Jennifer Dukarski Fishman Stewart Matthew W. Frank Cynthia Haffey Michael D. Hanchett Mary Massaron Megan Mitchell Ryan C. Washburn
Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Claim for payment for legal services; Whether a complaint related back to the filing date of a prior complaint; MCR 2.118(A) & (D); Statute of limitations (SOL); Accrual of a breach of contract claim; Whether a personal representative (PR) hired or otherwise authorized plaintiff to perform any work; Stay of discovery; Whether summary disposition was premature; Timeliness of a conversion claim; MCL 600.5805(2)
The court found no merit in plaintiff-law firm’s assertion the complaint in this case related back to the date of a prior complaint. It further held that the trial court did not err in dismissing count I of the complaint (a breach of contract claim) based on the SOL. As to Count II, while the court agreed with plaintiff that it was not barred by the SOL, it concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing it under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there was “no evidence of an agreement or ‘engagement’ between plaintiff” and defendant-estate’s former PR. Further, the lack of discovery was not a bar to summary disposition of that claim. Finally, the court held that plaintiff’s conversion was time-barred. The court referred to the attorney who was the principal owner of the firm and acted on its behalf in the case as plaintiff. Plaintiff asserted he was “owed money for legal services purportedly rendered on behalf of” the late Aretha Franklin. Count I generally related to “$35,000 that plaintiff claimed he was owed for increasing Franklin’s advancement from $150,000 to $500,000” but it additionally “included allegations that a separate $26,690 was owed for other legal services rendered.” The court noted that “accepting plaintiff’s own allegations as true, the $26,690 was due in 2012. Therefore, Franklin was in breach of any repayment obligation for that amount in 2012, which renders the 2020 complaint untimely for this portion of” his claim. As to the $35,000 portion of the claim, had he “attached evidence of unfulfilled invoices sent to Franklin in 2014, or some other evidence suggesting that the breach occurred in 2014, there may have been enough evidence to preclude summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Instead, plaintiff presented a plethora of evidence showing that 2012 was the operative year for the breach-of-contract claim, thus contradicting his claim in the complaint that the breach occurred in 2014. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” the court found that plaintiff offered “no evidence to support the contention that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the date on which the” SOL started to run. As to Count II, the evidence did not show the former PR “authorized or requested” that plaintiff perform any work. There was no genuine issue of fact as to whether “a contractual relationship existed.” Affirmed.
Breach of contract; Statute of frauds (SOF); MCL 440.2201(1); Exception to the statute’s writing requirement (MCL 440.2201(3)(a)); 9 Williston, Contracts (4th ed), § 26:19; Exception for partial performance in MCL 440.2201(3)(c); Unjust enrichment; Conversion
The court concluded the trial court did not err in “ruling that the exemption for specifically manufactured goods in MCL 440.2201(3)(a)” did not apply to the oral agreement at issue. Also, to the extent plaintiff relied “on defendant’s partial performance to avoid application of the” SOF, this reliance was only effective “for defendant’s additional payments for parts delivered from 2015 to 2018.” Further, plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim failed and the trial court did not err by dismissing its conversion claim. Thus, plaintiff failed to show that the trial court erred by granting defendant summary disposition. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred by holding that its claim for breach of the alleged 3/18 oral agreement was barred by the SOF. At issue was whether plaintiff could establish an exception to the statute’s writing requirement. The court agreed “with the trial court that MCL 440.2201(3)(a) is intended to protect a seller who relies on an oral agreement to manufacture goods for a specific buyer from being left with goods that cannot be sold to anyone else. The exception in MCL 440.2201(3)(a) expressly applies to goods that will be ‘specially manufactured for the buyer’ in the future, but the alleged [3/18] oral agreement did not involve such goods. Instead, plaintiff sought to recover alleged underpayments it claimed were owed by defendant for goods purchased from 2009 to 2014. The trial court’s interpretation of MCL 440.2201(3)(a)” was supported by Williston § 26:19. The alleged “oral agreement was not a contract for the sale of specifically manufactured goods, but instead involved an agreement regarding the price to pay for goods previously manufactured and delivered from 2009 to 2014. Plaintiff could not have produced the goods at issue in reliance on the 2018 oral agreement because the goods were manufactured and delivered well before that alleged agreement.” In addition, plaintiff did “not dispute that defendant paid the invoice price for those previously delivered goods.” The case did “not involve a situation where plaintiff may be stuck with specifically manufactured goods that defendant refuses to accept. Unlike a situation where goods are specifically manufactured for a buyer after an alleged oral agreement, which is a reliable indication that a contract was indeed formed, there are no circumstances here that serve as a reliable indicator that the parties formed an agreement in 2018 to pay a specific price for products previously delivered between 2009 and 2014.” Affirmed.
Instructional error; Right to a fair trial, to present a defense, & to a properly instructed jury; Self-defense & defense of others; People v Lefew; The deadly aggressor-withdrawal instruction; Admission of evidence; Relevance; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Vindictive sentencing; Guidelines scoring error; Resentencing
The court held that defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated. However, he was entitled to resentencing because his minimum guidelines range was miscalculated. He was charged in relation to the victim’s shooting death at a party after a fight broke out. The Michigan Supreme Court vacated his convictions from his first trial, finding the trial court erred by admitting rap videos made by defendant and his friends, “which confused the issue before the jury and ‘portrayed [defendant] as a ruthless and menacing threat to the community who would shoot upon the least provocation.’” It remanded for a new trial. On remand, he was convicted of second-degree murder and felony-firearm and sentenced to 35 to 125 years for second-degree murder, an increase from what he received at his first sentencing. The trial court denied his motion for a second new trial. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court’s instruction on deadly-aggressor withdrawal was erroneous and effectively prevented the jury from acquitting him under a theory of defense of others. “Because an initial aggressor has no legal right to use deadly force to defend others, they remain subject to the common-law duty to retreat.” And there was evidence at trial for the jury to conclude defendant was the initial aggressor. The court also rejected his claim that the admission of several pieces of unduly prejudicial photographic and other acts evidence violated his right to a fair trial, and that his trial counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. “[A]ny prejudice resulting from the admission of more than one photograph was insufficient to change the verdict” The photos were duplicative, but did not portray him “as any more ‘ruthless and menacing’ than one” photo would have. And evidence that his friends pled guilty to crimes in connection with this case was more probative than prejudicial. In addition, “trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object . . . .” Finally, the court rejected his contention that his sentence was vindictive, noting a “changed guidelines range counsels against a finding of vindictiveness.” However, it found he was entitled to resentencing because the guidelines were not scored correctly. “[T]he trial court erred by assigning 10, rather than 5, points to PRV 2 and by assigning 25, rather than zero, points to OV 13.” When properly calculated, his “total PRV score should have been 25 points, and his total OV score should have been 90 points. With these scores, [he] still would have been scored at PRV Level D, but he would have been scored at OV Level II (as opposed to OV Level III).” As such, his minimum “guidelines range would have changed. Because [his] sentence is based on an inaccurate calculation of the sentencing guidelines range and, therefore, does not conform to the law, [he] is entitled to resentencing.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.
Motion for judgment of acquittal (JOA); FedRCP 29; Sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction of conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion; 18 USC §§ 1591 & 1594(c); Sentencing; Enhancement for a “vulnerable victim” (USSG § 3A1.1(b)(1)); Enhancement for the use of a computer (§ 2G1.3(b)(3)(B))
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Aldridge’s conviction for conspiracy to sex traffic an adult where the injuries to the victim supported the claim that Aldridge voluntarily joined a conspiracy to coerce his girlfriend (K) into prostituting herself to support their drug habit. Aldridge argued the district court erred by denying his motion for JOA on the conspiracy charge where there was insufficient evidence to support it. He was convicted of conspiring with another individual (P) to sex traffic K. The government argued that K was “coerced” where P supplied she and Aldridge with drugs until they were deeply in debt, and then he cut them off, demanding that K pay through “sexual favors.” The issue was whether the conspiracy charge could be applied to Aldridge where both his and K’s opiate addictions were exploited. The court held that, in this case, there was sufficient evidence that “Aldridge voluntarily joined the conspiracy with the intent to further its goal of coercing” K. The court noted that K “had marks on her body and suffered permanent hearing loss as a result of [P’s] physical abuse and threats of violence.” She was living with Aldridge at the time, “they were in a romantic relationship and shared a bed.” The court further noted that P “left his guns in the open where Aldridge could see them whenever Aldridge was in [P’s] home.” It concluded that from “this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Aldridge knew that [P] was threatening or harming” K. The court also upheld the district court’s application of the “vulnerable victim” sentencing enhancement where K’s “physical and mental conditions, as well as her financial dependence on Aldridge, place her squarely within the vulnerable-victim category.” It also upheld the application of the two-level enhancement under § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), finding there was sufficient evidence that “Aldridge used a computer to ‘entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with’ each of” K’s daughters. The court rejected his arguments that the enhancement did not apply “because he did not communicate directly with a minor” or someone exercising supervising control over the minor to facilitate the minor’s travel to engage in sexual conduct. While this would be correct under § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A), the district court applied § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). The court added that any error in applying the enhancements would be harmless where Aldridge would still have been “subject to the same guidelines range of life.” Affirmed.
Motions for judgments of acquittal (JOA); Wire fraud; Double jeopardy; Whether the government “goaded” defendant into requesting a mistrial; Waiver; Whether the district court should have granted a mistrial with prejudice; Whether the government “constructively amended” the indictment; Whether there was a “material variance”; Denial of a motion for a new trial; FedRCrimP 33
In these consolidated appeals, the court reversed the district court’s grant of JOA for defendant-Robinson on one of her convictions for wire fraud related to a government grant. It affirmed the denial of JOA on the remaining counts and the denial of a mistrial with prejudice and motion for a new trial. Robinson was the founder and director of a for-profit LLC. A jury convicted her of four counts of wire fraud arising from her administration of a federal grant, which included “multiple discrepancies” in Annual Performance Reports (APRs). After her convictions, she moved for JOA on all counts. The district court granted it on one count, which the government appealed. Robinson appealed the denial of JOA on the remaining two counts, as well as the denial of her motions for a mistrial and for a new trial. The court first addressed the grant of Robinson’s post-verdict motion for JOA on Count 19. The government argued that a reasonable juror could find that “Robinson’s submission of the false 2017–2018 APR constituted a course of conduct intended to deprive the government of money[,]” and that the government had established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that the government showed the necessary “scheme to defraud” where it “proved that the 2017-2018 APR contained false representations.” It also established that the misrepresentations were material, and that she intended to deprive the government of money. The court held that the JOA was improperly granted. Robinson argued that the district court erred by denying her a mistrial with prejudice based on her claims that the government prosecuted her “in bad faith” where the indictment contained several counts that it could not prove. She also alleged that the government tried “to goad her into requesting a mistrial.” The court found that even if Robinson did not waive her argument for a mistrial, “the district court did not err by failing to grant a mistrial with prejudice” where she did not show that “the government acted with ill will.” The court also rejected her claims that the district court erred by not granting JOA on the other two wire fraud counts, and that the government “constructively amended” the indictment or it was subject to a material variance. The grant of a new trial was not warranted. Remanded.
Removal of a child from the parents’ home; Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b); MCR 3.965(B); In re Ferranti; Pretrial placement of the child; MCL 712A.13(a)(9); MCR 3.965(C)(2); In re Benavides; In re Williams
The court held that the trial court did not err by removing respondents-parents’ child (KK) from their home. The trial court authorized the DHHS’s petition and ordered that KK be taken into protective custody “because respondents ‘continue to maintain a toxic, caustic relationship by engaging in near constant arguments in the presence of [KK]’ that involved screaming, shouting, accusations, profanity, hysteria, and inappropriate emotional behavior.” On appeal, the court examined the factors for placement of a child and rejected respondents’ argument that the trial court erred by removing KK from their home. As to factor (a), “[g]iven respondent-mother’s behavior, combined with the marks on KK and the fact that respondent-father was not suspected to be the perpetrator of the abuse,” the trial court did not err by finding KK would be at substantial risk of harm in her care. “With regard to [f]actor (b), there had been numerous safety plans in place, but they did not adequately safeguard KK.” As to factor (c), the trial court properly “delineated on the record and in its order the reasons why it was contrary to KK’s welfare to remain in the home.” With regard to factor (d), “there was evidence that respondents failed to benefit from services, despite some periods of progress.” Finally, although “the trial court failed to make explicit findings regarding [f]actor (e), reversal is not required because it would not be ‘inconsistent with substantial justice’ to permit the order to stand.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (g); Children’s best interests
Holding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under §§ (c)(i) and (g), and that it was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondents’ parental rights. They both argued “that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of statutory grounds for termination.” The court disagreed. As to § (c)(i), it noted that at the start of the case, “respondent-father and respondent-mother lacked suitable housing, and the same remained true at the time of the termination hearing.” Further, the father agreed during the proceedings “to obtain some form of long-term employment because a lack of food led to the children’s malnourishment as well as their food-binging and hoarding behaviors. [He] claimed to have applied for numerous jobs through an employment agency, but when the foster-care worker checked, she found that he applied for” four jobs over a two-month period and he lacked “the qualifications for any of them. [He] worked at four different jobs” while the case was pending but the longest he held one was three weeks. The mother “claimed that she worked in the past but that she needed to receive disability income because she had low iron and mental-health problems.” However, she “testified at the termination hearing that she did not remember ever receiving a doctor’s diagnosis of a physical problem that prevented her from working. Possibly for that reason, [she] was denied disability income several times in the past, and she received another denial on the first day of the termination hearing. Therefore, by the termination hearing, neither respondent had a source of income or other resources to support themselves, much less a family of six people.” As to the continued existence of the conditions leading to the adjudication, “respondents continued to neglect or ignore the children’s emotional, physical and educational needs.” In addition, the court found “there was no reasonable likelihood, given that this was [the] mother’s second time being involved with services and facing the termination of parental rights, that they would be rectified within a reasonable time given” the children’s young ages. The court also held that the DHHS showed by a preponderance of evidence that terminating respondents’ rights was in the children’s best interests.
Child's best interests; Relative placement
Holding that the trial court did explore relative placement with respondent-mother’s father (L) and did not clearly err by finding that guardianship or relative placement with L was not in the child’s (CSJ) best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. Respondents stipulated to statutory grounds for termination under §§ (c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j). The issue was “whether the trial court clearly erred by failing to adequately considering [L] for a relative placement of CSJ, and finding guardianship with [L] was not in CSJ’s best interests.” The court found that it did not clearly err. The record was “clear DHHS met its statutory duty to explore relative placement with [L], but determined that he was ineligible, in part due to his noncompliance. No statutory violation occurred.” Respondents contended that the trial court erred when it found that relative placement or guardianship with L was not in CSJ’s best interests. The court disagreed. CSJ was not placed with L “at the time of termination because [L] did not complete the required paperwork or follow up with DHHS regarding his availability, despite several attempts by DHHS to obtain this information.” The court held that because CSJ was not in relative placement with L “at the time of the termination, the trial court had no statutory obligation to consider” L for guardianship. “Moreover, the trial court explained its reasoning for declining relative placement, noting that its primary concerns with [L] were that he was not in CSJ’s life until recently and did not appear bonded with CSJ. The trial court also expressed concern with [L’s] ability to provide the care and stability CSJ required.” Thus, the trial court did not “err by finding that guardianship or relative placement with [L] was not in CSJ’s best interests.”