Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for failing to protect an inmate from overdosing; The “objective component” of a failure-to-protect claim; Zakora v Chrisman; The “subjective component” of a failure-to-protect claim; Claims under Monell v. Department of Soc Servs; Whether the district court violated FedRCivP 12(d)
The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff-estate’s Eighth Amendment “failure-to-protect” claim arising from the decedent’s (Caraway) overdose while incarcerated in the correctional facility (Whiteville) operated by defendant-CoreCivic. The court held that the estate’s complaint failed to allege that Caraway faced an objectively excessive risk of harm from unfettered access to drugs because CoreCivic’s understaffing caused drugs to proliferate at its facility. Caraway died from a fentanyl overdose. The estate’s theory was that to save money, CoreCivic deliberately understaffed the facility, and improperly screened new hires who smuggled in drugs. It asserted “the individual defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on Caraway by understaffing Whiteville” and the corporate defendants were “liable because understaffing was a matter of company policy.” The court first held that the estate failed to meet the “objective component” of a failure-to-protect claim. It dealt with a similar claim in Zakora, where it found this component was met because “factual allegations permitted the reasonable inference that Zakora had ‘unfettered access to deadly drugs’ in prison, creating an objectively excessive risk of overdose.” But the court noted the circumstances in Zakora were egregious, and it found that only “one of the three key facts which made that case extraordinary is even arguably present here.” It did not have to decide whether the estate’s allegation that “the prison was ‘plagued by rampant drugs’ entering the facility” was sufficient to plausibly allege the widespread presence of drugs in Whiteville because the estate “failed to allege Zakora’s two other key facts” (immediately prior overdoses and prison officials’ failure to investigate). In a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim, “the plaintiff must show that the defendants’ unconstitutional act or omission failed to alleviate the excessive risk he faced.” The estate failed to do so. The complaint only made “generalized allegations that Whiteville’s understaffing ‘led to’ rampant drug use, apparently in part because officials couldn’t perform adequate head counts and inspections. That kind of conclusory statement,” without factual support, did not receive any presumption of truth. While the failure as to the objective component was by itself fatal to the Eighth Amendment claim, the court also held that the estate failed to establish the subjective component. It did not “sufficiently allege that the defendants knew of a drug problem at Whiteville” and failed to reasonably respond. Further, because the complaint did not allege a constitutional violation, the Monell claims against the corporate defendants likewise failed. Finally, the court rejected the estate’s assertion that the district court violated Rule 12(d).
Excessive force & failure to intervene claims under 42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; Jurisdiction over a defendant’s claim under Heck v Humphrey; Judicial estoppel; Whether the Fourth Amendment exempts the use of “de minimis” force
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court held that it lacked pendent appellate jurisdiction over Heck claims in qualified-immunity appeals. It also held that the Fourth Amendment does not exempt “de minimis” violence after an arrest. Defendants-Young and Teichow arrested plaintiff while searching his girlfriend’s house. He pled guilty to resisting arrest, but later claimed that after he peacefully surrendered, the officers kneed him, kicked him and dragged him across the floor. He sued under § 1983, alleging claims for excessive-force and failure-to-intervene. The district court denied defendants qualified immunity. On appeal, Young first argued that plaintiff’s claim regarding the alleged gratuitous violence conflicted with his guilty plea for resisting arrest under Heck. In the alternative, he asserted judicial estoppel should apply. But the court disagreed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over Young’s Heck claim where it did not satisfy the collateral-order test and the claim was still reviewable after the final judgment. Young agreed that the claim, by itself, was not reviewable, but contended the court could review it under pendent appellate jurisdiction. The court rejected this. holding for the first time that it “lack[ed] pendent appellate jurisdiction over Heck claims in qualified-immunity appeals.” The issues are not “inextricably intertwined,” and the court can fully address the issue of qualified immunity without considering the district court’s rejection of the Heck claim. Further, the Heck issue could be considered after a final judgment. Young’s judicial-estoppel claim failed where there was no “‘clearly inconsistent’ position.” The court then reviewed the excessive-force issue. To avoid the ban on“‘gratuitous’ force” against an arrestee that has surrendered, defendants argued that the Fourth Amendment did not concern itself with the de minimis level of force they allegedly used on plaintiff. Applying a “balancing approach,” the court found that defendants “have not identified any ‘legitimate government interest’” for the additional force alleged by plaintiff. Lastly, the court held that they were entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s duty to intervene claims “because a reasonable officer could believe that each” of the three incidents plaintiff alleged “ended too quickly to trigger ‘a duty to intercede.’” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction.
Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging fabrication of evidence; Mills v Barnard; Malicious prosecution; “Probable cause”; Qualified immunity; Collateral estoppel under Michigan law; Peterson v Heymes
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that defendant-Walters was not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff-Tanner’s fabrication-of-evidence claim. It found that a reasonable jury, crediting “Tanner’s account that she never made any of the statements at issue,” and considering the interview transcript, could conclude “Walters’s testimony and notes about his interview stating otherwise strongly suggested that he fabricated the statements.” Tanner served 17 years in prison before being released on a writ of habeas corpus based on insufficient evidence. She then sued Walters, the now-retired detective on her case, alleging violations of her constitutional rights based on his fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution, among other claims. Walters moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court ruled that Tanner’s fabrication and malicious prosecution claims could proceed to trial. The court first reviewed the transcript of Walters’s May 24 interview of Tanner and noted it “differed in important ways” from Walters’s testimony at the preliminary exam. It rejected Walters’s argument that Tanner was required to show “purposefulness” to support a standalone falsification of evidence claim. “Rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘knowingly fabricated evidence against [a plaintiff], and [that] there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury.’” The court found that the May 24 transcript supported Tanner’s “claim of falsity as none of the challenged statements appear in the transcript.” As to the malicious prosecution claim, case law provides that liability can extend to an officer who includes falsehoods in investigatory materials, knowing that a prosecutor is likely to rely on them and where the false material “‘actually influenced the prosecutor’s ultimate decision to bring charges.’” The court held that “a jury reasonably could conclude that Walters’s false statements ‘were material’” and further that “the state court relied on Walters’s false statements for its probable cause determination.” The court rejected his theory that the state court’s finding of probable cause collaterally stopped the district court from ruling otherwise, determining his argument did “not align with Michigan law.” The court held that a reasonable jury could find that without Walters’s statements, there would have been no finding of probable cause to prosecute Tanner. Affirmed.
Divorce; Criminal contempt; Restitution; MCL 600.1721; MCL 771.3(1)(e); Taylor v Currie; Actual injury; Conversion; Foremost Ins Co v Allstate Ins Co; Chose in action; City of Holland v Fillmore Twp
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded plaintiff-ex-wife (Lynn) $0 in restitution. In contemplation of the parties’ divorce, defendant-ex-husband (David) transferred martial funds to his brother, defendant-Howard. Lynn filed a fraudulent-transfer claim, and a jury found David fraudulently transferred the funds. She later moved to require Howard and his company, defendant-Alliance, to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating the trial court’s order. The trial court ultimately found Howard and Alliance in criminal contempt and ordered restitution in the amount of $370,000. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed. However, the trial court later denied Lynn’s request for restitution in the amount of $1.5 million. In the present appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred when it awarded her $0 in restitution, noting it did not err by finding she “did not suffer ‘an actual loss or injury.” Because she “did not have a property right in the $370,000 funds, the withdrawal of those funds from Alliance’s account cannot be deemed a wrongful exertion ‘over [Lynn’s] personal property,’ meaning that her claim of conversion is without merit.” In addition, her “reliance on the order authorizing proceedings supplementary to judgment also is not persuasive. Nowhere in that order did it decree that Lynn had a property interest in any property held by Alliance or that she had a right to the property. Although the order enjoined Alliance and Howard from transferring or otherwise interfering with” any property belonging to the judgment debtors, or to which they may be entitled or which may thereafter be acquired by or become due to said debtors, including the proceeds from the sale of real estate, “the order never established that any property held by Alliance was Lynn’s or owed to her. The order reinforces this because it further authorized Lynn ‘to file a complaint for proceedings supplementary to judgment,’ where such a decree could happen.” Affirmed.
Guilty pleas; Procedurally defaulted postconviction challenges; “Actual innocence”; United States v Bousley; Lewis v Peterson (7th Cir); Motion under 28 USC § 2255 to vacate a firearm conviction under 18 USC § 924(c); United States v Davis; Whether 18 USC § 3296 overruled Bousley
In these consolidated cases, the court held for the first time that it would not excuse plea bargainers’ procedurally defaulted postconviction challenges to their offenses of conviction unless, under Bousley, they can show their actual innocence of “equally serious” dismissed counts. Petitioner-Witham was charged with crimes related to bank robbery, including felony-firearm and six counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence under § 924(c). The government dismissed the felony-firearm charges and five of the § 924(c) charges, and he pled guilty to the remaining charges, including one § 924(c) charge. Witham later moved to vacate the § 924(c) conviction under § 2255, citing Davis. The district court denied his motion, ruling that his failure to raise the claim on direct appeal resulted in a default, and that his “actual innocence of the attempted bank extortion/firearm charge did not make a difference when it comes to excusing the default because he could not show his innocence with respect to the other dismissed firearms charges.” Petitioner-Savage was also charged with several crimes, including two § 924(c) counts. He pled guilty to “a § 924(c) count of using a firearm during the attempted robbery of federal property.” The other § 924(c) charge was dismissed. He did not appeal. After Davis, he filed a postconviction challenge to his § 924(c) conviction. His petition was also denied. The issue before the court was “whether Bousley requires plea bargainers to show actual innocence of dismissed counts of ‘equal seriousness with the count of conviction.’” Pursuant to Bousley, “when the Government gives up ‘more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also extend to those charges.’” The scenario presented here concerned “dismissed charges that are equally serious to the offense of conviction.” Joining the Seventh Circuit, the court held that “the Bousley rule ‘does not require that the charge that was dropped or forgone in the plea negotiations be more serious than the charge to which the petitioner pleaded guilty. It is enough that it is as serious.’” The court also rejected petitioners’ arguments that § 3296 overruled Bousley. Affirmed.
Request for a writ of superintending control; Mootness; Exception to the mootness doctrine for issues likely to recur but evade judicial review
The court held that the circuit court did not err in determining that plaintiff’s request for a writ of superintending control over defendant-district court was moot. And the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues likely to recur yet evade judicial review was not applicable given that the issue here became moot because he agreed to an order resolving the dispute. The case arose from plaintiff’s efforts to remove a tenant from a rental property he owned. He filed a complaint in the district court for termination of the tenancy. After a hearing and two adjournments in that matter, plaintiff filed this action in the circuit court. Eight days later, at a “hearing on the underlying eviction proceeding, the parties agreed to a stipulated order that the tenant and occupants would vacate the property by” a set date and plaintiff would withdraw the eviction complaint. The circuit court then concluded that “because plaintiff’s case was no longer pending in the district court, there was no case in controversy, and nothing to exercise superintending control over.” On appeal, the court found that “once the stipulated order was entered in the district court in the underlying eviction case, there ceased to be a controversy between plaintiff and the 36th District Court because the circuit court could no longer grant plaintiff any relief.” Further, to the extent he asserted the issue was “not moot because it is likely to recur but also likely to evade judicial review,” the court disagreed, noting the issue became moot due to “a matter entirely within his control” – his agreement to a settlement. The Supreme Court has held that “reviewing courts will not apply the exception to the mootness doctrine ‘when the party seeking review of an issue on appeal has rendered the issue moot by that party’s own volitional conduct . . . .’” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (g); Children’s best interests
Holding that §§ (c)(i) and (g) existed and the trial court did not clearly err by concluding termination was in the children’s (OG-1 and OG-2) best interests, the court affirmed. As to § (c)(i), there was “no dispute that the 182-day statutory period was met for both children. The conditions that led to OG-1’s adjudication were respondent-mother’s substance-abuse problems and OG-1’s health at the time of removal. The conditions that led to OG-2’s adjudication were OG-1’s original removal and the continued substance-abuse problems in the home.” The court held that considering the significant evidence that the mother’s “substance abuse remained an issue that had not been rectified, we are not ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Further, the record supported the trial court’s finding that termination was warranted under § (g). In light of the evidence, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that the mother’s continued struggle with meth, “her inconsistency in complying with services and visitation, her recent [meth] use, and her history of past neglect prevented her from providing proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the ages of the children.”