The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions solicits comment on the following proposal by August 1, 2025. Comments may be sent in writing to Christopher M. Smith, Reporter, Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Michigan Hall of Justice, P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909-7604, or electronically to MCrimJI@courts.mi.gov.
PROPOSED
The Committee proposes amending M Crim JI 15.14 (Reckless Driving), M Crim JI 15.14a (Reckless Driving Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function), and M Crim JI 15.15 (Moving Violation Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function) for improved readability and greater consistency with the statutes defining these offenses. The proposed changes were inspired by Footnote 7 in People v Fredell, ___ Mich ___ (December 26, 2024) (Docket No. 164098). Deletions are in strikethrough, and new language is underlined.
[AMENDED] M Crim JI 15.14
Reckless Driving
(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime of / You may also consider the lesser charge of]1 reckless driving. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(2) First, that the defendant drove a motor vehicle2 on a highway [or a frozen public lake, stream, or pond] or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles [including but not limited to any designated parking area].3
(3) Second, that the defendant drove the motor vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Willful or wanton disregard means more than simple carelessness but does not require proof of an intent to cause harm. It means knowingly disregarding the possible risks to the safety of people or property.
Use Notes
(1) Use when instructing on this crime as a lesser included offense.
(2) The term motor vehicle is defined in MCL 257.33.
(3) A highway is the entire area between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained roadway, any part of which is open for automobile travel. People v Bartel, 213 Mich App 726, 728- 729; 540 NW2d 491 (1995). A private driveway is “generally accessible to motor vehicles.” People v Rea, 500 Mich 422; 902 NW2d 362 (2017). The phrase “open to the general public” is discussed in People v Nickerson, 227 Mich App 434; 575 NW2d 804 (1998), and People v Hawkins, 181 Mich App 393; 448 NW2d 858 (1989).
[AMENDED] M Crim JI 15.14a
Reckless Driving Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function
(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime of / You may also consider the lesser charge of]1 reckless driving causing [death / serious impairment of body function to another person]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(2) First, that the defendant drove a motor vehicle2 on a highway [or a frozen public lake, stream, or pond] or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles [including but not limited to any designated parking area].3
(3) Second, that the defendant drove the motor vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Willful or wanton disregard means more than simple carelessness but does not require proof of an intent to cause harm. It means knowingly disregarding the possible risks to the safety of people or property.
(4) Third, that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused [the death of / a serious impairment of a body function4 to] [identify decedent or injured person]. To [cause the death / such injury], the defendant’s operation of the vehicle must have been a factual cause of the [death / injury], that is, but for the defendant’s operation of the vehicle the [death / injury] would not have occurred. In addition, [death or serious injury / the injury] must have been a direct and natural result of operating the vehicle.5
(4) Third, that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused [the death of (name deceased) / (name injured person) to suffer a serious impairment of a body function4]. To cause the [death / injury], the defendant’s operation of the vehicle must have been a factual cause of the [death / injury], that is, but for the defendant’s operation of the vehicle, the [death / injury] would not have occurred. In addition, the [death / injury] must have been a direct and natural result of operating the vehicle.5
Use Notes
(1) Use when instructing on this crime as a lesser included offense.
(2) The term motor vehicle is defined in MCL 257.33.
(3) A highway is the entire area between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained roadway, any part of which is open for automobile travel. People v Bartel, 213 Mich App 726, 728- 729; 540 NW2d 491 (1995). A private driveway is “generally accessible to motor vehicles.” People v Rea, 500 Mich 422; 902 NW2d 362 (2017). The phrase “open to the general public” is discussed in People v Nickerson, 227 Mich App 434; 575 NW2d 804 (1998), and People v Hawkins, 181 Mich App 393; 448 NW2d 858 (1989).
(4) The statute, MCL 257.58c, provides that serious impairment of a body function includes but is not limited to one or more of the following:
(a) Loss of a limb or loss of use of a limb.
(b) Loss of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb or loss of use of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb.
(c) Loss of an eye or ear or loss of use of an eye or ear.
(d) Loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function.
(e) Serious visible disfigurement.
(f) A comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days.
(g) Measurable brain or mental impairment.
(h) A skull fracture or other serious bone fracture.
(i) Subdural hemorrhage or subdural hematoma.
(j) Loss of an organ.
(5) If it is claimed that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle was not a proximate cause of serious impairment of a body function because of an intervening, superseding cause, the court may wish to review People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 438-439; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (a “causes death” case under MCL 257.625(4)). Schaefer was modified in part on other grounds by People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006), which was overruled in part on other grounds by People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010).
[AMENDED] M Crim JI 15.15
Moving Violation Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function
(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime / You may consider the lesser charge]1 of committing a moving traffic violation that caused [death / serious impairment of a body function]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(2) First, that the defendant operated a motor vehicle.2 To operate means to drive or have actual physical control of the vehicle.
(3) Second, that the defendant operated the vehicle on a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles [including but not limited to any designated parking area].3
(4) Third, that, while operating the motor vehicle, the defendant committed a moving violation by [describe the moving violation].
(5) Fourth, that by committing the moving violation, the defendant caused [the death of (name deceased) / (name injured person) to suffer a serious impairment of a body function].4 To cause the [the death of (name deceased) / such injury to (name injured person)], the defendant’s moving violation must have been a factual cause of the [death / injury], that is, but for committing the moving violation, the [death / injury] would not have occurred. In addition, the [death / injury] must have been a direct and natural result of committing the moving violation.5
Use Notes
(1) Use when instructing on this crime as a lesser offense.
(2) The term motor vehicle is defined in MCL 257.33.
(3) A highway is the entire area between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained roadway, any part of which is open for automobile travel. People v Bartel, 213 Mich App 726, 728-729; 540 NW2d 491 (1995). A private driveway is “generally accessible to motor vehicles.” People v Rea, 500 Mich 422; 902 NW2d 362 (2017). The phrase “open to the general public” is discussed in People v Nickerson, 227 Mich App 434; 575 NW2d 804 (1998), and People v Hawkins, 181 Mich App 393; 448 NW2d 858 (1989).
(4) MCL 257.58c provides that serious impairment of a body function includes but is not limited to one or more of the following:
(a) Loss of a limb or loss of use of a limb.
(b) Loss of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb or loss of use of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb.
(c) Loss of an eye or ear or loss of use of an eye or ear.
(d) Loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function.
(e) Serious visible disfigurement.
(f) A comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days.
(g) Measurable brain or mental impairment.
(h) A skull fracture or other serious bone fracture.
(i) Subdural hemorrhage or subdural hematoma.
(j) Loss of an organ.
(5) If it is claimed that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle was not a proximate cause of serious impairment of a body function because of an intervening, superseding cause, the court may wish to review People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 438-439; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (a “causes death” case under MCL 257.625(4)). Schaefer was modified in part on other grounds by People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006), which was overruled in part on other grounds by People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010).
The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions solicits comment on the following proposal by August 1, 2025. Comments may be sent in writing to Christopher M. Smith, Reporter, Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Michigan Hall of Justice, P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909-7604, or electronically to MCrimJI@courts.mi.gov.
PROPOSED
The Committee proposes amending M Crim JI 20.24 (Definition of Sufficient Force) in response to People v Levran, ___ Mich App ___ (December 3, 2024) (Docket No. 370931). The Court of Appeals held in Levran that the fifth paragraph of the current instruction did not accurately reflect how MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) defines “force or coercion” for purposes of criminal sexual conduct committed during a medical exam or treatment. The proposed amendment would remedy this defect. Deletions are in strikethrough, and new language is underlined.
[AMENDED] M Crim JI 20.24
Definition of Sufficient Force
[Choose any of the following that are applicable:]
(1) It is enough force if the defendant overcame [name complainant] by physical force.
(2) It is enough force if the defendant threatened to use physical force on [name complainant], and [name complainant] believed that the defendant had the ability to carry out those threats.
(3) It is enough force if the defendant threatened to get even with [name complainant] in the future, and [name complainant] believed that the defendant had the ability to carry out those threats.
(4) It is enough force if the defendant threatened to kidnap [name complainant], threatened to force [name complainant] to do something against [his / her] will, or threatened to physically punish someone, and [name complainant] believed that the defendant had the ability to carry out those threats.
(5) It is enough force if the defendant was giving [name complainant] a medical exam or treatment and did so in a way or for a reason that is not recognized as medically acceptable. A medical exam or treatment physical exam by a doctor that includes inserting fingers into the vagina or rectum is not in itself criminal sexual conduct. You must decide whether the defendant did the exam or treatment in a manner or for purposes that are as an excuse for sexual purposes and in a way that is not recognized as medically ethical or acceptable.1
(6) It is enough force if the defendant, through concealment or by the element of surprise, [was able to overcome / achieve sexual contact with]*2 [name complainant].
(7) It is enough force if the defendant used force to induce the victim to submit to the sexual act or to seize control of the victim in a manner facilitating commission of the sexual act without regard to the victim’s wishes.
Use Notes
(1) See People v Levran, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (December 3, 2024) (Docket No. 370931).
*(2)Use the bracketed expression “achieve sexual contact” when criminal sexual contact in the fourth degree is charged. See MCL 750.520e(1)(b)(v).
The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions solicits comment on the following proposal by August 1, 2025. Comments may be sent in writing to Christopher M. Smith, Reporter, Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Michigan Hall of Justice, P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909-7604, or electronically to MCrimJI@courts.mi.gov.
PROPOSED
The Committee proposes amending M Crim JI 37.11 (Removing, Destroying or Tampering with Evidence) to add a missing mens rea element. MCL 750.483a(5)(a) makes it a crime to “[k]nowingly and intentionally remove, alter, conceal, destroy, or otherwise tamper with evidence to be offered in a present or future official proceeding.” While the current instruction addresses the requirement that the defendant act “intentionally,” it does not address the requirement that the defendant act “knowingly.” The Court of Appeals has indicated that “the word ‘knowingly’ in the statute likely includes knowledge of an official proceeding.” People v Walker, 330 Mich App 378, 388 (2019). The proposed amendment would add that element and make other stylistic changes. Deletions are in strikethrough, and new language is underlined.
[AMENDED] M Crim JI 37.11
Removing, Destroying, or Tampering with Evidence
(1) [The defendant is charged with / You may also consider the less serious offense of1] intentionally removing, altering, concealing, destroying, or tampering with evidence to be offered at an official proceeding [not involving a criminal case where (identify crime where the punishment was more than 10 years) was charged1]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(2) First, that there was some evidence to be offered in a present or future official proceeding.
An official proceeding is a hearing held before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency or a hearing before an official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including a referee, a prosecuting attorney, a hearing examiner, a commissioner, a notary, or another person taking testimony in a proceeding.
(3) Second, that the defendant removed, altered, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise tampered with that evidence.
(4) Third, that when the defendant removed, altered, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise tampered with that evidence, [he / she] did so on purpose and not by accident.
(5) Fourth, that the defendant knew that the evidence would be offered in a present or future official proceeding at the time [he / she] removed, altered, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise tampered with it.2
[(56) Fourth Fifth, that the evidence that the defendant removed, altered, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise tampered with would be offered was used or intended to be used in a criminal case where (identify crime where the punishment was more than 10 years) was charged.]23
Use Notes
(1) Use this language when there is a dispute whether the charge involved the aggravating factor found in MCL 750.483a(6)(b) and the court is instructing the jury on the necessarily lesser included offense that does not require proof of the aggravating factor.
(2) The Michigan Court of Appeals has assumed without deciding “that the word ‘knowingly’ in the statute likely includes knowledge of an official proceeding.” People v Walker, 330 Mich App 378, 388; 948 NW2d 122 (2019). The Michigan Court of Appeals has also indicated that this element “may be proved with ‘[m]inimal circumstantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 301; 642 NW2d 417 (2001)).
(23)Use this paragraph where the aggravating element has been charged.