Attorney fees for postconviction work; MCR 6.425(G)(2); Compensation related to postconviction motions; MCR 6.425(G)(2)(a) & (b); Principle that a party claiming an appeal of right from a final order is free to raise issues on appeal related to prior orders; Green v. Ziegelman; MCR 7.202(6)(b); Compensation related to review of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) materials; MCL 15.240(1)(b); Burden of proving the reasonableness of requested fees; Adair v. Michigan (On Fourth Remand); Petterman v. Haverhill Farms, Inc.; In re Ujlaky; Excessiveness of claimed time related to preparing the appellate brief; The abuse of discretion standard; National Waterworks, Inc. v. International Fid. & Sur., Ltd.

The court concluded that the trial court erroneously held that appellant-Foster could not recover attorney fees for his work related to defendant-Rieman’s two postconviction motions. But it did not abuse its discretion by precluding compensation for his work related to FOIA requests or by setting the number of compensable hours for the time spent writing Rieman’s appellate brief at 21.5 hours. It precluded Foster from receiving compensation for some services he performed because it determined they were “not necessary” to his representation of Rieman in relation to his appeal. As to his “work pertaining to the postconviction motion to show cause and the postconviction motion to allow defendant to travel out of state and for removal of an alcohol tether, both of these motions involved matters related to the criminal case for which Foster was appointed to provide representation.” His endeavors clearly constituted work on “postconviction proceedings in the trial court the lawyer deem[ed] appropriate.” Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that they were beyond the scope of his responsibilities as appointed counsel. His “work in pursuit of the appeal of the trial court’s denial of the motion to show cause” was also compensable. Foster, acting on Rieman’s behalf, “would have to seek leave to appeal the trial court’s decision regarding the postjudgment motion to show cause, and this is precisely what he did.” Thus, under MCR 6.425(G)(2)(b), his “responsibilities included pursuing leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of the show-cause motion.” However, the court found no abuse of discretion with how the trial court handled his “work related to reviewing seven FOIA request letters issued by Rieman and the responses Rieman received because this work was not in the context of any postconviction proceeding. Any appeals from those FOIA rejections would have resulted in separate, original civil matters.” Further, Foster never mentioned the FOIA requests in his petition for attorney fees. The only reference to them was “in the spreadsheets he attached to his petition, which detailed how he spent his time.” The court noted that while “such billing records may substantiate how an attorney spent his time and which services he performed, they cannot demonstrate why said time and services were needed or reasonable.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.