Habeas corpus; 28 USC § 2254(d); Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ (MCOA) decision was entitled to deference under the Anti-Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; Ramos v. Louisiana; Principle that the state courts are not bound by the federal appellate courts’ decisions on constitutional questions; Johnson v. Williams; Michigan law on juror removal; People v. Tate; People v. Dry Land Marina, Inc.; Federal law on juror removal; United States v. Symington (9th Cir.); United States v. Brown (DC Cir.); United States v. Thomas (2d Cir.); Prophylactic rule requiring retrial whenever an alternate was seated once deliberation had begun; United States v. Lamb (9th Cir.); Cases adopting a rule requiring a showing of actual prejudice; United States v. Phillips (5th Cir.); United States v. Kopituk (11th Cir.); United States v. Hillard (2d Cir.); Case law showing the Michigan courts are aware of Sixth Amendment concerns & know how to address them; People v. Cooks (MI); People v. van Camp (MI)

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court held that the MCOA was free to require that petitioner-Wofford show an actual violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, and that it implicitly but clearly did so. The court concluded that the district court should have afforded AEDPA deference to the MCOA’s ruling, and that there was no actual constitutional violation in this case. Thus, while it upheld the district court’s factual findings, the court reversed its legal conclusion granting a writ of habeas corpus, and remanded. Wofford was found guilty of murder after a juror (M) was removed and replaced. While M “was holding out against conviction at the time, the judge removed her because of her misconduct: she had violated his instructions not to discuss the case with anyone other than her fellow jurors by hiring a lawyer to address the court about the tensions in the jury room.” The MCOA affirmed his conviction under “state precedent on juror removal.” The district court ruled that the MCOA’s decision was not entitled to AEDPA deference because the MCOA “overlooked Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims.” It also ruled that M’s removal “violated Wofford’s Sixth Amendment rights.” The court agreed with the factual determinations that M was removed for cause and “not because of her opinion on the case.” However, it disagreed with the district court’s legal conclusion that Wofford was entitled to habeas relief. To accept his theory for why AEDPA should not apply, the court “would have to hold that the MCOA ignored and sub silentio contravened” a great deal of precedent in deciding this case. “The better reading is that it considered the problem and saw no constitutional violation.” AEDPA applied. Wofford needed a prophylactic rule, adopted by other circuits and some states, “holding that where there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the removal decision stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case, such removal is impermissible and is grounds for reversal of a conviction and a new trial.” However, “Michigan chose not to go in that direction.” Since AEDPA applied, the court could not “use Brown-Thomas-Symington as the benchmark to evaluate” the Michigan courts’ decisions. Wofford did not cite a Supreme Court case “that would support the application of the Brown-Thomas-Symington rule or of any other analogous rule.”