Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging a Fourth Amendment violation; Whether the defendant-police officer’s actions resulting in the plaintiff’s decedent’s death were reasonable; Qualified immunity; Saucier v. Katz, Pearson v. Callahan; Excessive force claim; Graham v. Connor; Mullins v. Cyranek; Use of deadly force to prevent a fleeing suspect’s escape; Tennessee v. Garner; Untalan v. City of Lorain; Deadly force claims involving vehicular flight; Cass v. City of Dayton; Smith v. Cupp; Scott v. Clay Cnty.; Smith v. Freland; Hermiz v. City of Southfield (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Godawa v. Byrd; Sigley v. City of Parma Heights; Whether the right to be free from deadly force under the circumstances was “clearly established” at the time of the violation; Mullenix v. Luna; Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Office; White v. Pauly; Violation of police department policies; Bell v. City of E. Cleveland

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the defendant-former police officer (Phillips) was entitled to qualified immunity in the shooting death of plaintiff’s decedent (Latits) because even though Phillips’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable, violating the Fourth Amendment, the right to be free from deadly force under the circumstances was not clearly established at the time of the violation. After a car chase, Phillips rammed Latits’s car and then shot him when he tried to flee. The police department fired him for violating police policy by “engag[ing] in vehicular pursuit as the third police car without permission, pass[ing] the secondary and primary vehicles in the pursuit, us[ing] a PIT [Pursuit Intervention Technique] maneuver in violation of a direct order, and [running] up to Latits’s car instead of taking a tactical position using his vehicle as cover.” Latits’s estate sued under § 1983. The district court granted Phillips summary judgment, ruling that the shooting was reasonable. The court disagreed, concluding that the shooting was unreasonable. However, it held that Phillips was still entitled to qualified immunity. It considered whether “Latits presented an imminent danger to officers or the public at the time” Phillips shot him. After reviewing dashboard camera video, the court concluded that “because Officer Phillips fired after Latits’s car had passed the point where it could harm him, Phillips had time to realize he was no longer in immediate danger[,]” and that he “could see that no other officers or other persons were in Latits’s path” when he fired. It also considered “the prior interactions between Latits and Phillips.” It noted the non-violent nature of Latits’s suspected wrongdoing (drug possession). Further, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Latits’s conduct before being shot “showed a persistent intent to flee but not an intent to injure, and never placed the public or the officers at imminent risk.” However, although the court concluded that the use of deadly force here was unreasonable, it found that Phillips was entitled to qualified immunity because the right to be free from deadly force under the circumstances was not clearly established at the time of the violation. It considered whether “the ‘particular conduct’ [was] violative ‘in light of the specific context of the case[,]’” and determined that “controlling authority at the time of the events had not clearly established the rights” it identified here. It found that Sigley and Cupp were distinguishable. Affirmed.