Foreclosure redemption action; MCL 600.3240; Redemption period; MCL 600.3240(11) & (12); Extension of the redemption period; MCL 600.3232; Effect of foreclosure by advertisement; Trademark Props of MI, LLC v Fannie Mae; Failure to redeem; Bryan v JPMorgan Chase Bank; Distinguishing Lilly v Gibbs & Mills v Jirasek; Register of Deeds (ROD)

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff summary disposition and granting partial summary disposition for defendant in this foreclosure redemption action. The original plaintiffs, the Kesslers, sued claiming they had until at least 9/14/21 to redeem their farm after foreclosure. Defendant claimed their redemption rights expired on 8/21/21. The Kesslers claimed they deposited $907,000 into escrow on 9/14/21, and thus, redeemed the farm by paying an amount greater than the redemption into escrow and were the farm owners. They sought a declaration as to title to the property, as well as an accounting, and an order quieting title in their name and extinguishing any interest of defendant as well as a calculation of the true and accurate redemption amount. Shortly after the complaint was filed, plaintiff alleged it acquired an ownership interest in the farm from the Kesslers on 9/14/21. It was granted the right to substitute as a plaintiff, also seeking declaratory relief as to title to the property and an accounting. The trial court found that “MCL 600.3240(12) expressly provided that the redemption period was one-year from the date of the sale.” It rejected plaintiff’s position that MCL 600.3232 extended the redemption period, noting the statute “merely required the deposit of the sheriff’s deed within 20 days of the sale.” On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the failure to timely record the deed from the sheriff’s sale extended the date to redeem. “[T]he plain language of MCL 600.3232 does not support plaintiff’s position that the submission of the deed and its recording by the ROD is the dispositive date for determining the commencement of the redemption period.” Further, the plain language of MCL 600.3240, which governs redemption periods, “does not provide it runs from the date of recording at the ROD.” The court distinguished Lilly and Mills. It then concluded that “MCL 600.3232 delineates the procedural obligations on the sheriff and the clerk at the ROD. There are no penalties for noncompliance contained within the statute.” Moreover, although “the sheriff is to write the date for redemption on the deed, there is no indication that it is binding. The statute does not hold that the recording date by the ROD commences the period. Rather, only MCL 600.3240 delineates the commencement for the period and states that it runs from ‘the date of the sale.’” MCL 600.3240 is the “specific statute and controls over the general procedure delineated in MCL 600.3232. The caselaw cited by plaintiff does not warrant a disposition contrary to the plain language of the statutes.” Affirmed.