court to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial on this basis.”
Prosecutorial misconduct; Repeatedly bringing up consent during trial; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a jury instruction on flight; Trial strategy; Sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE)
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-Thomas’s motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He argued “the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly mentioning consent during trial, and that the refusal to grant a mistrial denied Thomas his due-process right to a fair trial.” The court held that reviewing “the record and statements in context, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referencing or eliciting testimony on consent at trial. The references were minimal, related to [the SANE’s] explanation of her actions and findings, and did not shift the burden to Thomas to prove consent. Thomas failed to show that the mention of consent was prejudicial to his right to a fair trial.” Thomas next argued “he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to request the model criminal jury instruction on flight, resulting in an improperly instructed jury.” The court held that the sequence of events called “into question whether Thomas’s actions truly constitute ‘flight,’ and thus whether a request for a flight instruction would have even been granted.” Even assuming his actions constituted flight, and “a flight instruction was available, Thomas still fails to establish that defense counsel’s performance was deficient.” He failed to “overcome this presumption, as there was a sound and objectively reasonable basis for not requesting the flight instruction—to avoid highlighting for the jury that Thomas’s flight could suggest guilt.” Thus, he could not establish “trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on flight amounted to deficient performance.” Affirmed.
Motion for relief from a renewed judgment; MCR 2.612(A)(1), (C)(1)(a), (C)(1)(c), & (C)(1)(f); Applicability of res judicata
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendants’ motion for relief from a renewed judgment. The bankruptcy court granted plaintiff-creditor (Vulpina) derivative standing to file an adversary proceeding to challenge defendant-Dzierzawski’s allegedly fraudulent transfer of a company to his then-wife. The trustee subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with Dzierzawski and his now ex-wife, which the bankruptcy court approved. Vulpina eventually filed a notice of judgment lien against defendants seeking attorney fees and costs associated with its post-judgment collection efforts. The trial court awarded $350,000, and the court affirmed. It later filed an ex parte motion to renew judgment, which the trial court granted, renewing the judgment in the amount of $847,364.15, including interest, for another 10 years. The trial court denied defendants’ motion for relief from renewed judgment, finding the settlement payment made to Vulpina in the bankruptcy proceedings did not fully satisfy the judgment, that the outstanding amount of principal remained due, and that res judicata did not bar Vulpina’s claim. On appeal, the court rejected defendants’ argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion. “[A]fter the bankruptcy proceedings, the outstanding principal balance on Vulpina’s judgment against defendants was approximately $120,776. Because Dzierzawski did not receive a discharge of his debts in bankruptcy and because the settlement agreement and release does not provide that Vulpina’s claim was barred by the release, Vulpina is not prohibited from seeking renewal of the outstanding judgment principal.” The court also rejected defendants’ claim that res judicata barred Vulpina from seeking a renewed judgment that included the principal on judgment. “Vulpina is not re-litigating any issues that were decided in the bankruptcy court. Nor do defendants argue that the matter currently being litigated could have been raised in the adversary proceedings specifically or the bankruptcy proceedings in general.” Thus, res judicata did not apply to bar Vulpina’s claim here. Affirmed.
Whether defendant-City’s vaccine policy for its employees violated § 225 of the 2021-2022 Omnibus Appropriations Act (2021 PA 87) (the Act)
The court concluded that plaintiffs’ complaint challenging defendant-City’s vaccine policy for its employees “on the basis of the Act was facially insufficient.” The case arose from a 2021 announcement by the City “imposing a policy requiring that all the City’s employees become ‘fully vaccinated’ against the COVID-19 virus (the ‘vaccine policy’). Any employees who did not become fully vaccinated would eventually be terminated. Soon after the vaccine policy was announced, the Governor signed” the Act into law. The Act “contained provisions specifically prohibiting vaccine mandates as a condition of employment by certain government employers.” In part, plaintiffs sought “declaratory relief that the City’s vaccine policy violated the Act’s prohibition of vaccine mandates. According to plaintiffs, the Act prohibited the City from enforcing the vaccine mandate.” The trial court agreed with the City that “the Act did not prohibit local governments from creating and enforcing vaccine mandates as a condition of employment” and granted the City summary disposition. Plaintiffs argued it “misinterpreted the plain language of the Act when it concluded the City was not subject to the prohibition of vaccine mandates.” The court disagreed. The issue was whether the City was subject to the prohibition of vaccine mandates articulated in § 225 of the Act. Based on the language of that provision, “the prohibition of vaccine mandates applies to employees of the Department of Treasury. Plaintiffs are employees of the City of Ann Arbor, not the Department of Treasury. Therefore, the prohibition of vaccine mandates does not apply to them. A plain reading of the statutory scheme demonstrates that the Act did not prohibit the City from enforcing its vaccine policy against its employees.” Affirmed.
Motion for a change in custody; Proper cause or a change in circumstances; Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Whether the trial court should have conducted a full evidentiary hearing; Rules as to parents on active military duty
The court held that plaintiff-mother failed to show proper cause or change in circumstances and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on her request for a change in custody of the parties’ child (N) and in not changing N’s legal custody. The parties had agreed to joint legal custody with plaintiff having sole physical custody. She sought sole legal custody two months after entry of a parenting time order. The trial court found that the facts she “alleged, even accepted as true, did not establish a proper cause or change in circumstances sufficient to merit a change of custody. The testimonies” it heard did not change its decision. While plaintiff criticized its “choice to voice its decision before it heard testimony, she does not argue on appeal that doing so constituted an abuse of discretion.” In addition, she did not cite any law supporting her argument that the alleged facts established “by a preponderance of the evidence that a change of circumstances or a proper cause to modify custody existed.” Rather, she simply rehashed her allegations against defendant-father and contended “the trial court came to the wrong conclusion.” The court noted it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in reviewing its factual determinations, and without any other error alleged, it must affirm. It added that the trial court’s decision was not against the great weight of the evidence, “particularly when reviewing the history of the case and the applicable rules regarding parents in active military duty.” The court noted the child’s custodial situation would be “the same after the proposed change. . . . Any change of legal custody would not necessarily change parenting time, the alleged source of [N’s] anxiety. Whether defendant remained allowed to have a say in important decisions in [N’s] life, therefore, would have no significant effect on” her well-being. The court additionally noted that “even when a child’s best interests are able to be factored into a custody determination, a parent’s absence as a result of active military duty may not be considered.” Given that plaintiff’s allegations largely revolved “around defendant’s absence, those allegations cannot be considered because they were a result of defendant’s active military duty.” Thus, her allegations did “not rise to the level required under Vodvarka and other precedent.” Affirmed.
Assignment of the right to no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Res judicata; Mecosta Cnty Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co; Privity
Holding that res judicata did not apply, the court reversed summary disposition for defendant-insurer in this action brought by plaintiff-healthcare provider based on an assignment of a nonparty’s (F) right to PIP benefits, and remanded. Plaintiff treated F after he was injured in an auto accident. Following his assignment to plaintiff, he sued defendant for PIP benefits. That case was settled and dismissed. While F’s case was pending, plaintiff filed this action. Defendant eventually successfully moved for summary disposition on the basis “plaintiff’s claim was barred by res judicata as a result of its settlement agreement with” F. The main issue on appeal was whether plaintiff and F were in privity when his case was adjudicated. The “Supreme Court recently addressed whether a plaintiff’s claim seeking payment of PIP benefits on behalf of an insured was barred under res judicata as a result of a judgment entered after an assignment in” Mecosta Cnty Med Ctr. It ruled in that case “that ‘a judgment entered after [an] assignment does not bind the assignee because the assignee is not in privity with the assignor with respect to that judgment.’” In this case, F executed his assignment to plaintiff on 3/23/21. It “preceded both the settlement between [F] and defendant on [11/10/21], and” the dismissal of that case on 11/24/21. Thus, “plaintiff was not in privity with [F] for purposes of the settlement agreement and cannot be bound by it.” As a result, res judicata did not bar its claim. The court declined to address defendant’s unpreserved issue as to MCL 500.3112 “because the facts necessary to resolve it have not been presented, and we do not believe that consideration of the issue is necessary for a proper determination of the case.”
Action seeking forfeiture of a land contract & to quiet title; The six-year limitations period for breach of contract; MCL 600.5807(9); The 15-year limitations period for claims of superior title; MCL 600.5801(4); Accrual; MCL 600.5827; Land contract forfeiture; MCL 600.5726; Graves v American Acceptance Mtg Corp; Zurcher v Herveat; Conveyance of legal title; MCL 565.361(1); Quiet title; Equitable title; MCL 600.2932; Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Pers Residence Trust v Emmet Cnty Rd Comm’n; Laches; Admission of evidence; Authentication; MRE 902(1) & (11); Expert testimony; MRE 702 & 703; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); Records of regularly conducted business activity; MRE 803(6); Sufficiency of the evidence; Superior title; Recording; Richards v Tibaldi; Sanction for filing a motion for relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); MCR 1.109(E)(6); Downtown Development Authority (DDA)
The court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s forfeiture and abandonment claims, by granting defendant-DDA summary disposition of its counterclaim to quiet title of the property at issue, or by failing to apply the doctrine of laches. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence or by sanctioning plaintiff for filing a motion for relief from judgment, and that its decision to quiet title to the property in defendant’s favor was supported by the evidence. Plaintiff filed this action for forfeiture of the land contract and to quiet title to a parking lot defendant had purchased on a land contract years earlier. Defendant filed counterclaims to quiet title and for slander of title. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the six-year limitations period applicable to claims for recovery of money damages for breach of contract, noting plaintiff “was not suing for enforcement of the land contract or to recover money damages resulting from a breach of the land contract.” However, it found the claim was barred by the 15-year limitations period for claims of superior title. Plaintiff’s “abandonment and forfeiture claims were untimely filed because those claims accrued in 2001, when the land contract came to maturity, and [it] did not file this action until 2019[.]” The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim it was entitled to summary disposition of defendant’s counterclaim to quiet title because defendant, as a land contract purchaser, only acquired equitable title, noting that “an action to quiet title may be based upon equitable title[.]” It next rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s delay in requesting the deed and bringing its claim was unreasonable because “faded memories and loss of documents” put it at a disadvantage, finding the evidence did not support a laches defense. It further rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing defendant to introduce various financial statements, business records, and minutes from its prior board meetings to document payment of the land contract debt, finding the documents were authenticated and were admissible as records of regularly conducted business. Finally, the trial court’s decision to quiet title was supported by the evidence, and it did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning defendant for filing a frivolous motion for relief from judgment. Affirmed.
Defamation; Bedford v Witte; Ghanam v Does; MCL 600.2911(1), (3), & (7); The “fair & true reporting privilege”; Sarkar v Doe; False-light invasion of privacy; Puetz v Spectrum Health Hosps
Holding that defendant’s statement in his blog post did not constitute defamation per se, and that plaintiff’s false-light invasion of privacy claim also failed, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. Plaintiff asserted “defendant committed defamation per se by imputing to her the commission of a criminal offense in his blog post.” The trial court determined that he “merely expressed a nondefamatory opinion that he based on the” accident incident report, which he confirmed with an officer (J). On appeal, the court compared the relevant portions of the incident report and the blog post. The last sentence of the post expressed his “conclusion that an ‘irregularity’ in the investigation existed. The first sentence in the paragraph indicates that in his opinion no irregularity existed respecting law enforcement’s conduct. Defendant then stated that the ‘only irregularity seems to be’ that plaintiff withheld evidence. The words ‘seems to be’ are not a declaration that something is. Use of the words ‘seems to be’ is indicative that an author has the opinion that facts suggest a state of being, but the author does not, cannot, or will not definitively declare such as a matter of actual provable fact. The trial court considered defendant’s use of the words ‘seems to be’ as dispositive that defendant merely stated an opinion that could never be actionable as defamation per se. [It] did not err in this regard because the sentence simply cannot be understood as a declaration of actual provable fact that plaintiff withheld evidence. The sentence merely expressed an opinion.” As to the false-light invasion of privacy claim, it failed “for two reasons. First, plaintiff failed and could not establish that defendant broadcasted false information” about her conduct. Rather, he “stated opinions based on his interpretation of the information available to him at the time from the police incident report.” Second, plaintiff was unable to prove he “knew of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter.” Before publishing his post, he “obtained the incident report and at least confirmed its contents with [J]. The facts he posted were not provably false, and he expressed his opinion based on those facts. The trial court determined that defendant had not acted negligently under the circumstances.” As a result, she also could not prove he “knowingly or recklessly publicized information that cast [her] in a false light.”
Whether termination was in a child’s best interests; Effect of relative placement; In re Olive/Metts Minors; MCL 712A.19a(6)(a); Placement with the other biological parent; In re Schadler; MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)
Noting that the trial court addressed the child’s (CH) placement with his mother, although it was not required to do so at the time, the court held that it did not clearly err in finding that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in CH’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. On appeal, respondent only challenged the determination as to CH’s best interests. He asserted the trial court clearly erred in its finding “because CH was placed with a relative—his mother.” The court disagreed. When the DHHS filed the petition here, “and when the trial court entered the order terminating respondent’s parental rights, the definition of ‘relative’ did not include” the biological mother. The court held in Schadler that a biological mother was “not included in the definition of relative in MCL 712A.13a(1)(j) then in effect under 2015 PA 228.” The court noted that 2022 PA 200 amended in part “the definition of ‘relative’ to include an individual at least 18 years of age and related to the child within the fifth degree by blood, marriage, or adoption.” However, the trial court in this case did not have to address CH’s placement with his mother because a biological mother was “not a relative as defined by the version of MCL 712A.13a(1)(j) in effect at the” relevant time. Nonetheless, the trial court did so, acknowledging “CH’s placement with his mother at the best-interest hearing and in its order terminating respondent’s parental rights.” Yet it still determined that termination was in CH’s best interests in light of the circumstances surrounding the death of an eight-month-old child (AA) that had been in respondent’s care. Addressing CH’s best interests, the trial court “found there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent was responsible for AA’s injuries and death. It also noted that respondent failed to provide an adequate explanation for AA’s injuries.” It only terminated respondent’s rights after making these findings, and the court held that a preponderance of the evidence supported those findings.