Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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The jurisdiction of the circuit courts & the Court of Claims; Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13; The Revised Judicature Act (MCL 600.101 et seq.); MCL 600.605; Prime Time Int’l Distrib., Inc. v. Department of Treasury; The Court of Claims Act (MCL 600.6401 et seq.); MCL 600.6419; Claim for monetary relief against a university; Fox v. Board of Regents of Univ. of MI; Attica Hydraulic Exch. v. Seslar; MCL 500.3112; Miller v. Citizens Ins. Co.; Principle that a court may not make an adjudication affecting the rights of a person or entity not a party to the case; Shouneyia v. Shouneyia; Spurling v. Battista; University of Michigan (U of M)
The court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter orders affecting appellant-Regents of the U of M because the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction as to claims for monetary relief against it. Thus, the court vacated the circuit court’s orders granting plaintiff’s motion to enforce a charging lien and compel the remittance of attorney fees to his counsel and denying relief from judgment and/or a stay of enforcement. Plaintiff was injured in an auto accident and treated for his injuries “by a number of medical providers, including U of M.” He sued his no-fault insurer, defendant-Protective, for no-fault benefits. “Protective apparently paid the bills for services submitted by U of M within a short time after the claims” for them were submitted. Plaintiff contended that U of M received payment due to his counsel’s efforts and thus, argued “that his counsel was entitled to 1/3 of the amount recovered for U of M.” Agreeing, the circuit court “ordered U of M to remit attorney fees in the amount of $14,708.08 to plaintiff’s attorney.” On appeal, the court determined that his claim was “essentially one for monetary relief.” It noted that the Michigan Supreme Court ruled long ago “that circuit courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain claims against” U of M’s governing body given that such jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Claims by statute. Thus, “the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s demand for attorney fees from U of M and the circuit court erred when it entered the orders that affected U of M’s rights in this case.” As to plaintiff’s reliance on Attica and MCL 500.3112, Attica was decided before the Court of Claims Act was amended. The amended “Act vested the Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction for claims against a state agency involving a demand for monetary relief.” The prior Act did not contain the same language. The court held that an “attorney fee award is a demand for monetary relief and is thus now subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.” Plaintiff’s argument as to MCL 500.3112 did not account for the Supreme Court’s order in Miller, where it stated that the statute “does not encompass an award of attorney fees to an insured’s counsel.” Finally, the court noted that the circuit court did not have “the authority to enter orders and judgments affecting appellant’s rights because appellant was not a party in this case.”
Property interest; Whether the property was removed from the plaintiff’s bankruptcy estate by exemption &/or abandonment; 11 USC § 541(a)(1); Owen v. Owen; Abandonment defined; § 554; Szyszlo v. Akowitz
The court held that because the undisputed record evidence supported that plaintiff-White “did not have a property interest in the crops, fencing, and fish on the [property], the trial court did not err by granting” the defendants-Knapps summary disposition. White purchased the real property in 1990. He later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which was converted to Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court ordered the bankruptcy trustee to sell the property. The trustee entered into a purchase agreement with the Knapps, and the bankruptcy court confirmed the sale. White argued that the crops, fencing, and fish in the pond at the property were not part of the bankruptcy estate and thus, were not transferred to the Knapps pursuant to the trustee’s deed. White claimed “that he retained a legal interest in the property because he claimed statutory exemptions and because the trustee abandoned the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the property.” The record did not support his claim. The property was transferred to the Knapps on 8/5/15. The bankruptcy court ruled that White was entitled to certain exemptions for property unrelated to the appeal, and “specifically held that White was not entitled to an exemption ‘as to the hay.’” A bankruptcy court order “further held that ‘to the extent property . . . is owned by a third party or a non-debtor entity, the property shall be administered by the trustee.’” In a later order, it explicitly held that the property had already been sold and was “not abandoned and [would] continue to be administered by the Trustee.” It subsequently issued another order that denied White’s request for various exemptions, “including any exemption ‘for hay, crops, and pasture.’” Thus, the record did “not support that the crops, fencing, and fish were abandoned or excluded from the bankruptcy estate.” Also, the court held that his argument was not supported by the plain language of the bankruptcy court’s order and the trustee’s deed. There was “no evidence in the record that the parties agreed that White would retain rights in any attributes of the subject property, and the bankruptcy court expressly denied White’s request or ‘any exemption for hay, crops, and pasture’” at the property.
Breach of an employment contract; Whether the cumulative overpayment recognized in an agreement continued to grow due to overpayments in successive years or whether that amount was fixed; Interpreting contract language according to its plain & ordinary meaning; Bank of Am., NA v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.; Calculation of damages; Chelsea Inv. Group, LLC v. Chelsea; Offsetting of severance from a damages award; Failure to preserve an argument; Detroit Leasing Co. v. Detroit; Failure to support an argument; Mitcham v. Detroit
Holding that the trial court correctly interpreted the contract and did not clearly err in its determination of damages, the court affirmed. Plaintiff previously employed defendant, who signed an employment agreement in 2013 addressing his “negative equity position within the company.” It provided that he had a “cumulative overpayment in compensation from [plaintiff] in the amount of $200,000.” After he resigned in 2015, plaintiff demanded that he “pay $317,145.20, in what plaintiff claimed was negative equity owed by defendant under the 2013 agreement.” Defendant refused to pay, resulting in plaintiff suing him for breach of contract. The primary issue was whether the $200,000 cumulative overpayment recognized in the parties “agreement continued to grow to the extent there were overpayments in successive years, or whether that amount was fixed.” Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred when it determined “that the cumulative overpayment that defendant was required to repay was fixed at $200,000.” The court disagreed. The agreement “identified a $200,000 cumulative overpayment representing defendant’s historical negative equity.” The trial court did not err when it held “that under the terms of the agreement, that amount did not rise on the basis of overpayments in successive years” and the court affirmed its conclusion. “Plaintiff had the contractual right to reduce defendant’s salary based on later yearly overpayments but did not do so until July 2015, leading the trial court to observe that ‘[t]he problem for which Plaintiff now complains is of its own making and the result of its own inaction.’”
Expert testimony about a “confirmed” diagnosis of “suspected pediatric sexual abuse” & that the witness believed the complainant; People v. Thorpe; People v. Smith; People v. Peterson; Bolstering witness testimony; People v. Dobek; Whether the error was harmless; People v. Lukity; People v. Denson
Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prosecution expert’s (Dr. S) testimony about “her diagnosis of ‘confirmed’ ‘suspected pediatric sexual abuse’ and her statement that she believed” the complainant (A), and that the error was not harmless, the court reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. S testified that although her exam “and testing had not revealed any physical evidence of abuse, she had nevertheless ‘confirmed’ a diagnosis of ‘suspected pediatric sexual abuse’ on the basis of” A’s reported medical history. This “was extremely similar to the testimony” S gave in Harbison. Further, here she “testified outright” that she believed A, which violated “long-standing general principles against bolstering witness testimony as well as the specific principles applicable to treating physician experts in sexual abuse cases.” Her testimony here was almost “indistinguishable from her testimony as prohibited” in Thorpe, and if anything her “testimony in this case was even more clearly inadmissible . . . .” The court also concluded that under Thorpe, the error was not harmless. As in that case, this “was basically a credibility contest between defendant and [A]. Defendant’s partial acquittal suggests that the jury did not fully believe” A’s testimony. Further, S’s “improper testimony was not an isolated event. The prosecution referred to [her] testimony during closing arguments, emphasized her credentials, and stated that ‘[h]er medical findings were consistent with pediatric sexual abuse.’” It referred to her testimony again during rebuttal argument, and emphasized that S “had ‘worked for so many years . . . with victims of sexual assault.’ The jury was aware that [S] was a medical doctor who specialized in the treatment of abused children and who had been qualified as an expert in the field of medical evaluation of child sexual and physical abuse.” While the prosecution argued that other witnesses’ testimony about A’s and defendant’s behavior after she revealed the abuse supported A’s “credibility and harmed defendant’s, the potential impact of [S’s] improper expert testimony was such that, as in Thorpe, it ‘very likely bolstered’” A’s credibility and influenced the verdict. Thus, the integrity of defendant’s trial was seriously affected. The court concluded that the untainted evidence was not sufficient to independently support his convictions.
Constitutional right to present a defense; People v. Hayes; People v. Arenda; People v. Unger; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Exclusion of evidence defendant previously filed a civil suit against two of the investigating detectives; Harmless error; People v. Burns; People v. Lukity; Admission of other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); People v. Martzke; People v. Knox; People v. Starr; People v. Watson; MRE 403’s balancing test; People v. Cameron; Felon in possession (FIP)
The court held that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that defendant previously filed a civil suit against two of the investigating detectives and in failing to engage in MRE 403’s balancing test as to other acts evidence. But it concluded that the errors were not outcome determinative in light of the independent evidence that overwhelmingly established his guilt. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of possession with intent to deliver 50 or more but less than 450 grams of heroin, possession with intent to deliver 450 or more but less than 1,000 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver marijuana, FIP of a firearm, FIP of ammunition, and felony-firearm. The court concluded that the “fact that the detectives assaulted defendant some years previously, in an unrelated incident, and that defendant brought a civil lawsuit against them, could make it more probable than not that the detectives could be biased against” him, at least to the extent they were motivated to watch him more closely “for potential drug-trafficking activities. Where the detectives had been named in an assault lawsuit concerning defendant and settled the matter with him could lead to their predisposition against defendant and make him the target of investigation and surveillance to which he might not otherwise have been subjected. Allowing the defense to elicit testimony and otherwise introduce evidence concerning the civil lawsuit would not, as the trial court stated, lead to a ‘trial within a trial.’ Rather, the defense would simply be able to question the detectives” about any potential bias against defendant. Nonetheless, the court found the error harmless. When he was taken into police custody, defendant “had keys on his person that provided access to both the house and to an inoperable car in the garage. Inside the car, and on the premises, officers found more than 900 grams of cocaine, more than 100 grams of heroin, nearly 400 grams of marijuana, drug-packaging materials, firearms, ammunition, and numerous items bearing defendant’s name and connecting him to the premises. Given the quantity of narcotics and the packaging materials found, there was significant evidence indicating” he was guilty of the charged crimes. Evidence about his prior lawsuit would not have negated the fact that he “was found with keys to the car and home in which a significant quantity of drugs and drug-trafficking materials were found.”
Sentencing; Scoring of OV 13; “Continuing pattern of criminal behavior”; MCL 777.43(1); Whether the offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity; MCL 777.43(1)(d); Consideration of all crimes within a 5-year period; MCL 777.43(2)(a); People v. Francisco; People v. Nix; Scoring of OV 19; Interference with the administration of justice; MCL 777.49(c); People v. Hershey; Proportionality; Principle that the court must affirm a within-guidelines sentence; MCL 769.34(10); People v. Schrauben; Court costs; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); People v. Cameron
Holding that there were no errors in sentencing, the court affirmed defendant’s sentence. He was convicted of CSC III for engaging in sexual intercourse with the 15-year-old victim, who purportedly had developmental issues and functioned on the level of an 8-year-old child, and who became pregnant and gave birth to a child. The trial court sentenced him to 8½ to 15 years. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by scoring 10 points for OVs 13 and 19. As to OV 13, it found that “the trial court properly considered defendant’s subsequent convictions when it determined [he] engaged in a pattern of felonious conduct involving three crimes against a person or property in a five-year period that encompassed the sentencing offense.” As to OV 19, it found that because he “fled the jurisdiction, took overt measures to avoid speaking to law enforcement, and otherwise misled law enforcement by providing an invalid contact number,” the trial court properly assessed 10 points. The court also rejected his claim that his sentence violated the principle of proportionality, noting it was required to affirm his within-guidelines sentence. Finally, it rejected his contention that the court costs imposed were unconstitutional, noting it was bound by Cameron.
Constitutional right to present a defense; People v. King; Exclusion of expert testimony offered to support an involuntary intoxication defense; People v. Caulley; Relevant evidence; MRE 401 & 402; The no longer viable diminished capacity defense; People v. Carpenter; People v. Yost; Denial of request for an involuntary intoxication defense jury instruction; People v. Dobek; People v. Crawford; Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH); Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant’s proposed expert testimony because it was not relevant to his involuntary intoxication defense and thus, he was not denied his constitutional right to present a defense. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a jury instruction on this defense given that the evidence did not support it. Thus, the court affirmed his AWIGBH, assault by strangulation, and unlawful imprisonment convictions and sentences. Defendant, who suffered from COPD, sought to have a critical pulmonary medicine physician (T) who treated him for the disease testify in support of his proposed involuntary intoxication defense. However, the court noted that T’s testimony did not support that defendant “had ingested intoxicating substances before the crimes were committed and that he was rendered temporarily insane as a result.” Instead, T testified that defendant’s “medical condition could cause confusion and could adversely affect his judgment.” Further, even assuming that the symptoms of his “COPD were analogous to an intoxicating substance, [T] explained that the symptoms were brought on by” defendant’s smoking and failing to use his oxygen machine. T’s testimony supported that defendant knew “he could suffer from mental deficiencies if he did not manage his condition given that, in 2015, he suffered from confusion as a result of his COPD.” Thus, T’s testimony did not support that defendant “was rendered temporarily insane after he unknowingly ingested an intoxicating substance or after he ingested a substance that he did not know to be an intoxicant.” Instead, at best, his testimony supported that defendant “could have lacked the ability to form the requisite intent to commit the charged crimes as a result of his medical condition. However, as the trial court concluded, such a theory would be akin to a diminished capacity defense, which is no longer a viable defense in Michigan.” As to the denial of the jury instruction, in addition to the fact T’s testimony did not support it, trial testimony supported that defendant “ingested marijuana and/or alcohol before the assaults occurred, and there was no evidence to support” that he did not do so knowingly.
Motion to withdraw a guilty plea; Alleged failure to comply with MCR 6.445(F); Principle that a defendant must file a motion to withdraw his or her guilty plea in the trial court or he or she is barred from raising the issue on appeal; MCR 6.310(D); People v. Armisted; People v. Pointer-Bey; Sentencing; Departure sentence; Proportionality; People v. Smith; People v. Dixon-Bey
Holding that the trial court erred by relying on uncharged and unverified conduct, which affected defendant’s substantial rights because it led to the revocation of his probation and the imposition of a significantly longer sentence, the court reversed the revocation and remanded for determination of whether, “only on the basis of charged and verified conduct, probation revocation is warranted.” He pled guilty to two counts of unarmed robbery and was sentenced to 270 days’ confinement in the county jail and 3 years’ probation for each conviction. He later pled guilty to violating his probation while in jail, which led to the revocation of his probation and a sentence of 36 to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his guilty plea for the probation violation must be vacated because the trial court failed to comply with MCR 6.445(F), noting he was barred from raising this argument under MCR 6.310(D). Because he “never filed a motion to withdraw his pleas in the trial court,” the court was precluded from reviewing the issue. However, it agreed with his claim that the trial court violated his due-process rights by relying on conduct that was not charged in the motions and affidavits for the probation violations in deciding to revoke his probation. “The only conduct that the trial court was permitted to consider was defendant’s altercation with [the second victim], which was the conduct to which [he] pleaded guilty as a violation of his probation.” However, the record indicated "that the trial court considered far more than the altercation . . . —defendant’s rule breaking, removal from an educational class, and obstruction of an officer’s duty—to revoke probation.” Finally, the court noted that, “[a]fter consideration of only the appropriate evidence, should the trial court find that a probation revocation and an upward departure sentence are still warranted, [it] should make sure to develop the record so that [the court] can properly determine whether the chosen sentence is reasonable and proportionate to the offense and the offender.”
Felon in possession (FIP) of a firearm; Whether the indictment failed to state that defendant knew he was a felon who was not permitted to carry a firearm; Rehaif v. United States; United States v. Cor-Bon Custom Bullet Co.; United States v. Martinez; United States v. Olive; United States v. Gatewood; Plain error review; United States v. Vonner; Molina-Martinez v. United States; United States v. Dominguez Benitez; United States v. Hobbs; Effect of the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on the “knowledge-of-status” element; United States v. Conley (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Balde (2d Cir.); United States v. Burghardt (1st Cir.); United States v. Miller (2d Cir.); United States v. Reed (11th Cir.); United States v. Hollingshed (8th Cir.); United States v. Benamor (9th Cir.); Sufficiency of the evidence to convict; Jackson v. Virginia; United States v. Ferguson; United States v. Blakeney
The court rejected defendant-Ward’s claim that he was entitled to relief under Rehaif on his FIP conviction where nothing suggested that he “was unable to present an adequate defense or was otherwise not put on notice of the crime that he was charged of committing.” Further, in an issue of first impression in this circuit, it held that the district court did not commit reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the “knowledge-of-status element” where there was clear evidence Ward knew he was a felon and no indication that the jurors’ decision would have been different had they received the instruction. Finally, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Ward first argued that his indictment failed to properly allege the crime charged because it did not allege that he knew he was a felon who was not entitled to possess a firearm. The court rejected his claim, noting that the purpose of the requirement that an indictment allege all of the elements of the charged offense is “‘to ensure that an accused is reasonably informed of the charge made against him so that he can prepare a defense.’” It held that Ward’s substantial rights were not affected. There was no evidence that he did not have adequate notice of the charged offense or that he was deprived of his ability to properly prepare his defense. Additionally, the court noted that even though Rehaif had yet to be decided, Ward could have challenged the indictment as did the defendant in Rehaif. It also rejected his argument that he was improperly convicted because the district court failed to instruct the jury on the knowledge-of-status element. It found no indication that, had the jury been so instructed, the outcome would have been different. The court noted that even though “‘the stipulation of a prior felony does not automatically establish knowledge of felony status, it is strongly suggestive of it.’” Also, there was more than sufficient evidence that the government could have provided as to his criminal record. The court then joined other circuits by holding that “where there is clear evidence in the record from which to infer that the defendant knew he was a felon, failure to instruct the jury does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights or the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.” Lastly, it held that there was sufficient evidence “for a rational juror to conclude that Ward had possessed a firearm on the date in question” and that he knew he was a felon when he did so. Affirmed.
Action seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for a trip & fall in a parking lot; MCL 500.3105(1); Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am.; Whether plaintiff was injured while entering into her vehicle; MCL 500.3106(1)(c); King v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.; Hunt v. Citizens Ins. Co.; McCaslin v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
The court held that because plaintiff had not yet begun entering into her vehicle when she fell, defendant-no-fault insurer was entitled to summary disposition. Plaintiff sought PIP benefits for injuries she sustained when she tripped and fell in a store parking lot. Defendant denied payment on the basis that plaintiff was not entering her vehicle at the time of the injury. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, finding a factual issue remained as to whether plaintiff was in the process of entering her vehicle at the time of her fall. Plaintiff “had not entered, or begun to enter, her vehicle. Indeed, she was merely preparing to enter her vehicle when she fell. After plaintiff placed her purchases on the front passenger seat of her car, plaintiff closed the driver’s side door and walked away. She did not start her car, or leave the door open. Plaintiff had not yet reached her car when she fell, and never touched her car after leaving to return the shopping cart. Clearly, plaintiff intended to enter into her vehicle, but intent to enter a vehicle is insufficient to warrant coverage under MCL 500.3106(1)(c).” Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in defendant’s favor.
Jurisdiction; In re Long; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Zeeland Farms Servs. v. JBL Enter., Inc.; People v. Perry; Child protective services (CPS)
Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in taking jurisdiction over the child (T), the court affirmed. The case arose out of allegations that respondent-father was aware that T was being sexually abused by her half-brother, J (who was six years older than T), and failed to protect her from the abuse. Respondent argued that the trial court clearly erred by exercising jurisdiction under MCL 712A.19(b)(1) and (2). In arguing that he was unaware of sexual contact, respondent relied heavily on the fact that a CPS investigation as to the incidents of sexual abuse that occurred when T was five years old was dismissed. Given the testimony, the dismissal of the investigation did not definitively establish that he was not aware of the abuse. Respondent argued that T provided inconsistent testimony on several matters. Respondent claimed that the journal entry proved that it was T’s mother, not him, who encouraged T to lie. He also pointed to inconsistencies on more ancillary matters such as how long J stayed at respondent’s home during the time at issue. However, the court generally defers "to a jury’s credibility determinations given their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.” The jury may have found that T “was not credible on some matters, while believing her testimony that she disclosed to respondent what [J] was doing to her.” Further, respondent overlooked that the jury was presented with evidence that did not reflect favorably on his credibility. In sum, there was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to find that respondent was aware of incidents of sexual abuse. Respondent argued that even if he was aware about the allegations of abuse, there was no evidence that he failed to protect T. Respondent asserted that after the incident occurred when T was five years old, he installed a lock on T’s door and established a house rule that boys were not allowed in T’s bedroom. Although T had “a lock on her bedroom door, she testified that respondent told her she was not allowed to lock it. Further, the house rule that boys were not allowed in [T’s] bedroom was insufficient to protect [T], because on two occasions, while visiting respondent, [J] entered [T’s] bedroom and began touching [T’s] legs and inner thighs.” Further, she testified J “would wait until respondent fell asleep and go into” her bedroom. More importantly, she testified that respondent was aware what J was doing, yet continued to allow J unsupervised accessed to her.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (i); In re Keillor; In re Ellis; In re Williams; In re Foster; Children’s best interests; In re Gonzales/Martinez; In re Medina; In re White; In re Mason; In re Moss Minors; In re Trejo Minors
Holding that § (c)(i) exited and termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed. The case arose when the youngest child, A, tested positive at birth for hydrocodone in late 2017. Respondent contended “that she demonstrated that she was making progress rectifying the conditions that were barriers to reunification. In the more than 14 months after the children’s removal, respondent failed to accomplish any meaningful change in the conditions that led to the trial court assuming jurisdiction of the minor children.” The conditions that led to the adjudication were her “substance abuse, lack of housing, lack of stable income, lack of parenting skills, mental health instability, and domestic violence with the children’s father.” The trial court found that she continued to communicate with the “father and lied to the foster care worker about those communications, suggesting that she had not benefitted from domestic violence counseling. Respondent continued to exhibit poor parenting skills, missing the children’s medical visits and making excuses such as needing to walk her dog or pay her bills. Respondent also was not receptive to the children’s trauma, blaming it on the DHHS.” The trial court observed that she “had not met with her housing program caseworker and was at risk of losing her housing, and had not obtained employment.” In sum, over "182 days had elapsed since the issuance of the initial disposition order and the conditions that led to the trial court assuming jurisdiction of the children persisted.”