Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Declaratory action regarding a lease; “Shall”; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3)
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for plaintiff-tenant and denying summary disposition for defendant-landlord. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment regarding its lease with defendant. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. On appeal, the court first found that the Second Amendment of the lease “unambiguously indicated that the $3,000 rate [for utilities] ‘shall continue’ until either the expansion was completed or defendant separated the utilities.” It noted that the word “shall” conveys “mandatory language.” Moreover, as to “the increased-rent schedule, the lease made clear that the schedule would only become applicable if the expansion was completed or the utility issue was addressed (added in the Second Amendment). This aspect of the lease—i.e., that the schedule would not apply unless triggered by the satisfaction of a condition—remained unaltered by the parties’ amendments. Because it was not disputed that neither condition had been satisfied, the trial court properly ruled that the Second Amendment’s monthly rate applied, including to the option term.” The court next found that although defendant claimed “the Second Amendment did not mention the option term, neither did the First Amendment amend the entire lease.” Likewise, it was “not necessary for this Second Amendment to address every aspect of the First Amendment or original lease to be clear. Even if there was an inconsistency in the amendments, the parties agreed in the Second Amendment that the terms of the Second Amendment would control.” Further, the “contract terms were unambiguous, and, accordingly, it would not have been permissible for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.” Finally, because defendant “did not demonstrate that the trial court made a palpable error or that a different disposition must result . . . the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s” motion for reconsideration. Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Alleged failure to raise a valid legal defense; Failure to raise challenges based on defendant being under the influence of marijuana when he made police statements & consented to the search of his phone; Voluntariness of a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights; People v Cipriano; Failure to investigate & present mitigating evidence at sentencing
Rejecting defendant’s multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed his convictions of capturing/distributing the image of an unclothed person, using a computer to commit a crime, and eavesdropping-installing a device. He first asserted that “defense counsel failed to present a legally valid defense because his theory consisted of the incorrect premise that a phone is not a computer. Defense counsel, however, raised the lack of direct evidence of defendant taking the photographs and videos in his opening statement, cross-examinations, motion for a directed verdict, and in closing.” The court concluded that this provided “an objectively reasonable defense. Therefore, even if defense counsel’s argument about the phone not constituting a computer was legally invalid, defendant” failed to show that “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that defendant was prejudiced.” He next contended that defense “counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his statements made, and his consent to search his phone given, while he was under the influence of marijuana.” But the court found that the “totality of the circumstances indicates that defendant’s statements in the first interview were voluntarily made” as well as “knowingly and intelligently made.” It determined that despite his “marijuana use, defendant appeared capable of understanding and agreeing to the waiver of his Miranda rights.” He specifically challenged “his statement identifying a video on his phone as being of his ex-girlfriend rather than of the victim, showing he knew that the images were on his phone.” However, he made that “statement in his second interview, which took place a day after he was arrested. Defendant has not demonstrated how officer’s questioning the first day coerced [his] statements on the second day, nor that [he] would be incapacitated by using marijuana the day before.” As to his consent to search his phone, the totality of the circumstances established that it was valid. And once the detective found photos and videos on the “phone, he stopped the search and obtained a search warrant. Because officers first obtained valid consent to search and then a search warrant, a motion by trial counsel to exclude the videos would have been futile, and trial counsel was not ineffective.”
Motion for clarification of a judgment of divorce (JOD)
Holding that the trial court erred when it granted defendant-ex-husband’s motion for clarification of the JOD, the court vacated the trial court’s 7/20/22 order and remanded for further proceedings. The trial court did not merely clarify the terms of the JOD “but changed its previous ruling, which impacted the parties’ substantive rights. There was no ambiguity in the [JOD]—it plainly provides that Plaintiff[-ex-wife] was ‘awarded fifty (50%) of the proceeds from the personal injury lawsuit of Defendant stemming from a motor vehicle accident.’ Rather than clarifying this provision, the trial court substantively modified it by limiting it to only past lost wages up to the date the [JOD] was entered. Additionally, as the trial court rightly acknowledged, this issue was not fully litigated at the time of trial. The result of this failure, though, was that the trial court could not look to its previous findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine how [its] judgment intended to address this issue.” This in turn supported that the trial “court was not merely clarifying its judgment but substantively modifying it. For these reasons, the trial court could not consider defendant’s request to modify the [JOD] as a request for clarification, and [it] erred by purporting to ‘clarify’ the [JOD] by modifying it in a way that changed the substantive rights of the parties.” The court noted that the “trial court could only grant the substantive relief requested by defendant if” he established he was entitled “to that relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f).”
Action seeking PIP benefits under MCL 500.3107(1)(a); Allowable expenses; Douglas v Allstate Ins Co; Whether an expense is “incurred”; Proudfoot v State Farm Mut Ins Co; Comparing Shanafelt v Allstate Ins Co & Bombalski v Auto Club Ins Ass’n; Detroit Medical Center Sinai-Grace Hospital (DMC)
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-insurer’s motion for partial summary disposition of plaintiff’s action seeking no-fault benefits after a car crash. The parties were able to resolve all of their differences except for whether defendant was obligated to pay PIP benefits for the billed cost of plaintiff’s treatment at DMC from 12/5/19 to 12/8/19. On that issue, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant. On appeal, the court noted that “the evidence submitted by the parties leads to one conclusion: that DMC accepted Medicaid’s payment as satisfaction of” plaintiff’s medical bill. Defendant “submitted evidence showing that, after DMC accepted Medicaid’s payment, [it] reduced the amount [plaintiff] was required to pay on her bill to $0.” In response she “failed to submit evidence creating a question of fact whether Medicaid’s payment to DMC satisfied [her] liability to DMC. Without evidence that [she] remains liable to DMC for any amount in excess of what Medicaid paid,” defendant was correct that the only charges she “incurred” for services provided at DMC between 12/5/19 and 12/8/19 was the amount paid by Medicaid. As such, defendant is “only responsible for paying that amount under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).” Ultimately, there was “no question of fact that [plaintiff] did not ‘incur’ allowable expenses beyond what Medicaid paid, and [defendant] is only responsible for paying that amount at this time.” The court expressly declined “to reach the issue of whether it would hypothetically be legal for DMC to collect additional payment from [plaintiff] beyond what Medicaid paid because there is no evidence that DMC has done that or is planning to do so in this case.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court, but on different grounds.
Fraudulent misrepresentation; Bergen v Baker; Principle that a party opposing a motion for summary disposition must present more than conjecture & speculation; Cloverleaf Car Co v Phillips Petroleum Co
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Plaintiffs purchased a property and then sued defendants for the condition of the property. On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court’s ruling. It noted that plaintiffs claimed there were material questions of fact that precluded summary disposition, but they “presented no evidence to show that any defendant made any false representation. After defendants moved for summary disposition, demonstrating that there was no genuine question of material fact, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Plaintiffs provided nothing to the trial court to establish any question of fact.” Although they “alleged that the property had been condemned at one point and that [it] had an actual value of $20,000, they failed to support these assertions with any evidence. The only evidence related to the property’s value was the appraisal estimating the value at $200,000.” Likewise, on appeal, “plaintiffs cursorily assert that there are material questions, without specifying what evidence there is to create such questions.” Affirmed.
Premises liability; Licensee; Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship; Distinguishing Kendzorek v Guardian Angel Catholic Parish; Duty owed to licensees; Sanders v Perfecting Church; Life of Purpose Christian Church (LOP)
Holding that plaintiff was a licensee and that defendants met their duty of care, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants in this premises liability case. He entered the property to donate food to a food pantry set up in a shed. After placing his food on the shelves, he slipped on a patch of ice when he turned to leave and fell. The court first found that the trial court did not err in ruling that he was a licensee. Defendant-Bernadette’s Faith in Action “was a nonprofit organization that held open its premises to members of the public to take food or clothing from the pantry or leave voluntary donations of food or other items. [It] did not receive a commercial advantage from the donations—members of the public could take food and clothing from the shed as needed, free of charge. It follows that, by inviting people to enter its property to donate to the pantry, Bernadette’s did not open its premises for commercial activity, so plaintiff was not an invitee.” Given that it “did not open its premises to receive a commercial benefit, [he] was a licensee.” While he cited Kendzorek, the court found this case distinguishable “because Bernadette’s did not hold open its property to receive a commercial benefit. Rather, [it] held open its premises for visitors to make voluntary donations, which does not constitute commercial activity.” The court also held that the trial court did not err in ruling that defendants met their duty of care. As to defendant-LOP (the other owner of the property), nothing indicated it “had actual knowledge of, or reason to know about, the ice in the shed—no one complained about ice inside the shed, no one reported that they slipped on ice before plaintiff’s fall, and there is no evidence that LOP had knowledge of water on the shed’s floor. LOP’s lack of knowledge is unsurprising given the evidence that LOP was not involved with the food pantry or shed.” As to Bernadette’s, it “also had no reason to know about the ice before plaintiff’s fall.” One of its owners (D) “inspected the shed the day after plaintiff’s fall and concluded that the ice formed after a pile of snow near the shed melted, leaked underneath the shed, and refroze overnight.” The evidence showed “that Bernadette’s did not have a reason to believe there was a gap under the sides of the shed that would allow water to pool underneath it.” The court also noted that it “had a heat lamp inside the shed that made it less likely” ice would form inside.
Children’s removal from a parent’s care; Placing a child in foster care; MCL 712A.13a(9); In re Benavides; Hearsay; MCR 3.695(C)(3); Reasonable efforts to prevent removal
The court held that the trial court did not err in finding “it was contrary to the children’s welfare to remain in the home” and in removing them from respondent-mother’s care. The court stated that it was not holding it against the mother “that she was a victim of domestic violence, nor does it appear that the trial court solely made its contrary-to-the-welfare findings on that basis.” It concluded that it “was not improper for the trial court to consider the ongoing nature of the domestic violence, and that [the] mother had not been effective at preventing the abuse from impacting the children, including [one child] being assaulted during a recent incident.” It further found that “the trial court properly considered the ongoing issues with the home conditions, including descriptions that the house was ‘a hoarding situation’ and ‘fire hazard.’” While both respondents argued “there was no evidence that the same home conditions existed at the time of the preliminary hearing, [the] mother requested additional time to clean the home before the DHHS completed a home assessment, indicating that the conditions persisted. Respondent-father” asserted that the mother “‘initiated a diligent effort to alleviate the unsatisfactory conditions,’ but the DHHS had not been able to witness that.” In addition, he admitted on appeal that she “‘was injured by’ [him], resulting in her being in a wheelchair, which contributed to the housing conditions.” As to their claim “there was no longer a threat of domestic violence because [the] father no longer lived in the home, there was evidence that [he] had already committed domestic violence against [the] mother by entering the home uninvited. Accordingly, there is a reasonable likelihood that he could return to the home and engage in additional acts of violence against” her or the children. As to his assertion that the trial court relied on hearsay within hearsay, MCR 3.695(C)(3) provides that a “trial court may make its contrary-to-the-welfare findings ‘on the basis of hearsay evidence that possesses adequate indicia of trustworthiness.’” The court found that the trial court here “relied on reliable information. The petition and testimony at the hearing showed an extensive history between respondents and the DHHS.” The record also showed “the DHHS made reasonable efforts before removal[.]” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Child’s best interests; Parent agency agreement (PAA); Guardian ad litem (GAL)
Concluding that § (c)(i) existed and that the trial court did not clearly err by holding that it was in the child's (HIRW) best interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights, the court affirmed. She asserted she had complied with her PAA, the trial “court failed to consider that her medication caused her issues prior to 2023, and the GAL mischaracterized facts.” It was “undisputed that more than 182 days have elapsed since the initial dispositional order in this case.” The initial dispositional order was entered on 3/15/22. The hearing to terminate her parental rights was held on 3/13/24, and 3/20/24. The order terminating her rights was entered on 4/19/24. The domestic violence and relationship between respondent and her then-boyfriend, C, “that led to the initial removal of HIRW continued to exist, and it was unlikely to be rectified within a reasonable amount of time as respondent maintained a relationship with [C] at every possible opportunity.” Respondent argued “that the trial court erred in finding statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights because she complied with her” PAA. However, respondent also admitted “that she had not complied with certain terms of the agreement that required her to address the impact of her relationship with [C], including: discontinue contact with non supportive partners that put herself and HIRW at risk of substantial harm and comply with the terms of her PPO against” C. Respondent argued “that she was no longer romantically involved with [C] but instead was embracing the principles of sober living of forgiveness and making amends and was trying to help him improve his life. Her reasoning for continuing to choose [C] over HIRW is irrelevant, however.” Respondent’s PAA “required that she not have contact with [C], but she continually violated that order as well as the PPOs that she sought out against him following domestic-violence incidents. Respondent gave no indication at trial that she was taking steps to remove [C] from her life. Though her relationship with [C] was discussed in respondent’s therapy, respondent did not appear to change how she interacted with him. Viewing respondent’s behavior in its totality, she had not benefited from her” PAA. She also argued “that her prescribed Lexapro negatively impacted her behavior prior to her [4/23] voluntary hospitalization and that the trial court failed to account for this. However, respondent was prescribed a new medication following her hospitalization and continued to involve herself in [C’s] life after her medication had changed, including obtaining a guardianship over him in” 5/23. In addition, on her 6/27/23 PPO application against C, “she listed an incident that occurred between them in” 5/23. Respondent also alleged “that the GAL made inaccurate factual statements that prejudiced” her. The “trial court did not mischaracterize any of these facts in its opinion terminating [her] parental rights.” Thus, it “did not clearly err in finding that the volatile relationship between respondent and [C] that led to the adjudication had not meaningfully changed and was unlikely to do so within a reasonable amount of time given that HIRW was 10 months old when first removed from respondent’s care but was three at the time of termination.”